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Summary 
The effect of budgetary participation on managers' performance and 
satisfaction has received a considerable amount of attention over the past three 
decades. Accounting literature has witnessed many contributions that attempted to 
check the nature of these two relationships and to investigate the variables which 
may have clear or hidden effects on them. 
Researchers went beyond accounting literature to study organisational and 
psychological theories and adopted some dimensions from each and tested these 
dimensions on those relationships. Scholars found different organisational variables 
(e. g. organisation size, environment uncertainty, technology, information asymmetry) 
and also behavioural. variables (e. g. locus of control, budget goals difficulty and 
clarity, motivation, slack) which affected the relationship between budgetary 
participation and both managers' performance and satisfaction. 
Culture has been also used as a possible contingent variable which may play a 
role in this conflicting area. Behavioural accounting research witnessed many efforts 
which investigated the effect of culture on budget-related behaviour. Nevertheless, 
the results were inconclusive. 
Prompted by the inconsistent results reported in the previous work, this study 
was designed to provide more insight for this area through three main purposes: 
0 Constructing an integrative model which consists of eighteen variables 
which have been frequently used in the previous work. 
0 Testing the proposed model using sample of managers from different 
cultures. 
0 Testing the proposed model using two analytical approaches 
"moderating and intervening". 
Twenty eight hypotheses were used to develop the proposed model. Some 
hypotheses have been replicated, whereas others have been developed because they 
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received little attention in the previous studies. UK and Saudi Arabia were chosen as 
sites to test the proposed model because they are culturally different. In Saudi Arabia 
two samples of managers Saudi (locals) and Arab (non-locals) were also used. The 
purpose of using two samples in Saudi Arabia was to see whether or not the results of 
the proposed model within the single country are different between locals and non- 
locals. 
The results of this study showed that both macro and micro level variables 
interact with budgetary participation affecting managers' performance and 
satisfaction. The results have highlighted the importance of using an integrative 
model as a way to reconcile the contradictory results reported in the previous work. 
With respect to the culture, the results provided evidence that budgetary control 
practices are different between UK and Saudi Arabia in some aspects, whereas no 
cultural differences were observed in others. For example the results showed that the 
effect environment uncertainty on budgetary participation, and the effect of budgetary 
participation on managers' satisfaction are culturally independent. The results of the 
proposed model showed that some relationships (e. g. the effect of leadership style on 
budget emphasis) are different between locals and non-locals within the single 
country. 
The results of this study also provided evidence that the contradictions in the 
previous work could be reconciled by using the appropriate analytical approach. 
Some hypotheses were supported using the moderating approach whereas others 
were supported using the intervening approach. Therefore, this study showed that 
these two approaches are complementary and both should be used either to support or 
reject a hypothesis. 
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1- Introduction and Research Aims 
1-1 A brief review on the development of this area 
The behavioural side of budgetary control has been seen as one of the most 
problematic issues in the accounting literature. This area has attracted the attention of 
researchers as it has either positive or negative impacts on implementing the objectives 
embodied in organisations' budgets. As long as budgets are set and run by people, the 
reactions of those people to what budget means to them should be considered. That is 
why more and more attention has been paid to this aspect. 
The traditional way of preparing budgets was called "imposed budgets", according 
to which, setting budgets was the responsibility of top management and the lower levels 
had to do their best to accomplish precisely the required job. Of course, such a way of 
working was resisted by employees, as they perceived themselves to be treated as 
machines where instructions were programmed. 
No one can tell accurately how the problems of using this imposed approach 
emerged. But much work in this area refers appreciatively to the early study of Argyris 
[ 1952] "The impact of budgets on people " who concluded from a field study conducted 
in four medium size manufacturing organisations, that budgeting could be related at 
least to four human relations problems. 
1. Budget pressure tends to unite the employees against management, and 
tends to place the factory supervisor under tension. 
2. The finance staff can obtain feelings of success only by finding fault with 
factory people. These feelings of failure among factory supervision lead 
to many human relations'problerns. 
3. The use of budgets as 'needlers' by top management tends to make the 
factory supervisors see only the problems of their own department. The 
supervisors are not concerned with other people. 's problems. They are not 
'plant-centred' in outlook. 
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4. Supervisors use budgets as way of expressing their own patterns of 
leadership. When these patterns result in people getting hurt, the budget, 
in itself a neutral thing, often gets blarned. 
The conclusions drawn by Argyris raised two questions for academics and 
professionals, which needed to be answered. The first was what are the results of such 
undesired side effects? The second how they could be avoided? The answer to the first 
question was, of course, low performance and satisfaction. The answer to the second 
question was believed to be involving managers in setting budget, which has been 
known until now as "budgetary participation7'. 
Argyris [1953] noticed that managers' participation was not in its real sense, on 
contrary it was "pseudo-participation" which aimed to put much pressure on workers 
(more details in p. 3.3). That is why Argyris stressed when participation is adopted, it 
should be real participation, otherwise it will lead to dysfunctional consequences. 
The next important work was that of Hofstede [1968] "the game of budgetary 
contror$ who studied budgetary participation and other behavioural aspects of 
budgeting. The results of this work will be discussed in some detail in the chapters of 
literature review. 
Much research has been conducted following Argyris and HoStede. Each piece of 
research tried to contribute by defining the dimensions of this problem. The basis on 
which all of researchers worked was the relationship between Budgetary participation 
and both j ob-related attitudes (such as job satisfaction) and job performance. The results 
of those research were often in conflict as budgetary participation did not contribute 
positively to either performance or attitudes in all circumstances, on the contrary, 
sometimes it had a negative impact on these two variables. 
Many researchers went beyond the accounting area, searching for either 
psychological (behavioural) or organisational variables which may affect these two 
relationships. The accounting literature witnessed a large amount of research 
contributing and adding new variables to reconcile the inconclusive results. 
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In the more recent literature attention has been paid to organisational variables as 
contingent factors. The structure of organisations are considered to be contingent on 
certain factors, and this approach has become known as the contingency theory of 
organisations. Technology, environment uncertainty, organisation size and diversity 
were considered as determinants of organisation structure. In turn, contingency theory 
has been applied to management accounting systems with regard to budgetary 
participation. Writers reported results of their empirical studies which supported their 
arguments that organisation size, decentralisation, environment uncertainty, technology 
affect the level to which managers should participate in budgetary process. In spite of 
this empirical evidence, there were some doubts that these variables would be universal. 
The results of some replicated studies uncovered the fact that these variables should be 
treated as situational rather than universal. 
Many writers have argued that, as long as people set budgets, attention should be 
paid to the behavioural side as the most suitable approach to the issue of budgetary 
participation. For example, budgetary slack "under estimation of budget figures" was 
investigated extensively in the literature as it has bad consequences on organisational 
resources and hence organisational efficiency. Many empirical studies, as will be 
discussed later, showed that managers used this phenomenon to protect themselves 
against uncertainty. Of course such behaviour sometimes increased their satisfaction, 
but at the same time it led to dysfunctional behaviour as well. That is why some 
researchers (i. e. Dunk 1993,1997] considered budgetary slack as a target "dependent 
variable" which, if top management knew how to deal with it would consequently lead 
to the optimal use of organisational resources. 
The way by which top management evaluate their subordinates was introduced as 
a variable which may affect employees' behaviour. Hopwood's [1972] evaluative styles 
emerged in the 1970s as an approach which may affect managers' feelings toward the 
company they belong to. One of these evaluative styles was what has been known as 
"budget emphasis", which Hopwood referred to as "budget constrained or budget profit 
styles". Hopwood's study received great interest by researchers, and the accounting 
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literature witnessed a flux of studies which used these styles to investigate their effect 
on employees' behaviour. 
Otley [ 1978] was one of the first scholars who highlighted the fact that there is no 
universal approach in this area. He extended the study of Hopwood to include 
performance, and concluded results which were contradictory to those of Hopwood. 
These contradictory results became a critical issue in behavioural accounting research as 
it will be shown in the next chapters. Each piece of research tried to add a dimension to 
this issue in order to highlight where the problem which might caused this contradiction 
lies I 
Many researchers used some organisational and behavioural variables to reconcile 
the results of both Hopwood and Otley. Environment uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, task difficulty and others were used as contingent variables. Finally, culture 
was also used as a possible contingent variable which may reconcile the results of 
Hopwood (USA) and Otley (UK). 
During the investigation of the causes of the contradictions between Hopwood and 
Otley, other researchers did not forget the original problem which is the relationship 
between budgetary participation and either performance or satisfaction. Some 
researchers adopted psychological variables such as locus of control as a contingent 
variable affecting these two relationships. A series studies by Brownell [1981,1982a] 
documented the effectiveness of this psychological variable on these relationships. 
Once Brownell's approach was introduced to the literature, many researchers 
adopted it to test its generalisability in different cultures and industries. Their results 
provided limited support to Brownell's conclusions as some of them supported his 
results, while others disagreed with it (more details in chapter three). Again those results 
confirmed the need for the contingency approach. 
Brownell left his approach for others either to support it or disagree with, and paid 
attention to other variables. He tried to reconcile the relationship between budgetary 
participation and performance using motivation as an intervening variable. He tested 
motivation in the context of the expectancy theory (Brownell & McIness [1986]). 
1.5 
Chapter one 
Although he tried to attract the attention to the importance of this variable, he failed to 
find a contingent relationship between budgetary participation and performance based 
on budget motivation. Others (Mia [1988]) replicated his study using different approach 
"moderating approach" and provided evidence that budget motivation has a contingent 
role. 
From 1990s onward the area of budgetary participation witnessed a large number 
of research projects. The direction of those researchers took two different approaches. 
First, replicating some of the previous works using either same or different 
methodologies (Frucot & Shearon [1991], Otley et al [1994], Griffin [1996], Dunk 
[1997]). Second, trying to reconcile the inconclusive results reported by some scholars 
using contingent variables (Harrison [1992,1993], Dunk [1993,1995a, 1995b, 1996], 
Choo & Tan [1997], Lau et al [1997], Subramaniam & Ashkanasy [1997], Lau & Tan 
[1998]). However, the chapters of the literature review in this study will explain all of 
these mentioned works in detail. 
1-2 The issues of this study 
The above review highlighted how massive attention has been paid to the 
behavioural aspects of budgetary control reflecting their importance. The conclusion and 
analysis of this review could be summarised in a way that reflects the issues of this 
study. 
a) Budgetary participation is the variable to which much attention has been 
paid in this area. This variable has been tested on managers' 
performance, satisfaction, motivation, and slack and the results were 
inconclusive. 
b) To reconcile these inconclusive results, much of the previous research 
investigated the contingent role of two groups of variables 
"organisational and behavioural" to provide possible interpretations 
which may help to determine where the problem lies. Few attempts have 
been made to combine between a large number of these two groups in an 
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integrative model that summarises systematically the relationships 
between these two groups in a way makes the picture much clearer. 
C) There are two analytical approaches have been used to test the 
contingent roles on a particular relationship. These approaches arc known 
as moderating and intervening'. Although these two approaches are 
complementary, much of the previous works used either. Very few 
attempts have been made to use these two approaches to test a particular 
model, so this area still unclear. 
d) Although the results of some studies in this area showed that culture has 
a contingent role, most of these studies focused on few issues (evaluative 
style, locus of control) and ignored the others. Tlierefore, the effect of 
culture on many other variables still unclear. 
e) Some studies which adopted a particular model and replicate it in a 
different culture did not replicate precisely (e. g. Frucot & Shearon [1991, 
Mia [1988]). In other words, those scholars used either different 
measures for their variables or different methodology. So, attributing the 
differences between the original study and the replicated one to culture 
may include some bias. 
f) Although culture has been used as a contingent variable which affects the 
perception of a manager with respect to budgetary control practices, little 
attention has been paid to how two groups of managers from different 
cultures within a single country (locals and non-locals) will perceive a 
particular relationship. 
This summary has shown that there are gaps in this area in many points. This 
research aims to fill in these gaps by conducting a study based on three directions as 
will be discussed in the next section. 
1. These two approaches are fully discussed in chapter five. 
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1-3 The aims of this study 
Promoted by the lack in the literature in the points discussed above, as well as the 
inconclusive findings reported on the previous works, the purposes of this study can be 
summarised as follows. 
1-3-1 Constructing an integrative model. This research will construct a model 
which consists of eighteen macro and micro level variables which have been frequently 
researched in the previous works. The construction of the relationships between these 
variables in the proposed model will be based on first, a replication of some of the most 
common hypotheses which were tested in the previous works and produced 
inconclusive results in order to assess the robustness of their outcomes. Second, 
developing another group of hypotheses which have not, so far, received a considerable 
amount of attention. This model will summarise systematically the previous works in an 
attempt to reconcile them and make the picture clearer. 
1-3-2 Examining the proposed model using samples from different cultures. 
As the results of many studies indicated that culture has a contingent role in this 
area, so we can strongly argue that the results of testing some hypotheses are culturally 
dependent. Therefore, this research aims to test the proposed model in different cultures. 
Britain and Saudi Arabia have been chosen as sites to test the proposed model because 
they have different cultural dimensions, as will be indicated in the next chapters. 
On the other hand, it was mentioned before that there is a lack in the literature 
regarding how two groups of managers from different cultures within a single country 
(locals and non-locals) perceive budgetary control. Non-locals, as will be shown later, 
work within three cultures. First, their own national culture, second, the host culture, 
and third, the culture of the institution they work in (organisational culture). Iberefore, 
this research will also test the proposed model using a sample of non-local managers. 
Getting a sample of non-local manager was easier in Saudi Arabia as some companies 
employ functional managers from different cultures. So, in the Saudi site, a sample of 
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Arab functional managers have been considered in addition to the Saudi functional 
managersi. 
According to the previous discussion the proposed model will be applied on three 
different groups British, Saudi, and Arab functional managers. This will help to 
understand the nature of the relationships in the proposed model. It will highlight where 
are the similarities and dissimilarities between these three different groups with respect 
to the research hypotheses in order to provide evidence about the possibility to 
generalise the results of each one. 
1-3-3 Examining the proposed model using two analytical approaches. The 
literature in this area used two analytical approaches to test the contingent roles of some 
variables, they are moderating and intervening2. Although these two approaches are 
complementary, many studies (i. e. Brownell & McIness [1986], Mia [1988], Kren 
[ 1992]) considered either independently. Few attempts have been made to use these two 
approaches to test a group of hypotheses to show which approach is more suitable for a 
particular hypothesis than the other. Therefore, this study will test the proposed model 
using these two approaches. - 
1-4 The importance of the study 
The primary importance of this study comes from the importance of the area of 
this research itself The reason why much attention have been paid to this area is that big 
organisations always apply budget systems to organise the different activities they run. 
Managers in different areas of responsibility may have different impressions about how 
the top management adopts and perceives such a system. As mentioned before, as long 
as budgets are set and run by people, it is important to know the perception of those 
people concerning what a budget means to them. Any misusing or misunderstanding to 
the nature of budget may lead to highly dysfunctional behaviour. 
2. When selecting the non-local sample, it was preferred to use a sample of managers who share similar cultural 
dimensions. Hofstede [1980], for example, combined between Arabs in his sample. 
3. These two approaches are fully explained in chapter five. 
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The results of this study will highlight the ways in which organisations can control 
their managers' budget-related behaviour to obtain maximum benefit from applying 
their budgeting system. It can also give top management insights into which situational 
variables managers' participation in setting budgets need, and whether such 
participation increases their performance and satisfaction. If so, are there any variables 
that may moderate or intervene in participation to increase these relationships? 
If, for example, the results showed that participation in setting a budget will lead 
to an increase in the managers' performance and satisfaction, top management may 
decide to use a more participative approach with their budgets. On the other hand, if top 
management found that participation increases managers' propensity to create slack 
when those managers have more information than the top management, the latter may 
try to find ways to decrease this slack-or apply less participative approach. 
In addition, this research will reconcile the results of the previous work as it will 
highlight the effect of culture on some variables. It will show also whether or not 
different analytical approaches produce different results. In addition the study will 
predict some relationships which have received little attention in the past and may be of 
value to future academic research in this area. Another importance of this study comes 
from applying the proposed model on managers from two different cultures within a 
single country, so that it will highlight whether host or national culture has much effect 
in this area. All of these aspects which this study is going to search will be a 








2- Macro-Level Factors Affecting 
Budgetary Control 
Chapter one mentioned that various researchers have suggested that the 
relationship between budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction 
might be contingent upon the presence of moderating or intervening variables. These 
moderating and intervening variables can be grouped into (1) macro-level variables and 
(2) micro-level variables. Macro-level is a term which refers to the organisational 
variables, whereas micro-level is a term which refers to the behavioural variables. These 
two terms have been used by some scholars in organisational and management 
accounting studies (e. g. Mealiea & Lee [ 1979], Frucot & Shearon [ 199 1 ]). 
Some of the variables have been classified as macro-level by some researchers and 
micro-level by others. In this study they have been classified based on the nature of the 
variables as follows. If a variable is related to organisational characteristics and/or their 
internal polices it would be classified as a macro-level variable (e. g. organisation size, 
technology, environment uncertainty, style of evaluation, leadership style, information 
asymmetry, and job difficulty). On the other hand, if a variable is related to the 
perception of the employees it would be classified as micro-level variable (e. g. 
budgetary participation, budget difficulty, budget clarity, locus of control, motivation, 
budgetary slack, performance, and satisfaction). 
Chapters two and three will discuss these macro and micro level variables which 
will be examined in this thesis. The following discussion introduces the macro-level 
variables. 
The universalistic view of organisational structure has been challenged by much 
researchers. The results of many studies showed that organisational, structure is not a 
universal structure which is applied and applicable in all circumstances. Hofstede [1996, 
p. 532] for example mentioned that "it is an illusion that any theory of social processes 
would ever gain universal approval". It has been argued in the organisation literature 
that the effectiveness of organisational structure depends on some contingent variables. 
This approach is known as the contingency theory of organisational structure. 
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The definition of the contingency theory is almost the same in all articles and 
books which discuss this theory. The general definition of this theory is there is no 
universal system applicable in all circumstances, the most appropriate system is one 
which takes into consideration situational variables. 
The relationship between organisational structure and situational variables has 
been the guiding principal for major research programs in different countries (i. e. Hage 
and Aiken [1969], Pugh et al [1969]). In their research they attempted empirically to 
discover variables which may affect or may cause the variation in organisational 
structure. However, in this area many researchers introduced contingency models of 
situational variables affecting the structure of organisations. 
The application of the contingency approach in organisation theory emerged 
before its application in accounting theory. Many authors (Gordon & Miller [1976], 
Hayes [1977], Otley [1980]) tried to apply this theory in the context of management 
accounting. Otley [ibid., p. 413] for example defined the contingency approach to 
management accounting as, 
it is based on the premise that there is no universally appropriate 
accounting system which applies equally to all organisations in all 
circumstances, rather, it is suggested that particular feature of an appropriate 
accounting system will depend upon the specific circumstances in which 
organisation find itself'. 
Budgetary control, as a major part of the management control system, is affected 
by such contingency variables. These variables include size, diversity, technology, 
decentralisation, and environmental uncertainty. However, these organisational (macro- 
level variables will be discussed in detail to conclude appropriate hypotheses. 
2-1 Size, Diversity, and Decentralisation 
A conceptual definition of size is lacking, although there is considerable 
consensus on how it should be operationally defined. Blau [1972, p. 3] defined it as "the 
scope of an organisation and its responsibilities". 
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Using Blau's own definition of size, many studies have reported that the increase 
in an organisation size and its diversity will increase the managerial problems in control, 
communication, and co-ordination. For example, Merchant [1984] mentioned that small 
organisations can often be controlled with informal control mechanisms such as direct 
supervision and oral communications. The argument of Merchant is intuitive as small 
organisations employ small number of workers, these small numbers can be easily 
contacted, organised and controlled. Conversely, larger organisations employ a large 
number of workers and consequently communication channels increase for co- 
ordination and controlling purposes. 
Activities in large organisations are more specialised and formalised. As a result, 
controlling these activities will be either through centralising decision-making at top 
management, or decentralising decision making to lower levels. The first approach is 
likely to be particularly inappropriate for large organisations, with many diýsimilar 
activities. Barfield et al [1998, p. 44], for example, support this as they argue that 
centralised organisations would have difficulty following a diversification strategy, 
because top management might lack the necessary and critical industry-specific 
knowledge. 
Homgren et al [1997] distinguished between total decentralisation as "minimum 
constraints and maximum freedom for managers to make decisions at lowest level of an 
organisatioW', and between centralisation as "maximum constraints and minimum 
freedom for managers at the lowest levels". They discussed (p. 902) many benefits of 
decentralisation. Some of these benefits are (1) greater responsiveness to local needs, 
and this means that sub-unit managers are better informed about their work than top 
management. (2) it leads to quicker decision making, and this means giving lower-level 
managers the responsibility for making decision can run decision quickly. 
From the discussion of Merchant [1984] and Horrigren et al [ 1997] it is possible to 
conclude that decentralisation is likely to occur in large organisations than small ones. 
However, some effects of such decentralisation and structuring firms on budgetary 
control systems were summarised by Merchant [1984, p. 814] as follows: 
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High participation by middle and lower management. He suggests 
that participation is consistent with the meaning of decentralisation. 
In more diversified firms, lower-level managers are more 
specialised and know much better than higher-level managers, that 
is why involving them in setting budgets can make budgets more 
realistic in addition to the motivational effects. 
Greater budgeting system sophistication results in more use of 
computers and staff. 
The effect of size on budget-related behaviour was also investigated carefully by 
different researchers. In this area Merchant conducted many studies whose results 
confirm what has been discussed above. For example, in [1981] he investigated how 
differences in corporate budgeting style were related to corporate size, diversity and 
degree of decentralisation, and how different choices in system design and use were 
related to organisational performance and manager motivation and attitude. 
Merchant's results showed that larger firms tend to make relatively greater use of 
more formal administrative, as opposed to interpersonal, controls. In all the firms, the 
more formal budgeting processes were generally received well by managers, but in 
larger firms they appear to be more positively linked with performance. 
In another study Merchant [1984] provided empirical evidence about the effect of 
situational variables that may be systematically related to differences in approaches to 
budgeting. His study related budgeting system characteristics to three types of variables 
which are likely to vary within an organisation: production technologies, market factors, 
and organisational characteristics. 
The results of his study (p. 305) showed significant relationships between the 
indicators of formal use of budgeting and some of the situational variables. The 
organisational characteristics, size, functional differentiation, and the level of 
automation adopted by a company were positively related to more formal use of budget 
(such as more formal budget communication and participation in budgetary process). 
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Furthermore, in departments where the expected context-budgeting relationships 
existed, the performance tended to be higher than the departments where they did not; 
and thus, the results supported a contingency theory approach. Merchant considered his 
results very important because they provide a start toward what could become useful, 
empirically-based, prescriptive advice for practitioners. 
Lyne [1988] studied the role of budget in 13 companies in UK. His results showed 
(p. 206) the amount of participation by all sections of a company could be explained by 
factors such as company size, profitability, and degree of divisionlisation. At the same 
time the results showed that top functional managers had the greater influence on budget 
than other departments. 
In another study in UK, Ezzamel [1990] focused as a part of the study on the 
effect of size on some budget characteristics such as participation and goal difficulty. 
The results were disappointing to his expectations, as he found that organisation size 
was not significantly correlated with any of the budget characteristics, particularly 
participation. 
The results of Ezzamel may have limited application as his sample was composed 
of financial directors reflecting single department. This may explain why his results are 
different from those of Lyne [1988] whose sample reflected different departments. The 
concept of participation is not restricted only for financial directors as the master budget 
is the output of all departments in a company. So, when participation is investigated, it 
should reflect different departments within a company such as production, computer and 
research and sales managers, and not only financial managers. It is intuitive to argue that 
financial managers are involved in setting budgets regardless the size of an organisation. 
The effect of decentralisation (which is suitable for some large organisations) on 
budgetary participation was also considered in various accounting studies. In large 
organisations, top management tend to delegate to lower managers' responsibilities and 
authorities to take decisions. It is also useful as a device of processing information of 
organisational units (see for more details Horngren et al [1997]). The literature suggests 
that participation is more likely to succeed in such organisations. For example, 
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Emmanuel et al [1990, p. 175] reported that "participation is therefore not a universal 
panacea, but can be selectively useful in helping promote commitment to organisational 
goals. It is perhaps most useful in decentralised organisations". 
In another study in this area, Gul et al [1995] argued that the effect of budgetary 
participation on managerial performance is contingent on decentralisation within 
organisations. The relationship between budgetary participation, centralisation and 
performance from their point of view is shown in figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 
Relationship between budgetary participation, decentralisation, and 
performance 
Decentralised Centralised 
High participation High Performance Low Performance 
Low participation Low Performance High Performance 
(adopted from Gul et &1119951) 
Their results showed that there was a significant interaction between budgetary 
participation and decentralisation. Of course such a result is not surprising as it 
consistent with the concept of decentralisation as discussed by Horngren et al [1997] 
66maximum freedom for managers to make decisions at lowest level of an organisation". 
However, the most interesting result showed a positive relationship between 
participation and managerial performance in situations of greater level of 
decentralisation. 
Although that the results of Gul et al [1995] was in the predicted direction it could 
be considered with some limitation as his sample was 36 personnel, operation and 
marketing managers from manufacturing companies. So, it does not reflect different 
kinds of business (e. g. finance, services, commercial) in spite of the fact that 
decentralisation is not restricted in manufacturing business. 
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The previous discussion indicated how the accounting literature is in conflict with 
respect to the effect of organisation size on managers' participation in the budgetary 
process. The majority of studies found a positive relationship between these two 
variables. The remaining studies generally had weaknesses in the nature of the sample 
used. Therefore, this research adopts the positive conclusions as shown in the following 
hypothesis. 
H-L I- In largefirms there will be a greater level ofBudgetary Participation 
byfunctional managers. 
2-2 Perceived Environment Uncertainty (PEU). 
Organisational theorists always emphasise that organisations have to adapt to 
changes in their environment so as to survive. Many contingency models imply that 
environmental factors determine the appropriateness of different organisation forms. 
Environmental factors composed of internal factors that lie within the boundaries of 
organisatiOn, and external factors which are outside the boundaries of an organisation. 
An example of internal factors are (a) organisational personnel component (b) 
organisational functional and staff units component (c) organisational level componenti. 
External factors consist of some items such as customer demands, competitors for 
market and resources, changes in low or polices by government, and technological 
factors. 
It impossible to say that those factors are static in all circumstances, on the 
contrary, they change from time to time and from situation to another. Therefore, we can 
argue that environment could be uncertain. Planners always consider these 
environmental factors to adapt to any changes in these factors. Duncan [1972, p. 314] 
defines environment as 
44environment is thought of as the totality of physical and social factors 
that are taken directly into consideration in the decision making 
behaviour of individuals in the organisation. " 
1. For more details about these component see Duncan [1972], p. 315. 
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According to this definition, environmental uncertainty is measured by how it is 
perceived by managers who are in charge in decision making. The relationship between 
actual and perceived environment uncertainty is not clear in most of studies'. Many 
studies focused on environmental uncertainty at the business unit/division level within 
an organisation. That means they referred to the portion of total environment that is 
relevant for organisational goal setting and attainment. However, this area is quite big 
and complex, so it is difficult to review it in detail in this part of the thesis. Therefore, 
attention will be focused only on perceived environmental uncertainty and its relation 
with budgetary control practices. 
Ferris [1977a] for example tested the relationship between perceived environment 
uncertainty (PEU) and job satisfaction. His results (p. 27-) indicated that PEU was 
negatively correlated with job satisfaction in the sample he investigated (audit staff). 
Ferris's results contained many important implications. First, if perceived uncertainty 
impacts job satisfaction, then it should also be expected to impact the antecedents of job 
satisfaction (e. g. employees motivation). Second, perceived uncertainty may be a causal 
factor of diminished employee performance. 
With reference to the effect of environmental uncertainty on budget related 
characteristics, many researchers argued that managers' participation in budgetary 
process is not necessary in all circumstances. For example Govindarajan [1986, p. 498] 
mentioned that "in order to obtain favourable outcomes, high budget participation 
would not be needed under all conditions. Instead, participation should be contingent on 
the level of environmental uncertainty". Govindarajan focused on the responsibility 
centre's (functional department's) environmental uncertainty and the degree of 
participation by the responsibility centre manager in the decision which established and 
administered the budget for that centre. 
The results of Govindarajan [ibid. ] supported his argument that the greater 
environmental uncertainty, the greater the positive impact of participation in the 
budgetary process on managerial performance, and on managerial attitudes and 
1. For more details about this issue see Tymon, et al, [ 1998]. 
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motivation. He provided representative results which reflected different areas of 
responsibilities (e. g. production, sales/marketing, accounting, research and 
development, personnel management). 
Ezzamel [1990], described above, provided the results of an empirical 
investigation about the impact of various contextual variables, such as perceived 
environmental uncertainty, on budget characteristics such as participation. Perceived 
environmental uncertainty appeared to have the strongest impact on the design of the 
corporate budgeting system. Particularly, the results (p. 190) found that environmental 
uncertainty was found to be positively related with budgetary participation. Again 
Ezzamel's results could be considered to have limited application due to the nature of 
his sample which has been discussed in the previous section. 
Kren [ 1992] examined the perceived level of j ob-relevant information (JRI) as an 
intervening variable between budgetary participation and individual performance. He 
viewed JRI as the information that facilitated job-related decision making. The results 
suggested that participation affects performance, not directly, but through JRL This 
more positive effect of performance on participation was more pronounced when 
environmental volatility was high. 
The results of the previous works provided support to the proposition that 
environmental uncertainty positively affect the level to which managers should 
participate in decision making such budgetary process. When environmental uncertainty 
is high, managers need a high level of participation in budgetary process in order to 
provide an accurate information to the top management. According the previous 
discussion the following hypothesis was derived: 
H-L2- The greater the environmental uncertainty, the greater the degree of 
participation in the budgetary process. 
2-3 Technology 
Researchers of organisational behaviour have frequently been attracted to the 
importance of technology as an important variable. The disagreement among researchers 
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has been whether this variable should be treated as an independent or dependent 
variable. Woodward [1965] and Perrow [1970] for example treated technology as an 
independent variable which exerted a causal effect on organisational control. Others 
such as Pugh, et al [1963] treat technology as a dependent variable and downgrade its 
importance in a theory of organisationi. 
Before introducing some research which studied the effect of technology on 
organisational structure and budgeting, a definition of this variable will be presented 
first. Perrow [ 1967, p. 195] for example defined technology as 
"the actions that an individual performs upon an object, with or 
without the aid of tools or mechanical devices, in order to make some 
change in the object" 
This interpretation of technology means that it ranges from non-automation to full 
automation. This point of view was adopted by many researchers as will be discussed 
later. 
Hage and Aiken [1969] also defined technology in term of routiness. They 
investigated the effect of technology on the social structure. The study was conducted a 
study in 16 health and welfare organisations which found a negative high relationship 
between routineness of the work and the degree of participation in organisational 
decision making. That means the more routine the work-flow, the greater the 
centralisation of decision-making about basic organisational issues. 
Bruns and Stalker [1961] studied the effect of technology on organisational 
design, in a sample of British companies. They found that when the rate of technical 
innovation was low, the successful firms were associated with "mechanistic" systems 
characterised by functional specialisation and detailed definitions of duties and 
responsibilities. Rapid technical innovation was associated with firms which had 
"organic" systems of management characterised by more flexible organisational 
arrangements and more participation (cited in Brownell [I 982c, p. 13 0]). 
1. See for more details Aldrich [1972, p. 26]). 
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However, with respect to the effect of technology on management control system 
and hence budgetary control, Merchant, [1984, p. 292] argued that if the production 
process was relatively routine and repetitive, task uncertainty is relatively low and co- 
ordination between the organisation's activities is easily accomplished with 
programmed interaction', and as a result, it is easier to use budgeting. He used process 
automation and product standardisation as dimensions for routine/non-routine 
organisations. 
These two dimensions "process automation and product standardisation" were 
adopted by much researchers such as Brownell and Merchant [1990] and Dunk and Lal 
[1995] who examined budgetary participation and technology through these two 
dimensions. The effect of process automation and product standardisation are discussed 
below. 
2-3-1 Process automation 
The role of participative budgeting in the case of process automation is unclear. 
Merchant [1984] for example tested the effect of automation on the existence of a 
formal budget system. The results showed that for more highly automated departments, 
managers felt that they had greater influence over their budget plan. The study of 
Merchant used three items to measure participation in budgetary process: influence in 
budget plans, personal involvement in budgeting, and time spent in budget related 
activities. His results found a positive relationship between automation and the 
influence of managers in budget plans, whereas no significant relationship was found 
with the other two items. 
Brownell and Merchant [1990] discussed two possible effects of process 
automation on budgetary participation. The first was based on Hayes et al [ 19 8 8], and it 
suggested that process development, one form of which is increased automation, 
increases control over the manufacturing process. Automated control therefore could 
reduce the role of budgetary controls and hence managerial participation in budgetary 
process. The second approach (see Brownell and Merchant, p. 389) suggested that 
1. See in this area Dunk 1992. 
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automated manufacturing facilities, especially systems emphasising flexibility, provide 
the manufacturing manager with choices in such matters as work scheduling. To the 
extent that choices have cost implications, the manufacturing manager has more scope 
for meaningful participation in setting manufacturing budgets than in the case of 
traditional technology. 
According to the discussion of Brownell & Merchant [1990] these two 
possibilities need ftirther research to test them empirically using a sample to reflect 
different activities. This study adopts the second point of view of Brownell and 
Merchant for two reasons; first, in highly automated companies a company has various 
alternatives to the extent arrangement between these alternatives is a matter of 
negotiation between different responsibility centres in the company and such 
participation is more meaningful. Second, it was partially supported by Merchant 
[1984]. Therefore, the following hypotheses were derived: 
H-L3- High participation in the budgeting process will be found in firms 
where automation is high and vice versa 
2-3-2 Product standardisation 
Literature (see Brownell and Merchant [1990]) suggests that the optimal 
input/output relation for highly standardised products is either known or can be learned 
from experience, as opposed to being a matter for negotiation between budget managers 
and their superiors. On the other hand, low standardisation implies little experience and 
difficulty in unambiguously specifying the proper set and order of inputs. Therefore 
participation in the second case provides means of pooling the experience and 
knowledge of budget managers and their superiors, and offers the potential to assist in 
resolving this ambiguity. Hence, high levels of budgetary participation will be 
associated with low product standardisation. 
As with process automation, the proposition of the effect of product 
standardisation on budgetary participation has not received much attention empirically. 
For example, Merchant [1984] failed to confirm this argument when he used 
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instruments of participation which were discussed in the previous section (2-3-1). So, 
the literature is still unclear about the validity of this proposition. 
From another point of view using these two dimensions of technology, Dunk and 
Lal [1995] tested the effect of technology as a moderating variable between budget 
participation and budgetary slack. Their sample was manufacturing managers from New 
Zealand firms. The findings provided support for the proposition that process 
automation and product standardisation influenced the relationship between 
participation and the propensity of manufacturing managers to create slack. 
The Dunk and Lal [ibid. p. 16] findings supported the argument of Merchant's 
[1985] that the nature of production technologies adopted in manufacturing departments 
can affect the relationship between participation and the propensity of managers of those 
units to build slack into their budgets. 
The previous discussion showed how the effect of product standardisation on 
budgetary control practices, particularly managers' participation in budgetary process 
has not received a considerable amount of attention so far, and thus the results in this 
area still inconclusive. To provide more insight to this proposition, this research will 
replicate the test of Merchant [1984] and the argument of Brownell and Merchant 
[ 1990] that budgetary participation and product standardisation are negatively related in 
the way indicated in the following hypothesis: 
H-L4- There is greater participation in setting budgets by managers infirms 
which have low product standardisation than in firms which have high 
product standardisation. 
2-4 Leadership Style 
One of the major issues in organisational and accounting literature is the way 
superiors handle their subordinates. This issue has been considered and investigated in 




The following definition of leadership may serve as a starting point for this 
discussion, "Leadership may be considered as the process (act) of influencing the 
activities of an organised group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement" 
(Stogdill, 1950, p. 4). This definition relates directly to the organised group and its goal. 
Stogdill reported that the minimal social conditions which permit the existence of 
leadership are the following: 
*A group (of two or more persons) 
A Common task (or oriented activities) 
Differentiation of responsibility 
The development of leadership theory was parallel to the development of 
organisation theory as was categorised by McGregor's [ 1960] theory X and Y, each of 
these theories has its own assumptions. For example McGregor [1960, p. 33 & 34] 
summarised the assumptions ofXtheory as follow: 
The average of human being has an inherent dislike of work and 
will avoid it if he can 
Because of this human characteristic of dislike of work, most 
people must be coerced, controlled, directed, threated with 
punishment to get them to put forth adequate effort toward the 
achievement of organisational objectives 
The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
responsibility, has relatively little ambition, and wants security 
above all 
The leadership style according to this theory is premised on an authoritarian 
notion where reward and punishment are the basis for handling employees effort. This 
theory was criticised strongly by- different organisational theorists, as the human side of 
employees must be considered to avoid their resistance toward organisation goals. It is 
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held that such effects may lead to dysfunctional behaviour and adverse consequences on 
performance. 
As a result of the criticism which was directed towards theory X, many researchers 
claimed that human side in organisation theory should be adopted. A new approach to 
leadership was referred to by McGregor (p. 47 & 48) as theory Y. The assumptions of 
this theory include: (a) the average human being does not inherently dislike work, 
depending upon controllable conditions, work may be a source of satisfaction or a 
source of punishment. (b) external control and the threat of punishment are not the only 
means for bringing about effort toward organisational objectives. Man will exercise self- 
direction and self-control in the service of objectives to which he is committed. (c) the 
average human being learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek 
responsibility. 
Different empirical studies supported theory Y, more specifically, the results of 
those studies suggest that higher performance is a result of superiors focusing their 
attention on (see Ezzamel 1987, p. 74) 
9 the human side of their subordinates' problems; 
* establishing effective work groups with high performance goals; 
ensuring that, subordinates are subject to low pressure rather than 
close supervision. 
The effect of leadership on budget-related issues has not been ignored. For 
example, in an early study, Argyris [1952] pointed out how budgets affect the personal 
relationships of supervisory personnel. His study concluded several results which were 
discussed earlier (p. 1 . 2). 
DeCoster and Fertakis [1968] conducted a study which was focused on how 
supervisors use budgets as a way of expressing their own patterns of leadership. They 
used the two dimensions of leadership which were identified by Ohio State University. 
These two dimensions are Initiation Structure and Consideration. 
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"Initiation structure refers to leadership which is related to work 
performance and therefore process oriented or structuring. This is 
characterised by such actions as organising and defining the 
relationships between himself and the group, defining interaction 
among group members, establishing ways of getting the job done" 
"Consideration refers to leadership behaviour which is employee 
oriented and is indicative of friendship, mutual trust and respect, and 
good human relations between the leader and his group" 
DeCoster and Fertakis [ibid., p. 239] hypothesised that high budget pressure, 
coincident with non-participation, would be concurrent with structuring behaviour on 
the part of the supervisor. In particular, s/he would be more likely to take greater 
initiative in assigning work, have a greater concern with production, (production 
oriented), allow fewer decisions to be made by subordinates, and behave in a manner 
associated with a directive superior. The amount of employee-oriented or considerate 
leadership behaviour, including such elements as friendship, and trust would be 
expected to be low when the supervisor experiences high budget pressure on his job. 
They found (p. 245) a positive relationship between budget pressure and initiation 
structure (. 445, p : 5.01), that indicated when the initiation dimension of leadership 
increased, supervisors' budget pressure increased as well. Contrary to their expectations, 
they found that budget pressure has a positive relationship with consideration. They 
expected a negative-or at least a little relationship between these two variables. 
Hopwood [1974] conducted a study related to DeCoster and Fertakis [1968]. He 
developed four evaluative styles, which will be discussed in detail in the following 
section, contrasting a budget-constrained style (a heavy emphasis on short-term, budget 
related results), with a profit conscious style (focusing more on long-term performance) 
and non-accounting style (accounting data is relatively unimportant in evaluating 
manager's performance). His results indicated that different combinations of the two 
leadership dimensions, consideration and initiation structure, resulted in varying 
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perceptions of evaluative style. For example high initiation structure and low 
consideration were found to be linked with subordinates perceptions of a budget- 
constrained evaluative style. The study of Hopwood did not test how style of evaluation 
affects managers participation in the budgetary process and the effect of that on 
managers performance. 
Therefore, Brownell [1983] extended the study of Hopwood to test the effects of 
leadership style (consideration and initiation structure) and budgetary participation on 
managers' performance and satisfaction. The results suggested that considerate 
leadership behaviour has, at best, no effect on subordinate performance unless 
accompanied by high level of budgetary participation. It was also found that 
consideration has a major effect on satisfaction under both low and high level of 
participation, and it was slightly stronger under high participation. 
The researcher believes that the literature in this area has ignored a possible 
contingent role of both consideration and initiation structure between budgetary 
participation and managers' motivation to achieve budget. This research argues that 
high budgetary participation interacts with these two dimensions affecting managers 
motivation to achieve their budgets. The direction of this effect will be positive for 
consideration and negative for initiation structure. On the other hand, this research 
argues as well that superiors are most likely to use a rigid style of evaluation (budget 
emphasis) when they are characterised as high initiation structure. These two arguments 
are the basis for the following two hypotheses. 
H-L5- The positive relationship between the level ofparticipation in 
the budgetary process and motivation (hypothesis H-H. 3) will increase 
when managers' superiors have a leadership style characterised by 
high consideration and low initiation structure. 
H-I 6- Managers are more likely to be evaluated on the basis of 
budget emphasis if their superiors have a leadership style 
characterised by high initiation structure. 
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2-5 Style of Evaluation 
One of the major issues in the area of budgetary control is the style by which 
superiors evaluate their workers. In the accounting literature there are four possible 
styles which were developed by Hopwood [1972] and they have been used by many 
research in this area, these styles are: 
" Budget Constrained style (BC) 
" Budget-Profit style (BP) 
" Profit Conscious style (PC) 
" Non-accounting style (NA) 
These four styles were measured by Hopwood using eight items, the first style 
(BQ reflects the ability of a functional manager in meeting his/her department' budget, 
and it does not consider the costs. The second style (BP) reflects two dimensions, they 
are meeting budgets and concern with costs. The third style (PC) is concern with the 
profit in the long run, as it reflects the ability of managers to minimise the costs. The 
fourth style (NA) does not pay attention to any accounting measures, on contrary, it 
concerns with non-accounting measures such as the quality and the ability of a manager 
to handle his/her subordinates. 
Hopwood's [1972] study was applied in one manufacturing division of a large 
American company, with a sample of cost centre heads. His results showed that cost 
centre heads who felt they are being evaluated on the basis of a Budget Constrained 
style (BC) reported a significantly higher level of job related tension than those who are 
evaluated on the basis of either a Profit Conscious or Non-Accounting style (see p. 166). 
In contrast, when cost centre heads were evaluated on the basis of their ability to 
continually avoid unfavourable budget variances, success in satisfying this criterion 
results in lower job related tension. The BC evaluation style was also found to result in 
poor relations with supervisors and peers. 
Hopwood' s study showed how different uses of accounting data in performance 
evaluation affected cost centre heads' perceptions of how justly their performance was 
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evaluated. For example when there was a tendency to use the accounting data in terms 
of BC, the respondents felt that their evaluation was less just than those reporting either 
a PC or NA. It should be noted that Hopwood' s[ 1972] study did not directly test the 
relation between supervisory style and managerial performance. 
In a subsequent study Otley [1978] conducted a replication and extension of 
Hopwood [1972]. Hopwood's emphasis was on the effect that budget use had on 
managers' beliefs and feelings and not with the overall effectiveness of operations. As 
Otley [1978, p. 125] mentioned, because Hopwood's study found a significant difference 
in the extent to which managers evaluated under different styles engaged in 
dysfunctional behaviour. Hopwood was able to conclude that it was likely that the 
tensions and manipulations noted under the rigid style of evaluation caused a 
deterioration in long-terni performance. Therefore, Otley [1978] felt that it was 
important to extend Hopwood study to include the effect of style of budget use on 
managerial performance. 
Otley conducted his study in a large organisation in UK, using a sample of profit 
centre managers. His results showed that the style of budget used did not affect job or 
budget related tension, nor did a budget-constrained style decrease job ambiguity. These 
results were contradictory to Hopwood's results. Otley explained these differences in 
terms of the appropriateness of the budgetary measures of performance for the 
independent operating units studied. 
Otley [ibid., p. 146] also found that a particular style of evaluation by group 
managers was conditioned partly by their own managerial philosophy, 'but it varied from 
one unit to another according to the toughness of its operating environment and its size 
and profitability. 
Some scholars argued that the differences between the Hopwood and Otley results 
may be explained by the nature of the environment which faced mangers in each 
sample. Tberefore, they attempted to adopt environmental uncertainty as a situational 
variable which may reconcile the results of both Hopwood and Otley. 
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Hirst [1983] for example investigated the effect of different uses of accounting 
performance measures on subordinate tension and social withdrawal in both high and 
low task uncertainty situations'. His results indicated where task uncertainty was high, 
subordinates reported an increase in tension as reliance on accounting performance 
measures increased. Where task uncertainty was low, as reliance on accounting 
performance measures decreased, subordinates reported an increase in tension. Although 
the first result was consistent with that of Hopwood's, the second result was inconsistent 
with Otley's results as he found no relationship between reliance on accounting 
performance measure (RAPM) and job tension. 
It worth drawing attention to the fact that Hirst [ibid. ] used a measure of RAPM 
which was developed by him. ' He argued (p. 598) that the measure developed by 
Hopwood [1972] and used by Otley [1978] and Brownell [1982] was specifically 
suitable for manufacturing setting and not for a non-manufacturing setting. The 
researcher disagrees with this point of view as the eight items of Hopwood were not 
restricted to manufacturing firms. In a subsequent study, Hirst [1987] used the measure 
of Hopwood in a large property development and management corporation. So, the 
results of his [1983] were limited as the measure he used was different from Hopwood 
and Otley and its validity was not established. 
In another attempt, Brownell [1982b] conducted a study to reconcile the results of 
Hopwood and Otley. He hypothesised (p. 13) that direct associations between leadership 
evaluative style and performance should not be expected because the relationship will 
be moderated by budgetary participation. The results confirmed that a budget-focused 
evaluative style was most effective under conditions of high participation, but was 
ineffective where participation was low. Brownell's sample was a single firm, so, the 
generalizability of his results was limited and open to question. 
Hirst [1987] replicated the study of Brownell [1982b] to examine whether its 
results are generalizable beyond the firm he studied. In contrast with Brownell's study, 
Hirst did not find an interaction between budget participation and budget emphasis 
1. See appendix B for the definition of social withdrawal. 
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affecting job performance. In another attempt to reconcile the results of Hopwood and 
Otley, Govindarajan [1984] developed a contingency framework which is shown in the 
following figure. 
Figure 2.2 
Degree of reliance on subjective approach in performance evaluation 










LOW Higher organisational Lower organisational 
performance performance 
(adoptcd from Govindarajan 1984) 
The results of Govindarajan supported his contingency framework, as it showed 
that superiors of business units which faced higher environmental uncertainty used 
greater subjective judgement in performance evaluation, whereas superiors of business 
units which faced lower environmental uncertainty relied heavily on financial data in 
performance evaluation. 
Dunk [1989] argued for a possible contingent role for budget emphasis between 
budgetary participation and performance. His results were contradictory to his 
expectations. Although he had expected a positive role for budget emphasis affecting 
managers performance, his results reported a negative effect of budget emphasis 
between budgetary participation and performance. More specifically, the results 
suggested that high (low) participation together with high (low) budget emphasis lowers 
managerial performance, rather than increasing it. 
From another point of view, Ross [1995] tested the effect of budget emphasis and 
enviromnent uncertainty on job-related tension. He hypothesised that under -conditions 
of low uncertainty, budget emphasis would result in lower levels of job related tension 
than the other evaluative styles (profit conscious or non-accounting style). Again he 
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hypothesised that under high uncertainty, budget emphasis would result in higher levels 
ofjob-related tension than other evaluative styles. 
His results (p. 7) showed that when low environment uncertainty was perceived, 
job-related tension had no effect on the style of performance evaluation. Consequently 
the results were inconsistent with his hypothesis. However, the results suggested that 
when high environment uncertainty was perceived, the use of a non-accounting style 
resulted in higher job-related tension than the other of evaluation styles. 
In this area it has also been argued that culture has a possible contingent role 
which could reconcile the results of Hopwood and Otley. For example Harrison [1993] 
conducted a study which used two cultural variables developed by Hofstede [1980] 
("power distance" and "individualism"') as the most appropriate cultural dimensions 
that may affect the styles superiors adopt in evaluating their subordinates performance. 
He found (p. 336) that high reliance on accounting performance measures in superior 
evaluative style was associated with lower tension and with higher job satisfaction in a 
high power distance and low individualism society (Singapore), while low reliance on 
such measures was associated with lower tension and higher satisfaction in low power 
distance and high individualism society (Australia). 
In a recent study, Choo and Tan [1997] studied the disagreement between 
superiors and subordinates regarding budgetary evaluative style on performance through 
two mediating (intervening) variables which were job-related tension (JRT) and job 
satisfaction (JS) as indicated in figure 2.3. 




Job-related tension and Job Satisfaction as intervening variables between 
disagreement in BPES and performance 
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(adopted from Choo and Tan [1997]) 
Their results showed that JRT and JS were negatively correlated with each other, 
and they both acted as intervening variables between disagreement in budget 
performance evaluation style (BPES) and performance. As disagreement in BPES 
increased, JRT increased and JS decreased. Consequently performance decreased when 
JRT increased and increased when JS increased as well. 
From the previous discussion we can see how the literature is quite in conflict 
with respect to the effect of evaluative style on managerial performance and job-related 
behaviour. Various variables such as budgetary participation and environmental 
uncertainty have been adopted to reconcile these contradictory results, and finally 
culture has also been used as a possible contingent variable. Nevertheless the area still 
unclear. Therefore, in an attempt to reconcile the previous work this research adopts 
replicating some hypotheses using a wide-ranging sample, in different cultures, and 
using two analytical approaches in order to provide more insight to this issue from a 
different points of view. 
This research will adopt the propositions which argues that budget emphasis 
interacts with budgetary participation affecting both performance and satisfaction. In 
addition to these two propositions, we can notice that literature has ignored a possible 
effect for style of evaluation on managers' motivation to achieve budget. This research 
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argues for a positive contingent role for budget emphasis between budgetary 
participation and managers' motivation. When managers are evaluated based on their 
ability to meet their budgets, high participation will increase their motivation to achieve 
these budgets. According to the previous discussion the following hypotheses were 
derived. 
H-I. 7- Budget emphasis plays a moderating role between Budgetary 
Participation and both performance and satisfaction asfollow. 
H-I 7a- when budget emphasis is high, there is a positive relationship 
hetween Budgetary Participation andperformance; 
H-L 7b- when budget emphasis is high, there is a positive relationship 
between Budgetary Participation and satisfaction. 
H-L8- Greater budget emphasis increases managers' motivation to achieve 
budget targets when they perceive a high level of participation in setting 
their departments' budgets. 
2-6 Information Asymmetry 
The literature with respect to information asymmetry and its interaction with 
budgetary participation is somewhat contradictory and confused, this may due to the 
way information asymmetry is interpreted. Some researchers mean that the subordinates 
have more information than their superiors, whereas others mean thit the superiors have 
some information that is not held by their subordinates. 
Information asymmetry is an assumption common to all principal-agent models. 
From the point of view of this theory, Magee [1980] proposed that the expected payoff 
to principals (superiors) could be enhanced with access to local information held by 
agents (subordinates) prior to setting the budget (see Dunk [ 1993]). 
By giving subordinates (agents) the opportunity to participate in budgetary 
process, superiors (principals) may be able to obtain the required information from those 
agents. This information may be incorporated into budget standards against which 
agents' performance would be evaluated. The problem here arises as agents may 
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misrepresent some of their private information which consequently leads to 
dysfunctional behaviour. Therefore, more attention has been paid to see whether 
participation in decision making by those subordinates who hold more information than 
their superiors will lead to dysftmctional behaviour or not. 
The accounting literature has witnessed various empirical studies in this area. 
Dunk [1993], for example, tested the effect of both information asymmetry and budget 
emphasis on the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. His 
results were contradictory to his expectations; the results showed that budgetary slack 
was low when participation, information asymmetry, and budget emphasis are all high, 
and vice versa. The results of Dunk [1993] have to be considered with some caution as 
budgetary slack was measured using a measure which was developed by Dunk himself, 
and accordingly its reliability has not been established. Dunk has already attributed his 
disappointing results partly to his new measure. 
From a positive point of view, Dunk [1995a] argued that high information 
asymmetry (subordinates hold more information than their superiors) will result a high 
performance when managers participate in budgetary process. His argument was based 
on the literature that suggests that involving subordinates who are better informed than 
their superiors may lead to more realistic and accurate budgets and such enhance their 
performance. The results of an empirical study in Australian manufacturing companies 
supported his argument strongly, as the results suggested that only those who held more 
information than their superiors reported higher performance. 
Dunk's [1995a] results have a number of limitations, first, he used a single item 
measure for performance which was used in some studies such as Brownell & Merchant 
[1990] to evaluates department performance. From the researchers' point of view a 
single item for performance measure is not quite accurate and may include some bias. 
Second, his sample did not reflect wide-ranging of areas of responsibility centres. 
Dunk's sample was production and marketing managers working in manufacturing 
companies. He argued that these two departments are often seen as being better 
informed than their superiors. Production and marketing managers are not the only 
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departments who are informed better than their superiors, there are different department 
such as finance managers who know about the liquidity necessary to run the work, 
maintenance managers whose budgets imply sometimes high cost to keep machines and 
building in a good condition and provide post-sales services. Tbird, his sample was 
selected from manufacturing companies, in spite of the fact that information asymmetry 
is not restricted on manufacturing activities but it could relate to all activities. Further 
research in this area is needed. 
In another study Shields & Young [1993] developed and tested a model of 
participative budgeting which had asymmetrical information as the antecedent and 
budget-based incentives and firm-wide performance as the consequences. The 
information asymmetry explanation tested in their paper was based on the assumption 
that an important source of the demand for participative budgeting is information 
sharing. Participative budgeting was used by superiors to learn about the better local 
information held by subordinate managers. 
Their results showed a significant positive correlation between budgetary 
participation and information asymmetry. Using path analysis they tested the indirect 
effect of information asymmetry on firm-wide performance. Their results provided clear 
evidence that participative budgeting had weak indirect effects on firm-wide 
performance. 
Although the previous discussion showed that information asymmetry and 
budgetary participation could imply either favourable or unfavourable attitudes toward 
budgets and performance, there is a lack in the literature about a possible interaction 
between budgetary participation and information asymmetry affecting managers 
motivation to achieve budgets. - The previous discussion could provide a base to 
hypothesise that information asymmetry has a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and both budgetary slack and motivation. The researcher argues when 
managers have more work-related information than their superiors, their propensity to 
create slack will increase and so they will be highly motivated to achieve their budget' 
goals. In addition, this research also argues that the size of an organisation and the 
2.27 
Chapter two 
degree of information asymmetry are positively related. This research will test these 
propositions empirically as they are stated in the following hypotheses. 
H-I. 9- "en managers are in a position of having more information than 
their superiors: 
H-I. 9a- high participation in the budgetary process will increase 
managers'motivation to achieve budget; 
H-I. 9b- high participation in the budgetary process will increase 
managers'propensity to create slack 
H-I. 10- There is a positive relationship between company size and the 
degree of information asymmetry. In other word, in large organisations, 
subordinates hold more information than their superiors. 
2-7 Job Difficulty 
The term ofjob (task) difficulty includes two separate concepts, job difficulty and 
variability. The first refers to "the analysability of the work itself and the extent to which 
there is a known procedure that specifies the sequence of steps to be followed in 
performing the task" (Van de Ven & Delbecq [ 1974]). The later refers to "the number of 
exceptional cases encountered in the work requiring different methods or procedures for 
doing the work". 
In the budgetary context, job difficulty has been investigated as a moderating 
variable between participation and both performance and motivation. A potential 
moderating effect of job difficulty was explained by Mia [1989, p. 348]. In situations of 
high job difficulty, more information is required at the point of task execution. 
Managers operating in such a situation may not have all the necessary information to 
execute the job; they may need to obtain and process additional information to 
understand the job clearly, thereby improving their chances of successful performance 
and obtaining desired rewards. ' 
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Mia [1989] argued that the greater job difficulty, the greater positive relationships 
between participation and both performance and motivation. Figure 2.4 summarises the 
relationships hypothesised by Mia. 
Figure 2.4 




High More positive Less positive 
relationship relationship 
Low Less positive More positive 
relationship relationship 
(adopted from Mia 1989) 
The results of Mia were partially consistent with his expectations; he found a 
significant interaction between participation and job difficulty affecting performance. In 
other word, performance was high when the amount of participation was consistent with 
the level of job difficulty. In contrast, performance was low when the amount of 
participation was inconsistent with the level of job difficulty. Mia [ 1989] interpreted the 
contradiction in previous research about the relationship between budgetary 
participation and performance as the absence of some moderating effect such as job 
difficulty. His results showed no significant interaction between participation and job 
difficulty affecting motivation, so this was in contrast to his expectations. 
In another attempt to investigate this proposition, Orpen [1992] also investigated 
the effect of job difficulty as a moderating variable between budgetary participation and 
performance. His study was conducted in a single firm in Australia, using sample of 136 
managers. The results were consistent with those of Mia [1989] as participation had a 
significant interaction with job difficulty affecting performance. Orpen's findings 
suggested that budgetary participation is more likely to improve performance in 








H-I-11- Job difficulty plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance, namely, when job difficulty increases, the 




Summary and Conclusion 
The accounting literature has argued that the influence of budgetary participation 
on managerial performance, job or budget-related behaviour (e. g. Job satisfaction, 
budget motivation, budgetary slack) is not universal. On contrary, they are contingent on 
other variables which has been classified into organizational (macro-level) and 
behavioural (micro-level). 
This chapter has discussed the macro-level group which consisted of nine 
variables. Based on the literature, four of these variables were perceived as determinants 
of budgetary participation and they are: organization size, environment uncertainty, 
process automation, and product standardisation. In organisation and management 
accounting contexts these variables have been known as "the contingency variables" 
The other macro-level variables which have been discussed in this chapter were: 
budget emphasis (style of evaluation), consideration and initiation structure (leadership 
style), information asymmetry, and job difficulty. The literature suggested that these 
variables influence the relationship between budgetary participation and performance, 
job and budget-related behaviour. 
In this chapter each variable was defined and the related literature was introduced 
to show how it was perceived by different scholars. At the end of each section a set of 
hypotheses were derived. Thirteen hypotheses were concluded in this chapter, of which 
nine were replicated because the previous studies showed inconclusive results, 
therefore, the replication will provide an assessment about the robustness of their 
conclusions. The other hypotheses were developed because they have not, so far, 
received a considerable amount of attention. 
These macro-level variables have been used in the integrative model which was 
proposed in this study. Before introducing this model it was necessary to introduce the 








3- Micro-Level Factors Affecting 
Budgetary Control 
This chapter discusses the effect of micro-level "behavioural" variables on 
budgetary control system. These variables have been investigated in the previous 
research and many empirical results provided evidence that they influence this system. 
These variables are budgetary participation, budget difficulty, budget clarity, locus of 
control, budget motivation, and budgetary slack. Performance and satisfaction will be 
discussed in this chapter as they were tested as dependent variables to the micro-level 
one. 
3-1 Budgetary Participation 
Budgetary participation refers to the extent to which managers are involved in 
setting budgets and they are able to influence or determine their department goals. It is 
one of the most important variables in this area, and it has been considered carefully and 
extensively in behavioural accounting research. It has been investigated with many of 
organisational and behavioural variables. This variable has been viewed differently by 
different researchers: some researchers consider it as an independent, others as a 
dependent, a third group as an intervening, a fourth group as moderating (see appendix 
F). 
Participation in decision making was considered originally as a behavioural. factor 
that has its effect on employees' motivation, performance and satisfaction. As discussed 
before, Theory Y was developed as a result of the criticism which was directed to 
Theory X which had negative behavioural consequences on employees. Theory Y 
claimed that under some conditions, employees not only accept but sometimes seek 
responsibility. Employees can be given this responsibility by being involved in decision- 
making. 
Over the past sixty years there have been a number of pieces of research which 
have studied autocratic and democratic styles of leadership, and more analytical parts of 
democratic leadership such as participation. These studies showed that supervisors who 
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use more democratic styles of leadership were likely to have both higher morale and 
higher productivity in their groups. The following review will show how budgetary 
participation has been viewed by different research and different consequences of 
participation on budget-related behaviour. 
Argyris [ 1953] who conducted a famous piece of research in the area of budgetary 
control, distinguished between "pseudo-participation" (that is, participation which is 
apparent but not real) and "true participation", where people can be observed to be 
spontaneous and uninhibited in their discussion. He noticed that the pseudo- 
participation was desired by some controllers as they use it as a pressure device. The 
following statement which was reported by a controller (p. 28) may indicate that clearly: 
"We bring them in, we tell them that we want their frank opinion, but most 
of them just sit there and nod their heads. We know they are not coming out 
with exactly how they feel. I guess budgets scare them; some of them do not 
have too much education .... Then we request the line supervisor to sign the 
new budgets, so he can not tell us he did not accept it. We have found a 
signature helps an awful lot. If anything goes wrong, they can not come to 
us, as they often do, and complain. We just show them their signature and 
remind them they were shown exactly what the budget was made up of ... " 
It is clear from this comment that budgetary participation was not in its real sense, 
on contrary, it was pseudo-participation. This kind of participation was criticised by 
Argyris himself as it may lead employees to reject goals. He recommended that if top 
management want to use participation to attain their objective, then they should use 
more effective participation, otherwise it will lead to dysfunctional behaviour. 
The study of Argyris attracted the attention of many researchers to investigate the 
effect of both real and pseudo participation on budget-related behaviour. For example, 
in a study by Becker and Green [1962], participation was perceived as process and 
content: process means the act of participation with the possible consequences 
stemming from the act; content was the discussion topic toward which are generated 
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positive or negative attitudes. The act of participating enabled the participants to know 
one another, communicate and interact with one another; conditions that can easily lead 
to increased cohesiveness. 
French et al [1966] tested the effect of participation on goal achievement, the 
relationship with managers, attitudes toward the appraisal system, and self-actualisation. 
Some of their conclusionsi were that the usual level of participation was associated with 
subordinate-manager relation as measured before the appraisal interview. A high level 
of participation was associated with occupational self-actualisation. They also found 
that increases in participation tended to produce improvements in the relation of 
subordinate to manager, but decreases in participation did not have their expected 
undesirable effects. 
In his leading research, Hofstede [1968] showed how participation affected 
employees' motivation. He produced clear-cut evidence by interviewing first and second 
line managers in five companies in The Netherlands. The following statements from his 
study show how managers viewed participation (ibid., p. 174) 
"I like working with standards, but with standards I've got a say in my 
seýf ' (second line manager) 
"My budget makes my task easier. It would be different if it were 
imposed without consultation. In that case the job would be very 
tough " (second line manager) 
The two statements showed how managers were highly motivated to work with 
figures with which they have been involved in putting it. Hofstede [ibid. ] developed a 
model of participation in standard setting that leads to higher performance. The 
traditional view of participation and developed model are explained in figures 3.1 and 
3.2 




The traditional view of the effect of participation in standard-setting 
(adopted from Hofstede 1968) 
Participation Communication Higher 
ReL ot in Standard Settin an Motivation ate. Performance 
(adoptcd from Hofstede [19681) 
Figure 3.2 
Improved model of the effect of participation in standard-setting 
External 
References Communication 
Point C ontrol 
Participation 
in Standard Relevance Higher Motivation 





(adopted from Hofstede 119681) 
The assumptions of his new model as indicated in figure 3.2 that participation 
contributed to communication, relevance of the standard, and attitudes toward the 
system. However, these three aspects were also affected by external reference points and 
the authority of superiors, so that achievement of the final goal of higher performance 
depended crucially on the combined inputs of the three initial elements in the model. 
The approach of Hofstede was a base for many researchers who followed him (as 
well as in this study) to test the effect of participation on many organisational and 
behavioural. variables either directly or indirectly. 
In another study, Milani [1975] developed a conceptual model which tested the 
effect of participation on performance directly and indirectly through employee's 
attitudes toward their jobs and companies. The study focused on foremen who were 





Conceptual model as proposed by Milani 1975 
I 
Attitude Toward Jýýý 
Budgetary 
Participation Performance 
Attitude Toward Company ompany 
He has also developed a measure of budgetary participation which has been the 
basis for many subsequent studies. Milani reported that his results provided limited 
empirical support for Argyris, Hofstede and others who advocated participation in 
setting budgets. The study showed a significant relationship between budgetary 
participation and attitudes toward both job and company, but it failed to find a 
significant contribution of participation on performance. It worth attracting the attention 
to the fact that Milani's study was conducted on a single firm and thus his results are 
less generalizable. 
Otley [1987] argued that budgetary participation has positive and negative impacts 
on budget-related behaviour, for example it increases the relevance of the budget 
standard in the eyes of the recipients. It also improves managers' attitudes to the budget 
system, and in the same time it increases the flow of information between managers and 
their superiors. Otley [ibid. p. 33] mentioned that it should not be overlooked that 
participation gives managers the opportunity to introduce bias into their budgets if they 
were motivated to do so. 
Kenis [1979] examined some effects of budgetary goal characteristics, such as 
participation on job and budget related attitudes and performance. His results supported 
the view that participation had a positive effect on attitude. Significant relationships 
were found between budgetary participation and both budget and job-related attitudes. 
The study (p. 717) found that participation was unrelated to job performance. 
The literature review in this area shows that much attention has been paid to the 
effect of budgetary participation and both job performance and job-related behaviour 
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(i. e. satisfaction). The results of these two relationships were inconclusive. Some 
researchers (i. e. Brownell [1982], Frucot & Shearon [1991]) found a positive 
relationship, others (i. e. Lau et al [ 1995]) reported a negative one, and a third group (i. e. 
Mia [1989]) found no relationship. That is why much concerns have been paid to 
investigate the role of some contingent variables which may reconcile these 
contradictory results. It is not necessary to discuss these studies at this point since each 
of these variables is treated separately, organisational variables were discussed in the 
previous chapter and the behavioural variables which affect these relationship will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
As the previous works reported conflicting results with respect to the effect of 
budgetary participation on managers' performance and satisfaction, so this research will 
replicate these two propositions using the approaches developed in this study in order to 
provide more insight about their effect. The direction of their effect was proposed to be 
positive as they are based on the literature review which suggests that when managers 
are involved in setting budgets they will be motivated to put more realistic figures and 
hence, they will perform better and more satisfied. 
In this area little attempt has been made to check whether or not managers allow 
their subordinates to participate in budgetary process if they themselves perceived high 
participation in the budgetary process. This research argues that when managers 
perceive a high level of participation in budgetary process, they will give their 
subordinates a high degree of participation as well. Based on the previous discussion 
this research will test the following hypotheses. 
H-H. ]a- There is a positive relationship between budgetary participation 
andperformance. 




H-H. 2- Managers will allow their subordinates a high level ofparticipation 
in the budgetary process ifthey perceive themselves as having a high degree 
ofparticipation in the budgetary process. 
3-2 Budget Goal Difficulty 
Before introducing the literature review in this area, distinction should be made 
between job difficulty and budget or goal difficulty. Job difficulty as was discussed 
before, is concerned with the particular job employees are involved in, for example in a 
watch factories technicians should be highly qualified and have a high level of 
concentration. Other factories are completely automated and products do not require the 
same level of attention from employees. Budget or goal difficulty refers to the extent to 
which budget goals are achievable by those people who are responsible for 
implementing them. It ranges from very easy to very tight. 
Stedry and Kay [1966] defined a goal as a level of performance whose attainment 
is associated with "success", and non-attainment with "failure". Thus, it will include the 
psychological aspiration level. Many studies investigated goal difficulty and 
performance. Dey and Kaur [1965] for example found hard (assigned) output goals to 
produce a higher level of performance than easy goals. Locke [1968, p. 166] reported 
that Siegal and Fouraker [1960] using an experimental bargaining task, asked some 
subjects to try for a specific quantitatively high profit and others to try for a specific 
quantitatively low profit. The former group negotiated higher profits than the latter. 
Locke et al. [1981] reviewed a massive volume of laboratory and field studies 
which considered the behavioural effects of goal setting. Some conclusions from this 
review are outlined below (p. 145-46): 
Ninety percent of the studies showed a positive or partially positive 
effects of goal setting on task performance. 
Goals are most likely to affect performance under many conditions. Some 
of these conditions are (a) range and type of goals (individuals with 
specific and challenging goals outperform individuals with easy goals); 
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(b) participation and supportiveness (Locke et at. reported that there was 
no consistent evidence that participation leads to better task performance 
than assigned goals when the goal level is controlled, though it 
sometimes leads to setting higher goals than the superior would have 
assigned). 
In the area of budgetary control, budget difficulty was investigated together with 
attitude and performance. Hofstede [1968, p. 144] found that the level of standards play 
a role in achievement motivation. More specifically, his findings showed that (a) loose 
budgets were poor motivators; (b) the motivation effect of budgets becomes stronger 
when they become tighter; (c) over a certain limit of budget tightness, motivation 
became poor again. 
In another study, Kenis [1979, p. 716] found no relationship between budgetary 
participation and budget goal difficulty. The relationships between budget goal 
difficulty and both attitude and performance were very weak. When mean scores of 
attitude and performance were examined at different levels of goal difficulty (about 
right, tight but attainable, very tight), no relationships existed between budget goal 
difficulty and job satisfaction, job tension, attitude toward budgets, budgetary 
motivation and performance. Ezzamel [1990] reported a similar result to that of Kenis 
as he found no relationship between budgetary participation and budget goal difficulty. 
The findings of both Kenis and Ezzamel provided support that culture had no effect in 
this area as they were conducted in two different culture (USA and UK). 
From the previous discussion we can see that most of the previous works were 
focused on testing the effect of goal difficulty on performance, satisfaction, and 
motivation. There have been few attempts to check the contingency role of goal 
difficulty between budgetary participation and both managers' motivation and budgetary 
slack. This research argues that goal difficulty interacts with budgetary participation 
affecting either favourable or unfavourable consequences. When managers are involved 
in setting budgets, it means they are better informed about the achievable levels, so they 
will include more realistic figures and hence they will be highly motivated to achieve 
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them, and their propensity to create slack will be decreased. Based on the previous 
discussion the following hypotheses have been derived. 
H-H-3- Budget goal difficulty moderates the relationship between budgetary 
participation and both motivation and slack; asfollows: 
H-II-3a- when goal difficulty is high, a high level of budgetary 
participation leads to high motivation; 
H-II-3b- when goal difficulty is high, a high level of budgetary 
participation decreases the propensity of managers to create 
budgetary slack 
3-3 Budget Goal Clarity 
Budget goal clarity refers to the extent to which budget goals are clear to those 
who are responsible for implementing them; it ranges from very ambiguous to very 
clear. However, in the area of budgetary participation this variable received little 
attention. This is probably because budget clarity and participation are close to each 
other. It is possible to argue that when managers are involved in setting-up budgets, 
budget goals are clear to them and then they will undertake implementing them. 
Locke et al [1981] which was discussed in the previous section, concluded from 
their review that goals are likely to affect performance under goal specificity. This 
means that goals regulate performance most predictably when they are expressed in 
specific quantitative terms rather than as vague intention to "try hard" or as subjective 
estimates of task. 
The results of Kenis's [1979] study which was discussed above showed that 
budgetary participation and budget goal clarity were not positively related, and both 
budgetary participation and budget clarity were significantly and positively related to 
managers' attitudes towards budgets. However, the contingency role of budget clarity 
between budgetary participation and both managers' performance and satisfaction is 
rare. This research considers this aspect by testing the contingency role of budget clarity 
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between budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction. It is anticipated 
that when budget goals are clear, high participation in the budgetary process will be 
associated with high performance and satisfaction, and these propositions are shown in 
the following hypotheses. 
H-114- Budget goal clarity moderates the relationship between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction: 
H-II. 4a- when budget goals are clear, high participation in the 
budgetary process will be associated with high performance; 
H-II. 4b- when budget goals are clear, high participation in the 
budgetary process will be associated with high satiifaction. 
3-4 Locus of Control 
Locus of control is a variable which has received a considerable amount of 
attention in the literature. It is a psychological variable which categorises individuals as 
either internals or externals (It is an expectancy variable rather than a motivational one). 
The following statement by Chiu and Hui [1982] indicates the difference between 
internal and external locus of control: 
"From the behaviourist point of view, the expectation that a particular 
behaviour will lead to a particular reward or punishment is 
generalizable, from the specific situation to situations that are seen as 
similar. The generalized expectancy that the reinforcement depends on 
one's own action is called internal locus of control. When a person 
perceives that reinforcements are not contingent upon their action, but 
rather upon other factors such as powerful others or fate, they are 
called external". 
Lefcourt [1966, p. 207] defined internals and externals as follow. 
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"internal control refers to the perception of positive and/or negative 
events as being a consequences of one's own actions and thereby 
under personal control; external control refers to the perception of 
positive and/or negative events as being unrelated to one's own 
behaviour in certain situations and thereby beyond personal control" 
Locus of control has been examined extensively in accounting research. Brownell 
[1981,1982a] investigated the effect of locus of control as a moderating variable 
between budgetary participation and both managers' performance and satisfaction. In 
1981, he reported the results of a laboratory study conducted to investigate the role of 
locus of control in the relationship between budgetary participation and performance. 
His research hypothesis is illustrated in figure 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 
Locus of control, participation, and performance 
Internal External 
High Congruence Incongruence 
Source of Control Participative High perfonnance Low performance 
1 
in Particular 




Low performance High performance 
(adopted from Brownell 119811) 
The results of his study provided strong confirmation of the predicted interactive 
effects of participation and locus of control for independent samples drawn from two 
different populations: accounting students and middle-level managers in manufacturing 
organisations. The results showed that the highest performing internals where those in 
high participation conditions, while the highest performing externals were those 
experiencing low participation. 
The first study did not test the moderating role of locus of control on managers' 
satisfaction, that is why Brownell [1982a] extended his model to involve satisfaction. 
Brownell [ibid. ] repeated his first study using a different method. A survey 
questionnaire was administered to 48 middle-level cost centre managers. This sample of 
Congruence Incongruence 
High performance Low performance 
Congruence Incongruence 
Low performance High performance 
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managers was the same group which formed the second experimental sample in 
Brownell's first study [1981]. 
The results of his second study were consistent with those'of the first, the 
interaction between budgetary participation and locus of control affecting performance 
was significant in both studies. Regarding satisfaction, the results in the second study 
showed that satisfaction with a particular job-aspect is higher for internals in high 
participation conditions and for externals in low participation conditions. 
It was questioned in the literature whether or not the results of Brownell [1981, 
1982a] were generalizable, therefore, many researchers tried to check this point. Frucot 
and Shearon [1991] for example replicated the study of Brownell in Mexico. Their 
results supported that locus of control and budgetary participation interact with each 
other affecting performance, whereas this interaction had no effect on managers' 
satisfaction. Although they attributed the differences to the culture, it would be more 
accepted to say that their study did not replicate Brownell precisely. In particular, Frucot 
and Shearon's measure of locus of control was different from that of Brownell. Of 
course each measure has its validity, but the researcher believes in order to avoid bias 
and to provide more precise comparison the same measure should have been used. 
In an attempt to check the generalizability of Brownell' results, Otley et al [ 1994] 
replicated the study of Brownell [1981]. They thought that replication was a much 
neglected aspect of accounting research. Their subjects were postgraduate students on 
various business degree courses and from different cultures, such as Anglo-Saxon, 
European, Oriental (Hong Kong and Singapore), African and Arab. 
Using the whole sample, which comprised of seventy five students, the general 
results provided weak support for Brownell's outcome, as the statistical interaction 
between participation and performance was not significant. But the graphical 
representation of their results showed that low participation resulted in better 




Otley et al [ibid. ] grouped their sample based on subjects (i. e. accounting, 
business analysis, operation research) and national background (i. e. Anglo-Saxon, 
European), then they tested their model for each group. Although each group composed 
of small numbers, students of business analysis and Anglo-Saxon national and cultural 
background produced significant coefficients of the expected sign. These results confirm 
that there are different variables, such as culture, which may play a role in the 
relationship between budgetary participation and locus of control affecting managers' 
performance. 
From another point of view Licata et al [1986] reported the findings of a 
laboratory experiment which indicated that locus of control also influenced the 
behaviour of superiors involved in the participative budgeting process. The research 
hypothesis was that an internal manager allows greater subordinate participation than an 
external manager. Research findings suggested that intemals tended to allow greater 
participation, thereby supporting the hypothesis. 
Mia [1987] tested the effect of locus of control on budgetary participation and 
hence attitude. Contrary to his expectation, Mia (p. 554) found the correlation between 
participation and locus of control was not significant, although it took the expected 
negative sign. The results also showed a negative relationship between locus of control 
and attitudes, and that means that internals were likely to have a more favourable 
attitude toward their jobs than externals. Using path analysis, Mia [1987, p. 558] tested 
the indirect relationship between locus of control and attitude via budgetary 
participation. The results showed it as negligible. So, his results supported the argument 
that locus of control has an important direct influence on employees' attitudes toward 
theirjobs and employers. 
It is clear from the above discussion that literature in this area has focused mainly 
on the joint effect of locus lof control affecting either performance or satisfaction, and 
testing these assumptionslin different cultures. The literature has ignored the results of 
this interaction on dysfunctional behaviour such as budgetary slack. The previous work 
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provides a basis to conclude that locus of control will play an important role in the 
manner set out below. 
For interrials who are confident of themselves and they perform well and 
are highly satisfied with a high degree of participation, high participation 
will decrease their propensity to create slack. 
1 For externals who are not confident of themselves and they perform 
poorly with low job satisfaction under a high degree of participation, 
high participation will increase their propensity to create slack. 
According to the previous discussion the following hypothesis was derived: 
H-H. 5- Budgetary participation and locus of control interact affecting 
managers' propensity to create slack In situations of high budgetary 
participation, internals are less likely to create budgetary slack, and 
externals more likely to do so. 
3-5 Budget Motivation 
Motivation is a topic of considerable significance which continues to attract the 
attention of those who want to influence and manage the motivation of people in 
organisations. Huczynski and Buchanan [1991, p. 57] defined motives as "learned 
influences on human behaviour that lead us to pursue particular goals because they are 
socially valued". 
In accordance with that definition, organisational theorists searched for the 
motivational components that affect employees and make them do their best to 
accomplish organisation goals. There are two reason given for the increased interest in 
work motivation. First, it is usually argued that organisation's effectiveness is often 
result of its managers' ability to motivate their workers. Second, motivation itself is 
complex and not fully understood by both managers and scholars (Griffin [ 1996)). 
Organisational theory has witnessed considerable research which investigated 
motivation on work-related behaviour. This is not the right place to discuss fully these 
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writings as they are out of the research interest. Attention will be given here to the effect 
of this psychological variable on budget-related behaviour. The role of motivation with 
budgetary participation was examined in early research. Searfoss and Monczka [1973] 
for example, tested the effect of motivation on budgetary control; his results supported 
his research hypothesis that participation in the budgetary process and motivation were 
positively related. Using a questionnaire distributed to middle and lower managers, 
Kenis [1979] confirmed the above argument that budgetary participation and budgetary 
motivation are positively related. 
To provide a good understanding of work-related motivation, different theories 
were introduced in the organisational and accounting literature such as expectancy, need 
satisfying, and achievement theories'. The effect of these theories has been tested on 
some organisational and budget-related variables. This section will focus on expectancy, 
theory as it has been used by different researchers in the area of budgetary participation. 
First, an explanation of this theory will be introduced, followed by reviewing some 
studies which used it in the budgetary context. 
Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory was developed in 1960s as a basic paradigm for the study of 
human attitudes and behaviour in organisations. It was frequently used as a theoretical 
and operational definition of motivation. Lawler and Suttle [1973] developed an 
expectancy model of behaviour. Its measures were the basis of many accounting 
applications, as will be described later. 
Another expectancy model was tested in a budgetary context by Ronen and 
Livingstone [1975] using House's [1971] formulation of an expectancy model which is 
set out below. 
n 
M= IVb+ P, [IVv,, + P2i Evj 
i=l, 2 




M= motivation to work 
IVa= intrinsic valance associated with successful performance of the task 
IVb=intrinsic valance associated with goal-directed behaviour 
EVi= extrinsic valances associated with the ith extrinsic reward 
contingent on work-goal accomplishment 
P, = the expectancy that goal-directed behaviour will accomplish the 
work-goal (a given level of specified performance); the measure's range 
is (4, +1) 
P2i= the expectancy that work-goal accomplishment will lead to the ith 
extrinsic reward; the measure's range is (4, +1) 
Ferris [1977b] applied the expectancy theory in public accounting firms. His 
results indicated that the expectancy model was a generally weak predictor of audit staff 
performance. It was, however, a significant predictor of employee job satisfaction. His 
results also suggested that the central expectancy core may not be applicable in 
professional environments, or at least at the lower echelons of professional 
organisations. 
In another use of expectancy theory in an accounting context, Brownell and 
McInnes [1986] attempted to reconcile the contradictions of previous work in the area 
of budgetary participation and performance. They used the motivational impact of 
expectancy theory as a mediator (intervening) of the relationship between these two 
variables. Their study failed to confirm that budgetary participation, through its effect on 
motivation, enhanced managerial performance. They found a positive relationship 
between performance and both motivation, whereas opposite to their expectations 
budgetary participation had a negative relationship with IVs "intrinsic valences" in the 
expectancy model. 
Brownell and McIness reported many limitations for their study which may have 
led to this disappointing results. Some of these limitations were directed to the sample 
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selection (non-random), others were to the theory itself They mentioned (P. 598) that 
expectancy models have sometimes shown a rather weak relationship to effort and 
performance. This criticism was observed by Ferris [I 977b] which was discussed above. 
To check this point further, Mia [1988] tested the effect of motivation as a 
moderating variable between budget participation and performance. Motivation in his 
study was viewed in the context of expectancy. Contrary to Brownell and McIness 
[1986], Mia found a positive interaction between budget participation and motivation 
affecting performance though budget motivation had insignificant relationship neither 
with performance nor budgetary participation. 
It is clear that the literature is in conflict with respect to the effect of budgetary 
participation on managers' motivation to achieve budget, and the role of motivation on 
the relationship between budgetary participation and managers' performance. The study 
of Brownell & McIness [1986] used the intervening approach and their sample was 
chosen from middle management managers from three companies. The study of Mia 
[1988] used the moderating approach and his sample was drawn from a single company. 
So, directly comparing these two results has some limitations as they used two different 
methodologies. 
Prompted by the inconclusive results reported by the previous works, this research 
will replicate some of the previous hypotheses to check their validity further. These 
hypotheses are consistent with the findings of Searfoss and Monczka [1973], Kenis 
[1979], and Mia [19881. Specially if we consider the comments of Brownell & McIness 
[1986], who doubt the generalizability of their results based on the weak points in their 
study, and advocate further investigation of their findings. This study also includes an 
extension to the previous work by testing the moderating effect of budget motivation on 
managers' satisfaction. Therefore, the following hypotheses were derived. 
H-H. 6- There is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
motivation to achieve budgets. 
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H-H. 7- Budget motivation plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance. "en managers are highly motivated to 
achieve budgets, the positive relationship hypothesised in H-H la will 
increase. 
H-H. 8- Budget motivation plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction. nen managers are highly motivated to 
achieve budgets, the positive relationship hypothesised in H-H. Ib will 
increase. 
3-6 Budgetary Slack 
One of the major issues in behavioural accounting research is the propensity of 
managers to create slack. Many studies (Le. Dunk [1997], Merchant [1985]) provided 
evidence that slack exists in many organisations. A major concern in the literature is 
how is budgetary slack created and what factors may increase or decrease this negative 
dysfunctional behaviour? First of all definitions of budgetary slack will be introduced, 
followed by a review for some previous works in this area. 
Cyert and March [ 1992, p. 42] considered slack as the difference between the total 
resources available to the firm and the total necessary to maintain the organisation 
coalition. A definition of budgetary slack is that offered by Nouri [ 1994] "the amount by 
which managers intentionally build excess requirements for resources into the budgets, 
or knowingly understate productive capability". 
How slack is incorporated into budgets, this was the question of many studies 
which their finding provided insights to the ways by which managers manipulate to do 
so. Low and Shaw [1968] produced evidence that sales forecasting could be used to 
create slack. Schiff and Lewin [1968] estimated that 20 to 25 percent of divisional 
operating expenses could be due to slack. 
Dunk [1997] investigated different issues about budgetary slack through a series 
of interviews with functional managers of different responsibility centres (production & 
marketing). One issue was how managers create slack. Some managers mentioned that 
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they can build slack into both fixed and indirect costs over which they have control. 
Marketing managers (revenue centres) particularly said that they were able to build 
slack by understating revenues (reducing expected sales quantities) and overstating costs 
(advertising costs). These results confirm that slack is existed in organisations and is a 
very common phenomenon. 
However, regardless of how slack is created, it should not be overlooked that it 
has its dysfunctional effect on organisations (Merchant [1985]). Such dysfunctional 
effects are the reason why much effort has been made to understand the causes of 
budgetary slack. One line of research was that, as long as budgetary slack is created by 
managers themselves, efforts should be made to test whether or not managers' 
participation in the budgetary process would lead to slack. 
Dunk [1997] tried to answer this question. His respondent were asked whether 
participation in budgetary process was a means by which slack could be built into their 
budgets, and they indicated this was the case. An initial response to this answer reveal 
yes, budgetary participation does affect managers' propensity to create slack. But some 
studies reported contrasting results. 
In early studies Onsi [1973] and Merchant [1985] for example found that 
participative budgets and budgetary slack are negatively related, whereas this 
relationship was weakly supported by others (Collins [1978]). Therefore, researchers 
focused on factors that may moderate this relationship and that might have led to such 
conflict. Budgetary slack-related studies have examined different factors that may affect 
the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. The following 
section introduces some of those factors. 
3-6-1 Environment Uncertainty. Govindarajan [1986] suggested that 
environmental uncertainty was a way of reconciling the previous conflict. He proposed 
that, as long as higher information-processing needs can be handled by giving subunit 
managers greater participation in decision making, the relationship between 
participation and slack need not be present under all conditions. Rather, the relationship 
will be moderated by environmental uncertainty, and the study provided empirical 
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evidence for that. He found (p. 513) that in situations of higher budgetary participation, 
the propensity of managers to create slack decreased in high environment uncertainty 
(but not in low-uncertainty). 
3-6-2 Budget Emphasis and Information Asymmetry. Dunk [1993] 
investigated the effect of information asymmetry and budget emphasis between 
budgetary participation and slack. Contrary to his expectations, the results showed that 
budgetary participation, information asymmetry and budget emphasis interact with each 
other affecting budgetary slack. Using a three way interaction the results showed that 
slack was lowest when all independent variables were high, and highest when all 
predictors were low. 
3-6-3 Ability of Superiors to Detect Slack. Lal et al [1996] tested the interaction 
between budgetary participation and slack detection on the propensity of managers to 
create slack. Their results provide evidence that slack is better controlled when the 
ability of superiors to detect it is high. 
3-ý-4 Technology. Merchant [1985] suggested that managers' propensity to create 
slack is negatively related to the predictability of the production process. His results 
showed that work-flow integration was negatively correlated with the propensity to 
create slack, but the product standardisation showed no significant correlation. 
In another study Dunk and Lal [1995] used a sample of production managers from 
different manufacturing companies in New-Zealand to test the interaction of budgetary 
participation, process automation and product standardisation on managers' propensity 
to create slack. Their results provided support for the proposition that both process 
automation and product standardisation influenced the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managers' propensity to create slack. 
3-6-5 Organisational Commitment. Nouri and Parker [1996] tested the effect of 
organisational commitment as a moderating variable between budgetary participation 
and budgetary slack, and. Their results showed a significant interaction of budgetary 
participation and organisational commitment leading to budgetary slack. For individuals 
with strong organisational commitment, the relationship was negative, for individuals 
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with low organisational commitment, the relationship was positive. The results of their 
study are limited as the sample chosen was from a single company and thus the results 
are less generalizable beyond the company they studied. 
It is clear that the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary 
slack is open to question as it was found to be positive in some cases and negative in 
others, and no relationship in a third group. On the other hand the previous results 
showed that this relationship is contingent on some organisational and behavioural. 
variable. Again, prompted by this inconclusive results this research will replicate some 
hypotheses which have been examined in the previous works to assess the robustness of 
their outcomes using the approaches adopted in this research. 
This research adopts the proposition that when managers participate in budgetary 
process they will be motivated to include more realistic figures and hence their 
propensity to create slack will decrease. This proposition is not universal, on contrary, it 
is contingent on some situational variable such as the ability of superiors to detect slack. 
When top management have various means to detect slack the relationship between 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack remains negative. The literature in this area 
has also ignored a possible contingent role for budgetary slack between budgetary 
participation and both' performance and satisfaction. Base on the literature review this 
research argues that when managers' propensities to create slack are high, high 
participation will decrease their performance and increase their work satisfaction. 
Accordingly the following hypotheses were developed. 
H-119- "en managers perceive a high degree of participation in the 
budgetary process, their propensity to create budgetary slack decreases. In 
other words there is a negative relationship between budgetary 
participation and slack. 
H-H. 10- Superiors' ability to detect slack plays a moderating role between 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack "en superiors have a high 
ability to detect slack, high participation in budgetary process will decrease 
managers'propensity to create slack. 
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H-H. 11- Budgetary slack plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance. In other words, when managers' propensity 
to create slack increases, high participation in the budgetary process will 
decrease their performance level. 
H-H. 12- Budgetary slack plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction. In other words, when managers'propensity 
to create slack increases, high participation in the budgetary process will 
increase their satisfaction. 
3-7 Job Performance 
I. 
The issue of performance evaluation has been considered by hundreds of articles 
and books. It is the key factor which determines the effectiveness an organisation in 
implementing its goals. It is necessary to distinguish between the measures of 
organisational performance and the measures of department or job performance. In the 
accounting literature there are various measures which have been used to evaluate 
organisations performance such as ROI "return on investment" or RI "Residual 
income". In this part of the thesis, it is not possible to discuss this area fully, so, these 
measures will be excluded from the discussion as this research focuses only on the 
measures which have been used by researchers to evaluate functional managers' 
performance. 
Many studies (e. g. Govindarajan [1984,1986), Merchant [1984], Dunk [1995b], 
Lau et al [1997]) used subjective measures to evaluate managers' performance. Their 
studies were based on a wide-ranging samples, thus it is impossible to get properly 
matched objective data in a cross-department study in multiple organisations. The 
literature in-this area witnessed a number of subjective measures, the most common 
used measure that of Mahoney et al [1963]. It is a self rating measure based on 
management ftinctions, it asks for rating for each of eight dimensions of performance as 
follow: planning, investigating, co-ordinating, evaluating, supervising, staffing, 
negotiating, and representing, bearing in mind that that different managerial positions 
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are likely to require different mixes of the eight dimensionsi. used this measure as the 
ability of department managers and his efficiency in each dimension as well as they used 
a global item which reflect his overall performance. 
Kenis [1979] used another subjective measure of performance through three 
dimensions, budgetary performance, cost efficiency, and job performance. Merchant 
[1984] and Dunk [1995] also used subjective measure which assess department's 
performance by asking their respondents bow effective is their department. 
Hopwood's earlier work on the criteria superiors use to evaluated their 
subordinates performance referred to four criteria. Three of these four were accounting 
measures reflecting two items only which are budget-constrained and concern with the 
cost (profit conscious) and the combination of these two items reflects a third dimension 
which is budget profit. The fourth dimension was non-accounting measure such as co- 
operation with colleagues, and concern with quality. In a previous section (2.5) attention 
was paid about the differential uses of these dimensions by superiors on actual 
performance, satisfaction and slack. 
It worth drawing attention to the fact that the subjective measures is not quite 
accurate as they may include bias. In the literature it has been argued that survey method 
is affected by social desirable responding (SDR) which is "the tendency of individual to 
present themselves favourably with respect to current social norms and standards" 
(Zerbe & Paulhus [1987], p. 250). It is difficult to discuss this issue (SDR) in detail, but 
attention should be paid in this section to the effect of this variable in the area of 
budgetary participation. Nouri et al [1995] argued for a moderating role for SDR on the 
relationship between budgetary participation (BP) and self-reported job performance 
(SJP). They proposed a positive relationship between BP and SJP when SDR is high, 
and no such relationship when it is low. Job performance was measured using two 
subjective measures (Mahoney [1963] and Gupta & Govindarajan [[1984]). Their 
empirical results supported strongly their argument for both measures. 
1. See also chapter six. 
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Performance was considered as a dependent variable for most of the research in 
this area. This research introduced various hypotheses in which performance was used 
as a dependent variable as well. The measure used in this study for this variable will be 
introduced in detail in chapter six. 
3-8 Job satisfaction 
Price & Mueller [1986] defined job satisfaction as " the degree to which 
employees have a positive affective orientation toward employment by the organization" 
In a similar manner to job performance, job satisfaction was used as a final outcome for 
most of the previous work. In the accounting literature many researchers investigated 
the effect of some organisational. or behavioural variables on job satisfaction (see 
Brownell [1982b], Harrison [1992], Ferris [1977]). The results of many of the previous 
studies found that managers' satisfaction in the company they belong to was associated 




Summary and Conclusion 
Chapter two and three have introduced the macro and micro level variables which 
have been selected in this study to construct the proposed integrative model. Macro- 
level is a term which refers to the organisational variables, whereas the micro-level 
refers to the behavioural. variables. These variables were classified into macro and micro 
level based on the nature of each variable and whether it was related to organisational 
characteristics and/or their internal polices or the perception of employees themselves. 
The previous chapter has introduced the macro-level variables which consisted of 
organisation size, environment uncertainty, technology, budget emphasis, leadership 
style, information asymmetry, and job difficulty. This chapter has introduced the micro- 
level variables which consisted of budgetary participation, budget goal difficulty, budget 
goal clarity, locus of control, ability of superiors to detect slack, budgetary slack, budget 
motivation, performance, and satisfaction. Chapter six will discuss fully the instruments 
which have been used to measure these variables. 
The macro and micro level variables were selected from the accounting literature 
to compose the proposed model. These variables have been selected as they received a 
considerable amount of attention in the previous work and their results showed their 
potential influence on budgetary control practices. In chapters two and three each 
variable was defined and the related literature was introduced. Twenty eight hypotheses 
were concluded and they were used to construct the proposed integrative model which 
shows systematically the relationship between them. 
The next chapter will discuss the effect of culture on budgetary control practices 
because one of the aims of this study is testing the model in different culture. Chapter 
five, however, will re-review the research hypotheses altogether and explains fully the 
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4- Chapter Four 
Cultures and Budget-Related Behaviour 
Many studies investigated the effect of culture on organisations and the systems by 
which these organisations are being run. The results of the previous works in this area 
were inconclusive. This chapter will introduce some definitions of culture which have 
been used by different researchers in this area (e. g. Hofstede [1980,1994]). Then it will 
review some studies in this area which tested the effect of culture on management 
control systems and budgetary control. 
4-1 The Concept of Culture 
It is difficult to be precise about what is meant by culture. For Kluckhomn [1951] 
culture "consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and 
transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i. e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached 
valuesI99. 
Hofstede [1994, p. 5] distinguished between what he called "culture one" where 
culture was perceived as a civilisation or refinement of the mind, and "culture two" 
where it was perceived as "a collective programming of the mind which distinguishes 
the members of one human group from another". Culture according to Hofstede's 
definition includes systems of values. 
Culture is usually learned and not inherited. For example, if we imagine that after 
birth a baby girl was adopted by-another family from a society different from that of her 
parents, she would acquire the culture from the environment she lived in. That is why 
Hofstede distinguished between human nature, personality and culture. Human nature 
represents the universal level in one's mind. It is inherited with one's genes. Hofstede 
1. Cited in Hofstede [19801. 
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gave an example of human nature as the operating system which exists in any computer, 
and cultures is the programs. Human nature includes fear, anger, love and so on. 
Personality, on the other hand is an individual characteristic. It is a unique 
personal set of mental programs which one does not share with others. It is partially 
inherited and partially learned. Figure 4.1 illustrates these three categories clearly. 
Figure 4.1 
Level of uniqueness in human mental programming 
Specific to Individual Inherited and Learned 
Pamnality 
Specific to Group or Category Culture Learned 
Uni Sal Inherited -I Human Nature 
I 
(adopted from Ilofstede 11994]) 
4-2 National and Organisational Cultures 
4-2-1 National Culture 
In the first half of this century social anthropology reported that all societies 
modem or traditional face the same problems, but the answers to them are different 
(Hofstede [19941). Social scientists attempted to identify those problems that were 
common to all societies through conceptual reasoning and reflection upon field 
experiences, as well as through statistical studies. Hofstede [ 1994, p. 13] reported that in 
[1954] Alex Inkeles and Daniel Levinson, published a broad survey, which suggested 
that the following issues qualify as common basic problems world-wide: 
Relation to authority 
Conception of self, in particular: 
a. the relationship between individual and society, and 
b. the individual's concept of masculinity and femininity 
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e Ways of dealing with conflicts, including the control of aggression 
and the expression of feelings 
Hofstede conducted different studies examining the cultural dimensions in 53 
countries and their effect on the values of people. Those people worked in local 
subsidiaries of one large multinational company (IBM). The four basic problem areas 
defined by Inkeles and Levinson were empirically found to represent dimensions of 
culture. Hofstede named these dimensions as follows: 
0 Power Distance (PD) 
0 Individualism versus Collectivism 
0 Masculinity versus Femininity 
0 Uncertainty Avoidance 
4-2-1-1 Power Distance. The first dimension was power distance. This dimension 
refers to the way in which societies perceive human inequality. Some societies have 
norm value that inequalities between people should be minimised, to the extent that 
make them believe that hierarchies in a society and its organisations; exist only for 
administrative convenience. Such society is classified as low power distance. On the 
other hand, some societies are characterised by the acceptance of their members of 
human inequality and its institutionalisation in hierarchies within a society such that is 
characterised as high power distance. According to the previous explanation, Hofstede 
[1994, P. 281 defined power distance as "the extent to which the less powerful members 
of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally". 
Institutions such as the family and school are the basic elements of society, 
whereas organisations are the places where people work. Hofstede [1980, p. 99] more 
specifically defined power distance between a boss (B) and his subordinate (S) as "the 
difference between the extent to which B can determine the behaviour of S and the 
extent to which S can determine the behaviour of B". The relationship between B and S 
is determined by different factors which are objective and subjective. The former refer 
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to the expertise of both, the history of their relationship and the task at hand. The latter 
refer to their mental programming and psychological impact on each other. The mental 
program contains their personalities and values. Table 4.1 explains the differences 
between low and high power distances in different countries. 
Table 4.1 
Summary of some power distance index (PDI) differences 
Low or Small FDI Countries High or Large PDI Countries 
More educated persons hold less 
authoritarian values than less educated 
Both more and less educated persons 
show almost equally authoritarian values persons 
Hierarchy in organisations; means an Hierarchy in organisations reflects the 
inequality of roles, established for existence in inequality between higher- 
convenience up and lower-down 
Decentralisation is popular Centralisation is popular 
Subordinates expected to be consulted Subordinates expected to be told what to 
do 
Adopted from Hofstede [1994] 
4-2-1-2 Individualism versus Collectivism. The second dimension was 
individualism. This dimension describes the nature of relationship among individuals in 
a society. Hofstede (1994, p. 50] classified people into two categories; the first is where 
people live in societies in which the interests of the group prevail over the interests of 
the individual. Every one in these societies seeks the interest of himself and people 
around him, and these societies were named "collectivist". In the second category, 
people live in societies where the interests of the individual prevail over the interests of 
the group. Every one in these societies seeks the interest of himself and of his/her 
immediate family. Hofstede [ibid., p. 51] defined these dimensions as follows: 
Individualism was defined as "societies in which the ties between 
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself 
and his or her immediate family". In contrast collectivism was defined as 
"societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, 
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cohesive in-group, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect 
them in exchange for unquestioning loyality". 
Table 4.2 surnmarises the differences between collectivist and individualist 
societies. 
Table 4.2 
Summary of some collectivist and individualist differences 
Collectivist Individualist 
High-context communication Low-context communication 
Relationship of employer-employee is 
perceived in moral terms, like a family 
link 
Relationship of employer-employee is 
Contract supposed to be based on mutual 
advantages 
Hiring and promotion decisions take 
employees' in-group into account 
Hiring and promotion decisions are 
supposed to be based on skills and rules 
only 
Management is management by group 
Management is management of 
individuals 
Relationship prevails over task Task prevails over relationship 
Adoptcd from Hofstede [1994] 
4-2-1-3 Masculinity. The third dimension was masculinity and femininity. All 
societies consist of men and women who are biologically distinct. In all cultures this is 
acknowledged, but the roles which determine their behaviour are culturally different. 
For example, in some cultures, women are not allowed to work at all, where as in others 
they are allowed to work but not in the same place as men. In other cultures they work 
together with men. However, Hofstede [1994, pp. 261-262] used the terms of 
masculinity and femininity for culturally determined roles. He defined them thus: 
Masculinity was defined as "a society in which social gender roles are 
clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on 
material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender and 
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concerned. with the quality of life" Femininity as its opposite was defined as 
66a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are 
supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life". 
Table 4.3 summarises the differences between feminine and masculine 
societies. 
Table 43 
Summary of some feminine and masculine differences 
Feminine Masculine 
People and warm relationships are 
important Money and things are important 
Work in order to live Live in order to work 
Managers use intuition and strive for 
consensus 
Managers expected to be decisive and 
assertive 
Stress on equality, solidarity, and quality 
of work life 
Stress on equality, competition among 
colleagues, and performance 
Resolution of conflicts by compromise 
and negotiation 
Resolution of conflicts by fighting them 
out 
Adopted from Hofstede 119941 
4-2-1-4 Uncertainty Avoidance. The fourth of Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
was uncertainty avoidance. It is a fact that people do not know what will happen 
tomorrow, and as long as the future is uncertain, they have to live with it but feel 
anxious about what will happen. 
Hofstede reported that every human society has developed ways of dealing with 
this anxiety. The ways belong to domains of technology, law, and religion. He defined 
uncertainty avoidance as, 
"The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain 







Summary of some uncertainty avoidance differences 
Low or Weak Uncertainty Avoidance High or Strong Uncertainty Avoidance 
There should not be more rules than is Emotional need for rules, even if these 
strictly necessary will never work 
Time is a framework for orientation Time is money 
Comfortable feeling when lazy; hard- Emotional need to be busy; inner urge to 
working only when needed work hard 
Low stress; subjective feeling of well High stress, subjective feeling of anxiety 
being 
Motivational by achievement and esteem Motivation by security and esteem or 
or bclongingness belongingness 
Adopted from Hofstede [1994] 
Many researchers have used Hofstede's cultural dimensions in their research. In 
the accounting area there are many studies which have used these dimensions to test the 
effect of culture in accounting in general (e. g. Gary [1988]), and in budgetary control in 
particular (e. g. Harrison [1993]). Summary of some of the previous work with respect to 
budgetary control is discussed below. 
Ueno and Wu [1993] used Hofstede's four cultural dimensions to determine 
whether national culture has an impact on budget control practices in the United States 
and Japan. They included the aspects of communication and co-ordination, planning, 
and performance evaluation. Some of their hypotheses were as follows. 
1. US companies use formal communication and co-ordination in budget 
planning process to a greater extent than Japanese companies. 
2. Japanese companies use broad time horizons in the budget planning 
process to a greater extent than in US companies. 




4. US companies practice controllability of budgets to a greater extent than 
Japanese companies. 
They reported (p. 33) that US companies characterised by individualistic managers 
were found to (1) use formal communication and co-ordination to a great extent, (2) 
build slack into their budgets to a greater extent, (3) practised controllability of budgets 
to a greater extent. 
However, Ueno and Wu concluded that the cultural dimension of individualism- 
collectivism was a significant factor in explaining the different practices in budgetary 
control systems between US and Japan for hypotheses 1,4,5. On the other hand, 
uncertainty avoidance did not explain much the differences in budgetary control 
practices between the two countries. 
Based on the results of Hofstede [1980], Frucot and Shearon [1991] expected 
Mexican managers to react differently to American in the area of budgetary 
participation. They replicated the study of Brownell [1982a] in Mexico city. Their 
research was based on a number of hypotheses including: 
1. In Mexico, participation in the budgetary process does not lead to 
high performance and satisfaction. 
2. In Mexico, locus of control does not interact with budgetary 
participation affecting managers performance and satisfaction. 
Their results confirmed that both budgetary participation and locus of control 
affect managers performance, and participation alone positively affects the satisfaction 
of Mexican managers. However, locus of control was found not to have any interaction 
with budgetary participation affecting satisfaction. These results were consistent with 
Brownell [1981,1982a] in performance, but they differ in satisfaction. Frucot and 
Shearon concluded that in performance culture has no effect, but in satisfaction they 
attributed the differences from Brownell [1981,1982a] to culture. 
Although Frucot & Shearon [1991] replicated the study of Brownell [1982a] in 
Mexico to test the effect of culture in this area, they did not include any cultural 
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dimensions in their study. So, Nur [1993] extended the study of Brownell to include 
cultural dimensions and tested his model in Indonesia. 
Nur's study found that participative budgeting in Indonesia is positively related to 
performance. His study failed to find a moderating role of locus of control affecting 
managers' performance, so these results are contradictory to both Brownell [1981, 
19 82a] and Frucot and Shearon [ 199 1 ]. 
With respect to j ob satisfaction, Nur [ 1993 ] also found that participative budgets 
were positively related to managers' satisfaction. Again, his study did not find a 
moderating role of locus of control affecting managers' satisfaction. 
Bilbeisi [1989] investigated the effect of culture on the relationship between 
budgetary participation and performance. He adopted the intervening model of McIness 
and Ramakrishnan [1987] which consisted of participative budgets, motivation, 
managerial confidence, information effect and performance (see figure 4.2). The main 
purpose of his study was ' 
to investigate the effect of culture on this model, and whether 
the effect of American is different from Saudi culture. 
Figure 4.2 
The intervening model adopted by Bilbeisi [1989] 










Bilbeisi's statistical tests showed that there was no significant difference between 
the USA correlations and the Saudi Arabian correlations linking participation and 
performance through the intervening variables. However, Bilbeisi saw that the structural 
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model revealed some significant differences between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia concerning participation's effect on managerial performance through the 
intervening variablesi. 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions were found to have implications for the 
appropriateness of participation. These dimensions are power distance and 
individualism. These two dimensions were identified by Hofstede as the most relevant 
dimensions for leadership and, therefore, for attributes of leadership, such as the degree 
of participation. (see Harrison 1992, p. 3]). 
According to the definition of power distance, in low PD societies, superiors and 
subordinates regard each other as having equal rights. Therefore, subordinates are 
expected to be consulted in decisions where they are responsible for implementation. On 
the other hand, subordinates' reaction to participation is likely to be favourable in 
situations of high collectivism/low individualism societies. Hofstede [1980, p. 230] 
noticed that, in low individualism societies, there is a belief that group decisions are 
better than individual decisions. On the contrary, in high individualism societies, there is 
a belief that individuals' decisions are better than group decisions. 
Harrison [1992] used Hofstede's cultural dimensions of power distance and 
individualism to examine the cross-cultural generalisability of the effect of participation 
on the relationship between budget emphasis and job related attitudes of subordinates. 
His study took place in Singapore and Australia. The results, (see p. 12) suggested that 
the effects of participation on the relationship between budget emphasis and job related 
tension and job satisfaction may be generalisable across cultures which are characterised 
by high power distance/low individualism and low power distance/high individualism. 
Harrison [1993] reported an examination of the effect of culture and personality 
on the relationship between reliance on accounting performance measures in the 
evaluative style of superiors and work-related attitudes of subordinates. He found that 
cultural dimensions affected the way superiors use accounting performance measures 
when evaluating their subordinates performance (see p. 2.24). 
1. For more details see Bilbeisi [ 1989] pp. 180-2. 
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4-2-2 Organisational Culture 
The concept of organisational culture has been studied in organisational and 
accounting literature. It has an important effect on job related outcomes as will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Hofstede [1990] mentioned that the cross-national research in IBM did not reveal 
anything about IBM's corporate culture, except that it engaged in a survey project of this 
size. All the units he studied shared the same corporate culture. In other words, the 
differences in the first study were in values rather than in practices. Therefore, Hofstede 
et al [1990] conducted another study to discover the dimensions of organisational 
culture. The study took place in two countries, the Netherlands and Denmark. The 
sample consisted of 20 units from 10 different organisations. The results (see Hofstede 
[ibid., p. 312 & Hofstede [1994], P. 182) indicated considerable differences in practices 
and small differences in values (see figure 4.3). They concluded the following six 
dimensions of organisational culturel. 
Process oriented vs. Results oriented 
Employee oriented vs. Job oriented 
Parochial vs. Professional 
Open system vs. Closed system 
Normative vs. Pragmatic 




The nature of cultural differences: national, occupational and 
organisational level 
Level 







(Adopted from Hofstedc [ 1994]) 
The effect of organisational culture on budgetary control has been investigated by 
Subramanian and Ashkanasy [1997]. They argued that the moderating role of 
organisational culture between budgetary participation and job-related outcomes Oob, 
related tension and performance) is neglected in accounting research. They examined 
organisational culture through two dimensions: innovation and attentions to details. 
Each of these two dimensions was classified as either high or low. Subramanian and 
Ashkanasy [ibid. ] developed their hypotheses as indicated in the following four 
categories: 
1. High innovation - High attention to detail: this was perceived as 
Dynamic/Disciplined. Budgetary participation leads to high performance 
and less job related tension. 
2. High innovation - Low attention to detail: this was perceived as 
Organic/Creative. Budgetary participation leads to high performance and 
less job related tension 
3. Low innovation - High attention to detail: this was perceived as 
Mechanistic/Role-Oriented. Budgetary participation leads to low 
performance and high job related tension. 
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4. Low innovation - Low attention to detail: this was perceived as 
Stagnant/Reactive. Budgetary participation leads to high perfonnance and 
less job related tension. 
Their results supported their arguments that organisational culture determines the 
impact of budgetary participation as a mean of producing favourable job related 
outcomes. More specifically, they found (see page 17) that participative budgeting was 
associated with decreased job related tension and increased managerial performance in 
situations of high innovation (Dynamic/Disciplined and Organic/Creative). Their results 
also found that budgetary participation was associated with high job related tension in 
Mechanistic/Role-Oriented than in Stagnant/Reactive, although there was no effect of 
participation on performance. 
O'Connor's [1995] provided evidence that organisational culture differences may 
lead to different responses to participative budgeting. His study was conducted in 
multinational companies to examine the differences of organisational culture among 
foreign and local companies (the study took place in Singapore) and its effects on the 
usefulness of participative budgeting. 
The results suggested that among the foreign subsidiaries (low power distance 
culture) increased participation in budgeting setting was significantly related to lower 
role ambiguity and a more favourable superiors/subordinates relationship. His results 
were significantly different from local company sample (which exhibit a high power 
distance organisational culture). 
However, the next chapter will introduce the proposed model adopted in this study 
and which will be tested in different cultures. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the concepts of both national and organisational 
cultures and also their effects on budgetary control practices. The definition of national 
culture was introduced followed the cultural dimensions which was developed by 
Hofstede [1980] and which has been used to distinguish a society form another. This 
chapter also provided a summary of some studies which investigated the effect of 
culture on participatory budgets. The results of the previous works revealed an 
important role for these cultural dimensions on budgetary control practices. 
The most important dimensions which showed significant roles on budgetary 
participation were power distance and individualism. Little attention has been paid to 
uncertainty avoidance, but no important role was found for masculinity. Therefor, this 
research will test the proposed model in different cultures to provide more insight to this 
area. But as the research questionnaire was quite long, it was not possible to use any 
cultural measures. Adding more items to the questionnaire would have reduced the 
response rate. This study will use the results of the previous studies which have been 
conducted in countries which have similar cultural dimensions to UK and Saudi Arabia 
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5- Research Hypotheses and the 
Proposed Model 
The previous chapters have discussed the aims of this research and the literature 
review based on which the research hypotheses were derived. This chapter will re-state 
the hypotheses indicated in chapters two and three all together, followed by the 
proposed model which will illustrate the nature of theses hypotheses systematically. 
This chapter also indicates the two analytical approaches adopted in this research by 
which the proposed model and hypotheses will be tested. 
5-1 Research hypotheses 
Research hypotheses consist of two groups: the first deals with, macro-level 
variables, whereas the second deals with the micro-level one. As mentioned before, a set 
of these hypotheses were adopted from previous works and will be replicated to assess 
the robustness of their conclusions. The rest were developed as they received little 
attention in past work, and their results may be of value for academic and practitioner in 
this important area of research. 
Although it was argued in the last chapter that culture is a contingent variable in 
this area of research, it is worth drawing attention here to the fact that the same 
hypotheses have been applied and tested in all cultures. In other word, no particular 
hypotheses were proposed for each culture. This approach was adopted because all the 
replicated hypotheses were developed based on studies conducted in UK and other 
countries which share similar cultural dimensions (i. e. USA, Australia). This study will 
explore whether these hypotheses are universal or culturally dependent. Moreover, 
chapter II will provide more explanations about the hypotheses which are expected to 
be culturally dependent as well as the expected effects that cultural differences would 
make to the original hypotheses. 
5-1-1 Macro-level hypotheses 
H-1.1- In large firms there will be a greater level of Budgetary Participation 
by functional managers. 
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H-I. 2- The greater the enviromnental uncertainty, the greater the degree of 
participation in the budgetary process. 
H-I. 3- High participation in the budgeting process will be found in firms 
where automation is high and vice versa. 
H-1.4- There is greater participation in setting budgets by managers in firms 
which have low product standardisation than in firms which have high 
product standardisation 
H-I. 5- The positive relationship between the level of participation in the 
budgetary process and motivation (hypothesis H-Il. 3) will increase when 
managers' superiors have a leadership style characterised by high 
consideration and low initiation structure. 
H-I. 6- Managers are more likely to be evaluated on the basis of budget 
emphasis if their superiors have a leadership style characterised by high 
initiation structure. 
H-I. 7- Budget emphasis plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction as follow. 
H-I. 7a- when budget emphasis is high, there is a positive relationship 
between budgetary participation and performance; 
H-I. 7b- when budget emphasis is high, there is a positive relationship 
between budgetary participation and satisfaction. 
H-1.8- Greater budget emphasis increases managers' motivation to achieve 
budget targets when, they perceive a high level of participation in setting 
their departments' budgets. 
H-1.9- When managers are in a position of having more information than 
their superiors: 
H-I. 9a- high participation in the budgetary process will increase 
managers' motivation to achieve budget; 
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H-1.9b- high participation in the budgetary process will increase 
managers' propensity to create slack. 
H-I. 10- There is a positive relationship between company size and the 
degree of information asymmetry. In other word, in large organisations, 
subordinates hold more information than their superiors. 
H-I-11- Job difficulty plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance, namely, when job difficulty increases, the 
positive relationship between budgetary participation and performance will 
increase. 
5-1-2 Micro-level Hypotheses 
H-Il. I a- There is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
performance. 
H-11. I b- There is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
satisfaction. 
H-II. 2- Managers will allow their subordinates a high level of participation 
in the budgetary process if they perceive themselves as having a high degree 
of participation in the budgetary process. 
H-II-3- Budget goal difficulty moderates the relationship between budgetary 
participation and both motivation and slack, as follows: 
H-II-3a- when goal difficulty is high, a high level of budgetary 
participation leads to high motivation; 
H-II-3b- when goal difficulty is high, a high level of budgetary 
participation decreases the propensity of managers to create budgetary 
slack. 
H-II. 4- Budget goal clarity moderates the relationship between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction: 
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H-II. 4a- when budget goals are clear, high participation in the 
budgetary process will be associated with high performance; 
H-II. 4b- when budget goals are clear, high participation in the 
budgetary process will be associated with high satisfaction. 
H-II. 5- Budgetary participation and locus of control interact affecting 
managers' propensity to create slack. In situations of high budgetary 
participation, internals are less likely to create budgetary slack, and externals 
more likely to do so. 
H-11.6- There is a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
motivation to achieve budgets. 
H41.7- Budget motivation plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance. When managers are highly motivated to 
achieve budgets, the positive relationship hypothesised in H-II. la will 
increase. 
H-II. 8- Budget motivation plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction. When managers are highly motivated to 
achieve budgets, the positive relationship hypothesised in H-Il. lb will 
increase. 
H-II. 9- When managers perceive a high degree of participation in the 
budgetary process, their propensity to create budgetary slack decreases. In 
other words there is a negative relationship between budgetary participation 
and slack. 
H-11.10- Superiors' ability to detect slack plays a moderating role between 
budgetary participation and budgetary slack. When superiors have a high 
ability to detect slack, high participation in budgetary process will decrease 
managers' propensity to create slack. 
H-H. II- Budgetary slack plays a moderating 'role between budgetary 
participation and performance. In other words, when managers' propensity ' 
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to create slack increases, high participation in the budgetary process will 
decrease their performance level. 
H-II. 12- Budgetary slack plays a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction. In other words, when managers' propensity to 
create slack increases, high participation in the budgetary process will 
increase their satisfaction. 
5-2 The Proposed Model 
The proposed model has been constructed based on the hypotheses indicated 
above. It shows systematically the relationships between two sets of variables which 
have been used extensively in this area of research and which were discussed in chapters 
two and three. As mentioned earlier, the first set consists of organisation size, 
environment uncertainty, technology (process automation and product standardisation), 
budget emphasis, consideration, initiation structure, information asymmetry, and job 
difficulty, Whereas the second set consists of budgetary participation, budget 
motivation, budgetary slack, budget goal clarity, budget goal difficulty, locus of control, 
satisfaction and performance. However, the next chapter explains in detail the measures 
which were used in this study to test each variable. 
The proposed model was tested using two complementary analytical approaches, 
the first is the moderating approach (see figure 5-A-1 in the appendix of this chapter); 
the second is the intervening approach (see figures 5-A-2 to 5-A-7). Before proceeding 
to explain the construction of each approach, a brief explanation about the differences 
between these two approaches is necessary. 
5-3 Moderating and Intervening Approaches 
A moderating variable is one that influences the sign or level of association 
between two variables. In other word, the direct effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent one is affected by a third variable. For example, when a researcher tried to 
find the relationship between smoking and heart diseases in a society he did not find a 
significant relationship between them. Then he grouped his respondents into two 
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categories. The first consisted of respondents who were aged between 15 to 35, whereas 
the second consisted of respondents who were aged from 36 and over. Then he ran his 
analysis again and found that smoking had insignificant relationship with heart diseases 
in the first group (15 to 35), whereas there was a positive relationship between them in 
the second group (36 and over). We can say that age played a moderating role between 
smoking and heart diseases as indicated in figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 
The moderating role of age between smoking and 
heart diseases 
As shown in figure 5.1 age was related neither to smoking nor to heart diseases. It 
influenced indirectly the relationship between smoking and heart diseases. On the other 
hand, an intervening variable is both directly affected by and directly affects other 
variables. In the previous example if we supposed that same researcher wanted to extend 
his study further to test the effect of heart diseases on happiness. He found, for example 
that heart diseases are negatively related with happiness. According to this discussion 
we may find that smoking has affected happiness indirectly. It increased heart diseases 
which in turn decreased happiness. Therefore, we can say that heart diseases has an 




The intervening role of heart diseases between smoking 
and happiness 
Age 
Smoking Henn d, seam 
An important feature of the intervening approach is that a researcher can use the 
results of statistical techniques such as path analyses (see chapter six), to compare direct 
and indirect effects. This will help to assess whether the direct effect contributes more 
than the indirect or vice versa, and it can provide the percentage of the indirect effect to 
direct one. 
In the accounting literature in general, and in the area of budgetary participation in 
particular, these two approaches have been used frequently by various researchers. The 
following example shows how different researchers perceived a particular relationship 
using these two approaches. 
Mofivadon 
Figure 5.3 
Model showing motivation as an intervening variable 
(Adopted from Brownell & McInnes [1986]) 
I- 
Figure 5.4 
Model showing motivation as a moderating variable 
(Adopted from Mia[1988]) 
According to figure 5.3 Brownell & McIness, [19861 proposed that high 
participation in budgetary process increases managers' motivation which consequently 
inc 
I 
reases their performance. Whereas Mia [1988] proposed that for managers who are 
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highly motivated to achieve their work and budget, high participation increases their 
performance. In other word, the proposition of Mia argues that budgetary participation 
enhances performance for managers who are highly motivated to achieve budget. 
The literature argues that understanding a particular relationship is dependent on 
the approach adopted. For example, the study of Brownell & McIness [1986], which 
was discussed in chapter three, failed to find an intervening role for budget motivation 
between budgetary participation and performance, whereas the study of Mia [1988] 
which tested the contingent role of motivation using the moderating approach found a 
positive role. 
On the other hand, we may find that both moderating and intervening approaches 
are suitable for a particular relationship. For example H-I. II which argues that when a 
job is difficult, high participation increases managers' performance. According to this 
hypothesis participation has a positive effect on performance when a job is difficult. On 
the other hand, in the intervening approach it is possible to argue that high participation 
will provide managers with high job-related information by which they will perceive 
their job less difficult and thus they will perform better. The following figures may 
indicates this. 
Job Difficulty Job DifTiiIty 
'I _____________ Budgetaty + Participation Performance 
Figure 5.5 Figure 5.6 
The positive role of participation on performance The positive role of participation on performance 
whenjob difficulty is low when job difficulty is high 
The previous figures show that in the moderating approach budgetary participation 
increases managerial performance when job difficulty is high, whereas in the 
intervening approach budgetary participation increases managerial performance when 
job difficulty is low. The researcher applied these two approaches to test the research 
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hypotheses to provide insight into these hypotheses from different points of view. 
Chapter eleven will provide more explanations about the appropriate analytical 
approach for each hypothesis. 
5-3-1 The Moderating Model. The construction of the proposed model is 
illustrated in figure 5-A-1 in the appendix of this chapter. As indicated, the model starts 
with four macro level variables: organisation size, environment uncertainty, process 
automation, and product standardisation. It is hypothesised that these four variables 
determine the level of budgetary participation (see hypotheses H-I. 1, H-I. 2, H-I. 3, and 
H-1.4). 
As shown in figure 5-A-1, the effect of budgetary participation on both 
performance and satisfaction will be tested directly (see hypotheses H-H. Ia& b), and 
then indirectly by examining the moderating effects of both budget motivation and 
budgetary slack (see hypotheses H41.7 & 8, H-II. Ila & b). Another nine macro and 
micro level variables will be tested as moderating variables between budgetary 
participation and budget motivation, budgetary slack, performance, and satisfaction 
according to the research hypotheses indicated in the beginning of this chapter. Figure 5. 
A-1 indicates the nature of the relationships between variables investigated in this study 
clearly. 
5-3-2 The Intervening Model. To test the intervening approach, path analysis 
was chosen as the most suitable technique. Path analysis has been used widely in 
psychological research and, in particular, behavioural accounting research (see, for 
example: Brownell and McIness [1986], Mia [1987], Kren [1992a], Sheilds and Young 
[1993]). The theoretical background of this technique will be discussed in detail in 
chapter six. 
To construct the intervening model by which research hypotheses will be tested, it 
was necessary to make a minor change to the proposed model shown in figure 5-A-1. As 
the structure in path analysis should be linear, and, according to the definitions of 
moderating and intervening approaches which were discussed earlier, moderating effects 
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do not exist in path analysis. Consequently, all the variables which played moderating 
roles in the moderating approach were considered as intervening variables here. 
From the research hypotheses, we can find that there are three sets of dependent 
variables, the first are the ultimate dependent variables as they do not have any other 
roles, and these variables are performance and satisfaction (see hypotheses H-Illa & b, 
HIAa & b, H-Va & b, H-H. 7 & 8, H-H. II& 12). The second set consists of both budget 
motivation and budgetary slack. These two variables play dependent roles in some 
relationships (see hypotheses H-H. 6, H-H. 9, H-1.8, H-I. 5, H-II. 3a & b, H-1.9a & b, H- 
IL 10), at the same time they play intervening roles in others (see hypotheses H-II. 7 & 8, 
H-11.11 & 12). The third set is a single variable, namely, budgetary participation, and it 
plays a dependent role to the contingency variables (see hypotheses H-I. 1,2,3 & 4), as 
well as it plays an independent role for all other hypotheses. 
According to the previous discussion it is clear that there are also two groups of 
intervening variables. The first, consists of nine variables which played moderating roles 
in the moderating approach and they are considered as intervening in this approach. 
These variables are budget emphasis, consideration, initiation structure, information 
asymmetry, budget goal difficulty, budget goal clarity, locus of control, ability to detect 
slack, and job difficulty'. The other set of intervening variables consists of budget 
motivation and budgetary slack. Figure S-A-2 in the appendix of this chapter shows the 
path diagram for the intervening model. 
To simplify understanding and testing the model indicated in figure 5-A-2, it was 
divided into four sub-models (see figures S-A-3,5-A-4, S-A-5,5-A-6). Each sub-model 
has its own equations, and hence results which will either support or reject some of the 
research hypotheses (these equations are in appendix C at the end of the thesis. All sub- 
models have the same starting point, as all start with the four contingency factors which 
affect the level of budgetary participation. These four variables are organisation size, 
environment uncertainty, process automation, and product standardisation (see figure 5- 
A-3). 
1. Chapter six discuses the measures which were selected to test these variables. 
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The four sub-models are different from this point. Sub-model I (see figure 5-A-4) 
tests the effect of budgetary participation on performance through the first set of the 
intervening variables (which consist of nine variables) and budget motivation. Sub- 
model 2 (see figure 5-A-5) tests the effect of budgetary participation on satisfaction 
through the first set of the intervening variables (which consist of nine variables) and 
budget motivation. Sub-model 3 (see figure 5-A-6) tests the effect of budgetary 
participation on performance through the first set of the intervening variables (which 
consist of nine variables) and budgetary slack. The last sub-model (see figure 5-A-7) 
tests the effect of budgetary participation on satisfaction through the first set of the 
intervening variables (which consist of nine variables) and budgetary slack. However, 
the following figure 5.7 summarises the four sub-models. 
Figure 5.7 












udgetary -30, Satisfaction 
....... 
12 








Chapter six will discuss in detail the methodology adopted in this research and it 
will also discuss the instruments which have been chosen from the literature to measure 
both macro and micro level variables. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the two approaches adopted in the current study to test 
the research hypotheses and they are moderating and intervening. Accounting literature 
suggests that two approaches explain the relationship between budgetary participation 
and both managers performance and satisfaction. These two approaches are 
complementary to understand a particular relationship. 
The model started with four contingency variables which were used extensively in 
previous research to test their effect on the level to which managers are involved in 
setting their department budgets. The effects of budgetary participation on both 
managers' performance and satisfaction - 
were tested directly, and indirectly through 
eleven variables were perceived once as moderating and second as intervening. This 
chapter has also re-introduced research hypotheses based on which the proposed model 
was structured. 
The next chapter introduces research methodology to test the proposed model. It 
includes research site, measures of variables included in the model, the results of testing 
its reliability in the current research and, finally, the statistical techniques to test both 
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6- Research Methodology and Statistical Design 
6-1- Research Methodology 
This chapter introduces the methods adopted to test the proposed model. It 
includes details of the research sites, the method of collecting data, implications of the 
size of the samples and translation, and the measures used. At the end of this chapter 
path analysis is discussed to provide more explanation about its assumptions. 
6-1-1 Research Sites 
The proposed model was tested on a group of functional managers chosen from 
two countries, UK and Saudi Arabia. UK was chosen as the primary field study to test 
the proposed model because this research includes a replication of some of previous 
hypotheses which have been conducted by different scholars in UK and other countries 
which share similar cultural dimensions (e. g. USA and Australia). Saudi Arabia was 
chosen to replicate the study which has been conducted in UK using two samples, Saudi 
(locals) and Arab (non-locals) functional managers to see whether or not the results of 
the proposed model are culturally dependent. Saudi Arabia and UK have been examined 
in previous work and there was evidence that they are culturally different. The best way 
to summarise the cultural differences between UK and Saudi Arabia is to compare the 
scores reported by both Hofstede [1994] and At-Twaijri & AI-Muhaiza for each cultural 
dimension. Table 6.1 indicates these differences. 
Table 6.1 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions in UK, Saudi and Arab countries 
Dimensions UK Arab Saudi 








Masculinity 9\10 i 66 23 53 53 
Uncertaincy Avoidance 47\48 - 35 27 68 99 
Adopted from Hofstede 1980 
Adopted from At-Twaijri and AI-Muhsiza 
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It should be noted that this research did not employ cultural measures. Therefore, 
the scores of Hofstede's cultural dimensions reported by Hofstede [1980] and At- 
Twaijri & AI-Muhaiza were used as a base to show how these two countries are 
culturally different. From table 6.1 we can see that there are substantial cultural 
differences between the UK and Arab countries in general, and between the UK and 
Saudi Arabia in particular in each of the four dimensions as well as in each score rank 
(rank of the sample within the fifty three countries which were studied by Hofstede). 
The scores of Hofstede [ 1980] have at least three limitations: first, the study was 
conducted in the 70s, so it is not wise to argue that over the past three decades cultural 
dimensions remained the same. Second, in spite of the fact that- Arab cultures share 
similar dimensions, each of them has its own characteristics, and the study of Hofstede 
did not provide that. Third, the study of Hofstede was conducted using a sample from a 
single organisation, and we can strongly argue that organisational culture may prevail 
over national culture. A strong defence to the first and third points is indicated in figure 
6.2 
Table 6.2 
Scores of power distance and individualism in 
Singapore 
Singapore Power Distance Individualism 
Hofstede 1980 74 20 
Harrison 1992 92 36 
Harrison et al 1994* 73 46 
O'Connor 1995 
Combined 61 56 
Local companies 72 65 
Foreign companies 53 50 
Lau et al 1997 60 41 
* Adoptcd from O'Connor 1995 
Table 6.2 provides support to the first point as cultural scores have been changed 
through different years for the same country (Singapore). This table also limits the 
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results of Hofstede [1980] as it shows cultural scores for a single country are different 
between local and foreign companies. With reference to the second point, the study of 
At-Twaijri & AI-Muhaiza which was applied in the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) 
countries provided evidence that there are some differences between Arab in these 
cultural dimensions. 
Although the study of At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza can provide a base to show the 
cultural differences between UK and Saudi Arabia, it has certain limitations. First, the 
study of Hofstede was applied in the 70s, and that of At-Twaijri & Al-muhaiza was 
applied in the 90s. This twenty year difference may have caused some of the differences. 
The second, the study of At-Twaijri & Al-Muhaiza was applied in a single industry (oil 
companies), so their results are less generalisable. However, both studies can be used as 
a base to show how UK and Saudi Arabia are culturally different. 
Data were collected using a survey questionnaire from functional (responsibility) 
managers in manufacturing, finance, commercial and service companies in Saudi Arabia 
and UK. Those managers reflected different areas of responsibilities (profit centres, cost 
centres, revenue centres). It was decided to select managers from different companies 
rather using a single company. Of course the results of using sample from single 
company are more accurate, but at the same time these results are less generalisable. 
Nouri & Parker [ 1996] confirmed this point of view when they considered their results 
limited as the sample was selected from one company. 
As the research required collecting data from different functional managers in 
each company, it was necessary to get the approval of the functional managers who 
would distribute the questionnaires to their colleagues before sending them, and also to 
determine the departments whicli would be involved. 
6-1-2 Collecting data 
6-1-2-1 Britain 
Data was collected first from British companies. Companies were selected non- 
randomly from "UK Kompass Business Directory". It was focused on companies in 
Bristol and the surrounding areas. It was determined to contact companies which had 
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one hundred or more employees, because it was expected that companies with a small 
number of employees would be less likely to have clear budgeting systems. This number 
has been considered in other accounting research such as Subramanian and Ashkanasy 
[1997] and Dunk [1993]. About one hundred and fifty letters were sent to different 
companies explaining the nature of the study and seeking the approval to distribute the 
questionnaire to different functional managers in each company. 
Only a very few positive answers were received, so that it was necessary to 
contact the companies that did not reply by telephone to encourage them. At first, fifty 
questionnaires were sent to the companies which agreed to participate. The first twenty 
completed questionnaires were used as a pilot study to check the following matters: 
a- question wording; 
b- the length of the questionnaire. 
No problems were found in question wording. Regarding the length of the 
questionnaire the researcher found that the average time spent answering the 
questionnaire was 24 minutes. Therefore, the researcher continued to contact companies 
and distribute the questionnaire. The researcher found that phone calls had better results 
than letters. In each company phone calls were made with a functional managers (e. g. 
financial director, personnel manager, or public relationships manager) explaining the 
nature of the study and convincing them to encourage their colleagues to participate in 
the study. 
Managers were promised that all data will be strictly confidential and will be used 
for scientific research purposes, they were also told that their names and their 
companies' names will not be mentioned in the study as the research is dealing with a 
wide-ranging sample. Some managers mentioned that they will select personally some 
of their colleagues to participate. Others said they will distribute the questionnaire to 
their colleagues in different departments and it is up to them as it is voluntary work. 
Questionnaires were sent to those managers each with a pre-paid envelop to return 
the questionnaire directly to the researcher. After deleting the invalid questionnaires, a 
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sample of 65 (of 240) was used in the analysis from 20 company yielding a response 
rate of 27%. It was noticed that some respondents did not answered all items in some 
questions. For example some measures consist of six items, some respondents answered 
for example four and left two items. In order to avoid bias in the analysis, each question 
had missing items was considered as missing only for this respondent. Thus the number 
of cases is given for each analysis. 
6-1-2-2 Saudi Arabia 
Collecting data in Saudi Arabia was more problematic than the UK for two 
reasons: first, it was necessary to translate the questionnaire into Arabic, as companies 
employs Saudi and other Arab managers. Second, the researcher tried to obtain samples 
from different cultures. Contact was made with companies in three cities, Jeddah, 
Riyadh, Yanbo. Consistent with the UK sample, the researcher focused only on 
companies which employ more than one hundred to ensure there was a clear budgetary 
system. 
Companies were selected also non-randomly using some directories obtained from 
the information centre of Jeddah chamber of commerce and industry. In addition, 
managers in some big companies were personally approached using access of some 
friends who work in those companies. To distribute the questionnaire to different 
functional managers in each company, the same procedures as in UK were followed. 
Contact was made with a functional manager (e. g. financial director, personnel manager, 
or public relationships manager). Personal visits were made to companies in Jeddah and 
phone calls were made with companies in Riyadh and Yanbo. 
Questionnaires were given to managers who agreed to participate. The 
questionnaires distributed were in two versions, Arabic and English, as some managers 
were from far east countries such as India, or Philippines. The first thirty questionnaires 
returned were chosen as a pilot study. Both question wording and the length of the 
questionnaire were checked. There were some inquiries regarding certain items and it 
was explained to the managers what the researcher meant by these items. Regarding the 
length of the questionnaire, no objections were found. 
6.6 
Chapter six 
The researcher continued contacting companies and distributing the questionnaire. 
About two hundred and twenty questionnaires were distributed, and 134 (61%) were 
returned. After deleting invalid copies, a sample of 118 (53%) remained to be analysed. 
Then it was noticed that 27 (12%) questionnaires were from different cultures; Indian, 
European, Philippine and others. So they were excluded from the research as they were 
from cultures which shared no similarities, and the number of each group was 
insufficient for analysis to be reliable. Thus, the study focused only on Saudi (locals) 
and other Arab (non-locals) managers. It was not acceptable in this research to combine 
these two groups into one sample for three reasons. 
First, the results of Mann-nitney test showed that some variables (see table 6.3) 
are significantly different in these two groups. Table 6.3 indicates that budget emphasis 
and subordinates participation in budgetary process had no significance differences in 
all of the three samples. Although these two variables were similar, it was not possible 
to combine them. The reason is that some variables (i. e. performance) that were 
hypothesised to have an interactive effect with budget emphasis had significant 
differences between the three cultures. From table 6.3 we can see that there were only 
seven variables which were significantly different between the Saudi and Arab samples, 
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The second reason for distinguishing between Saudi and Arab samples was 
reported by Ilofstede [1994, p. 54]. He mentioned "of course the Arab countries differ 
among themselves, and impressionistically the Saudis within this region are even more 
collectivist than some other Arab like Lebanese or Egyptians". Collectivism is a major 
cultural dimension which was investigated in various research particularly in the area of 
budgetary participation as mentioned in chapter four. The third reason was that both 
Saudi and British arc locals and the Arab sample are non-locals (see glossary at the end 
of this thesis). Non-locals work within three cultural dimensions: the first, their own 
national culture, second, the host Culture in which they live for some time, and the third 
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Figure 6.1 shows that both Saudi and British work in area (4) which combines 
national and organisational cultures. Arab managers work in area (5) which combines 
between their own national culture, the host culture (Saudi Arabia) and the 
organisational culture they work in. 
The number of valid responses of Saudi managers were fifty one (23%) from 15 
companies, and the number of valid responses of Arab managers were forty (18%) from 
17 companies. Again, it was noticed that few managers left items in some questions 
unanswered, therefore, these questions were considered missing. 
The range of respondents in each company in the British and Saudi samples 
ranged from 1-10 based on the co-operation of the functional managers who were 
contacted and the willingness of their colleagues to spend time on the study. The 
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6-1-3 Demographic Factors 
These factors indicate the characteristics of the samples in this study, and they are 
in sequence, job content, age and education level. The demographic characteristics of 
participating managers for the three samples are given in table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
Demographic factors for the three samples 
Culture British Saudi Arab 
Sample Size 
Characteristics 
65 51 40 
Job - Production 16 (24.6%) 6 (11.7%) 3 (7.50%) 
Sales & Marketing 10 (15.41/9) 11 (21.6%) 9 (22.5%) 
Personnel & Training 16 (246%) 13 (25.5%) 7 (17.5%) 
Finance & Accounting 10 (15.4%) 10 (19.6%) 13 (32.5%) 
Others 13 (20.0%) 10 (21.6%) 8 (20.0%) 
Age - Under 25 0 12 (23.50K) 5 (12.5%) 
25-35 13 (20.0%) 13 (25.5%) 5 (12.5%) 
36A5 22 (33.8%) 21 (41.2%) 14 (35.00/*) 
46-55 25 (38.5%) 5 (9.80%) 16 (40.0%) 
Over 55 5 (7.70%) 0 0 
Education - High school 16 (24.61/6) 6 (11.8%) 3 (7.50%) 
B. Sc. 14 (21.5%) 36 (70.6%) 29 (72.5%) 
M. Sc. 2 (3.10%) 7 (13.71/6) 6 (15.01/0) 
Ph. D. 1 (1.50%) 2 (3.90%) 1 (1.50%) 
Other 27 (41.5%) 0 5 (5.00%) 
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Table 6.5 shows that all samples consisted of different functional managers. Of 
course it was not possible to obtain the sarne number in each group in each culture as It 
depended on the co-operation of the companies. However, figure 6.2 simplifies the 
comparison ol'the number of functional managers in each sample. 
Figure 6.2 
Comparison of functional managers in the three samples 
6-1-4 Size and translation implications 
6-1-4-1 Size Implication 
'['his StUdy has some limitations concerning the size of the samples as they were 
somewhat small and at the same time non-random, this is explained below. 
+ The questionnaire included one hundred and thirty three items 
measuring nineteen variables, and this made convincing managers to 
participate in the study very difficult as the questionnaire was quite 
long. 
* The samples of this research reflected different departments in each 
company. Consequently, getting approval to reach those managers was 
quite difficult, as some managers who were contacted said that they 
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could not insist their managers should participate in work that did not 
relate to the company. 
Much research in this area has suffered from these problems. An examination of 
sampling procedures in the previous research indicated that some research preferred to 
focus only on a single firm. Brownell and Dunk [1991, p. 695] reported that "it is not 
uncommon for empirical work in this area to focus on samples of respondents firom 
single organisations". Hopwood [1972], Milani [1975], Otley [1978] and Brownell & 
Hirst [1986], Orpen [1992] and Mia [1988], all conducted their studies in single firms. 
In another attempt to avoid the previous problem, other researchers selected their 
samples non-randomly, and considered that as a limitation of their study (for example 
Brownell [1982b], Brownell & McIness [1986], Mia [1987], and Gul et al [1995]). 
Nouri & Parker [1996] mentioned that their sample was not completely random. Ross 
[1994] for example reported that his sample was selected largely on the basis of ease of 
access to him and thus his sample was non-random. To avoid the fault which directed to 
non-random sample Ross used sample reflected different area of activities (e. g. finance, 
manufacturing, and services). A third group preferred to use university students as a 
surrogate (see for example Otley et al [1994], Waller [1988], Hirst [1983], Licata, et al 
[1986] and Chow et al [1988]. 
The researcher believes that the size of the samples is satisfactory. Table 6.6 
surnmarises other studies in this area. From this table it can be seen that the samples in 




Sample sizes of some of previous studies 
Study Research Method Date of Study Size of Sample 
Govindarajan Questionnaire 1984 58 
Brownell Questionnaire 1985 66 
Waller Laboratory-Stu. 1988 51 
Kenis Questionnaire 1979 169 
DeCoster & Fertakis Questionnaire 1968 121 
Dunk & Lal Questionnaire 1995 83 
Hirst Quest. Student 1983 111 
Collins Questionnaire 1978 101 
Brownell & McIness Questionnaire 1986 108 
Brownell & Merchant Questionnaire 1990 146 
Brownell Questionnaire 1982 48 
Hirst Questionnaire 1987 44 
Brownell & Hirst Questionnaire 1986 80 




Chow et al Laboratory Stu. 1988 40 
Dunk Questionnaire 1993 79 
hfia Questionnaire 1989 76 
Orpen Questionnaire 1992 136 
Shields & Young Questionnaire 1993 98 
Foran & Decoster Question. Stu. 1979 81 
Milani Questionnaire 1975 82 
Licata et al Question. Stu. 1986 127 
Frucot & Shearon Questionnaire 1991 83 
Mia Questionnaire 1988 83 
Chenhall & Brownell Questionnaire 1988 36 
Otley et al Laboratory-Stu. 1994 
Gul 1995 Questionnaire 1995 37 
Lal et al Questionnaire 1996 83 
* two cultures 
6-1-4-2 Translation Implication 
To conduct this research in an other culture (Saudi Arabia) it was necessary to 
translate the questionnaire items into Arabic.. Any translation has implications as it is 
difficult to give sentences the same meaning. Many researchers considered this problem. 
The best solution was the method of back translation as suggested by Brislin [1970]. 
This method means a researcher has to translate his questionnaire items from the 
language it was originally developed into the language he wants. Then translate it back 
to its original language. This method was adopted by some researchers in accounting 
literature such as Nur [1993]. The translation prIocedures as used by Nur were also 




Back-translation procedures adopted from Nur [1993] with minor 
change 
In the current research, the researcher started translating the questionnaire (source) 
into Arabic and then, it was reviewed many times. Some questions were translated back 
also by the researcher into English. So, back-translation method was not applied for all 
questions, but only to some of them. The questionnaire included some questions asking 
for items and scales which were not clear in the questionnaire. The researcher conducted 
a pilot study to find out any problem in understanding the questionnaire items. The pilot 
study did not include any major inquiries. Based on some suggestions few revisions 
were made and it was distributed as a final copy. However, the results of the reliability 
test, as will be described later, give more confidence of the accuracy of the translation 
procedures. 
6-1-5 Research Measurements and Reliability Test 
This section introduces the measures used in the study and the results of reliability 
tests. In accounting and organisational literature there is a number of measures for each 
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variable used in this study. To decide what measures to use in this research two factors 
were considered: first, it was decided to select measures which have been used 
extensively by many researchers as their validity has been established, and each measure 
will be explained in detail in the following section. Second, the length of a measure. As 
this research intended to test nineteen variables and some of them consist of a large 
number of items, it was necessary to short some measures (such as satisfaction, 
leadership style, job difficulty) to keep the questionnaire in a manageable limit. Where a 
measure was shortened, the discarded items from the researchers' point of view shared 
similar meanings to items which were included. 
The issue of shortening a measure has been acknowledged by some researchers, 
Nouri et al [1995] mentioned that survey length constraints necessitate using shorter 
measures. Their study for example measured social desirable responding (SDR) using 
10 items of Crowne & Marlow's [1964] measure which consists originally of 33 items. 
They accepted this procedure basing on the argument of Robinson & Shaver [ 1973] who 
suggested that such strategy "using a smaller number of items from the overall scale of 
the original authors" is acceptable. Curry et al [1986] also measured job satisfaction 
using six items selected from the index developed by Brayfield and Rothe [1951] which 
consists originally of eighteen items. 
Of course such shortening will include some bias particularly when results are 
compared with previous works, therefore, the results for the variables which were 
shortened will be considered with some caution when they are compared with the 
previous work. 
In social research there are two tests which are usually conducted before 
proceeding with analysis, namely, reliability and validity. Reliability of the instrument 
means "the degree to which the same scores can be reproduced when the same objects 
are measured repeatedly" Tannebaum's (OST) [1957f. 
The test according to the previous definition tries to answer whether the testing 
instrument and subjects produce consistent answers for similar questions. Validity is 
1. Cited in Grove and Savich [1979, p. 524]. 
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another issue which it focuses on the instrument itself rather than respondents. The 
major concern of validity is whether, the instrument measures what the researcher has in 
mind. For example, the validity test for the instrument for budgetary participation tries 
to ensure that the instrument actually measures the level of participation in the 
budgetary process. 
This study focuses only on the first issue, namely, reliability and compared the 
results with previous studies. Validity is not discussed here because all the measures 
used in this study were developed by experts in behavioural. accounting research and 
they have been used by other researchers on many occasions. 
Before proceeding to introduce the measures used in this study, it is important to 
mention that there are different statistical techniques which produce reliability results. 
Cronbach's Alpha (cc) is concerned with the internal consistency of a test, based on 
correlations of items on a single scale (for details see Cronbach [1951]). Another 
method is "Split-Half reliability", which is based on splitting the scale into two parts 
and looking at the correlation between the two parts. In this study and consistent with 
most of the previous research in this area, Cronbach's Alpha was used. This will 
facilitate comparing the results with previous studies. 
In should be noted here that there is no significance level for the reliability 
analysis. But from the literature it can be concluded that there are three levels as follow. 
(a) Alpha < 0.5 indicates that reliability for a measure is low, therefore, such results can 
not be relied upon and caution should be exercised when these results are interpreted. 
(b) Alpha ý: 0.5 and < 0.7 indicates that reliability for this measure is in a moderate 
level. (C) Alpha 2: 0.7 indicates that reliability for a measure is high. This classification 




Levels of reliability test used in this study 
Levels of Cronbach Alpha Interpretation 
<0.5 Can not be relied upon 
0.5 . 6.9 Moderate level 
0.7 and over Hgh level 
I 
6-1-5-1 Organisation Size. In the literature there are a number of measures for 
organisation size, including number of employees, turnover, and capital employed. 
Some studies (e. g. Ezzamel [1990]) used all. Consistent with Merchant [1981] and 
Bruns & Waterhouse [ 1975] this research used only number of employees as a measure 
for the size of a company for two reasons. First, using other measures with the number 
of employees would limit the number of companies which were going to be contacted. 
Second, number of employees are more consistent with this area of research. The main 
issue of this research is managers' participation and its relation with other behavioural 
and organisational aspects. Participation is more effective arguably with a large number 
of employees. 
6-1-5-2 Perceived Environment Uncertainty (PEU). In an early discussion (2-2) 
it was mentioned that most of research, particularly in this area, has focused on 
perceived environment uncertainty rather than the actual uncertainty. This research has 
also adopted this approach, as it aims partly to provide a comparison with the previous 
works. The literature witnessed different instnunents for PEU. Ezzamel [1990] and 
Govindarajan [1984] for example used the instrument of Miles & Snow [1978] which 
consists of 23 items. They tested environment uncertainty by measuring external factors 
as they were perceived by departmental managers on a scale ranging from highly 
predictable to highly unpredictable. Others, for example, Ferris [1977a] focused on the 
three dimensions of Duncan, which were revised by Sathe [1974]. This instrument 
measures PEU as how it is perceived by departmental managers in the following three 
dimensions: (1) the lack of information regarding the environmental factors related with 
a given decision making situation, (2) the degree of confidence with regard to how 
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environmental factors would affect success or failure, (3) the difficulty of knowing the 
outcome of a specific decision. 
To keep the research to a manageable size, the 12 items instrument of Duncan 
[1972] which was revised later by Sathe [1974] (see Ferris [1977a]) was selected 
(question number 4 in the questionnaire). Response categories varied along a five-point 
scale anchored by never, occasionally, half the time, frequently, and always (items 1,2, 
6,8,10 were reverse scored). An overall measure of perceived uncertainty was 
computed by summing the 12 item-scores. The reliability tests for this measure (see 
table 6-A-1 in the appendix of this chapter) were ((x 0.41,0.68 and 0.77) for British, 
Saudi and Arab samples. Saudi and Arab alphas show a considerable level of reliability, 
but the reliability alpha for British sample reported a low level. Therefore, caution 
should be exercised when the results of the British study are interpreted. 
6-1-5-3 Technology. Consistent with the previous studies, this research measured 
technology in terms of process automation and product standardisation. Only production 
managers (if there is one in a company) oy financial managers were asked to answer this 
question as other managers such as marketing may not answer it properly. The answers 
were generalised for all respondents from the same company. Only few managers have 
answered this question, so the samples size for this question was low. 
6-1-5-3-1 Process Automation. The operational measure of process automation 
is the three-part instrument developed by Inkson et al [1970]. The first part calls for a 
rating of the degree of automation of the most automatic piece of production equipment 
used in the respondent's company (question number]4 in the questionnaire). The rating 
is on a six-point scale. Using the same scale and anchor set, the second part elicits a 
rating of the degree of automation of the bulk of the production equipment in use in the 
respondent's department. The third part provides a rating of the degree of automation of 
finished product quality control on a three-point scale. The responses were summed to 
give the overall measure of process automation. This measure was used by Brownell 
and Merchant [1990], Dunk and Lal [1995], and Dunk [1996]. Descriptive reliability of 
this measure was carried out (see table 6.9, p. 6.27). Table 6-A-1 in the appendix of this 
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chapter shows that the reliability analysis of Arab sample was high (a 0.7), whereas it 
was in a moderate level for both British and Saudi samples (cc 0.66,0.5). 
6-1-5-3-2 Product Standardisation. The measure of product standardisation 
proposed by Thompson [1967] and subsequently used by Merchant [1985] and Dunk 
and Lal [1995] was used in this study (question number 14 in the questionnaire). 
Products were classified as follow: (1) custom made products, (2) products differing but 
having common components, (3) products basically alike with only minor differences 
and (4) completely standardised products (see Brownell and Merchant [1990]). It is 
obvious that number I is the least standardised and number 4 is the most standardised. 
As this measure is a single item measure, no reliability test can be made. 
6-1-5-4 Budgetary Participation. The accounting literature witnessed various 
measures for budgetary participation (i. e. Hofstede [1968], Milani [1975], Aranya 
[1990], Kenis [1979]). Hofstede's instrument is a single item with eight points which 
places a stress on who makes the proposal, rather than who takes the final decision. 
Milani's instrument consists of six questions on a seven point scale to determine a 
manager's position with regard to participation. Milani's participation questionnaire 
measures both the amount of influence an individual has on the budget and his/her 
involvement in the process of establishing the budget. Aranya's instrument consist of 
six items which trays to assess the degree to which budget goals are imposed (see Nur 
[1993]. 
Aranya's [1990] instrument was overlooked as its validity has not been 
established yet. The instrument of Milani [1975] was chosen for this study because, 
unlike the instrument of Hofstede [1968], it is a multi-item instrument which permits a 
reliability assessment (question number 1 in the questionnaire). This instrument has 
been used extensively to study the level of budgetary participation in budgeting research 
and reported a high reliability (e. g. Harrison [1992] cc 0.89, Mia [1988] ot 0.89, Nouri 
and Parker [1996] a 0.84, Chenhall and Brownell [1988] a 0.71). The Cronbach a for 
this measure are 0.89,0.89 and 0.85 for British, Saudi and Arab samples respectively 
(see table 6-A- I at the appendix to this chapter). 
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It is important to mention here that it was also hypothesised that the managers will 
exercise a high degree of budgetary participation with their subordinates if they 
perceived themselves as having a high degree of budgetary participation with their boss. 
For this reason it was important to use another instrument to measure the degree of 
budgetary participation which managers allow their subordinates. The instrument of 
Kenis [1979] with some modifications was used in this study (question number two in 
the questionnaire). Reliability test for this measure recorded cc 0.68 for the whole 
sample and 0.69,0.79,0.56 for British, Saudi and Arab samples (item number 2 was 
reverse scored). The reliability level of the Arab sample with respect to the instrument 
of Kenis was lower than the other two samples, but it was considered as a moderate 
level. 
6-1-5-5 Style of Evaluation. The instrument of Hopwood [1972] was employed 
in this study to measure budget emphasis. The original measure of Hopwood consists of 
eight items (e. g. meeting budget, concern with cost, co-operation with colleagues). The 
measure requires respondents to rank the three factors which they perceive as being 
most important in their own evaluation. Then, the following four criteria define the style 
of evaluation (1) budget constrained style, when meeting budget appears among the top 
three items (2) Budget profit, when both meeting budget and concern with the cost 
appear among the top three items. (3) profit conscious, when concern with the cost alone 
appears among the top three items. (4) non-accounting style, when neither meeting the 
budget nor concern with the cost appear among the top three items. 
The accounting literature has witnessed an extensive use for this measure either 
identically or with some modification. Some research has added either one or two items 
to the original eight, while others has used scales instead of ranking method. Brownell 
[1982b] for example noticed that his respondents failed to rank these items properly, so 
in Brownell [1985], this measure was used with a Likert scale for the all eight items. He 
summed two items meeting the budget and concern with the cost as they were highly 
correlated. Many researchers after that (e. g. Dunk [1989]) used the Likert method which 
was suggested by Brownell [1985]). 
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The concept of budget emphasis is somewhat in conflict. Some interpreted budget 
emphasis as RAPM "reliance on accounting performance measures" and used the 
summation of the two accounting criteria such as Dunk [1989] and Brownell [1986]. In 
another study, Dunk [1993] considered only meeting the budget as an indicator of 
budget emphasis. This research adopts the concept of Dunk [1993] as it used only the 
item of meeting budget to reflect superiors' emphasis to meet budget when they evaluate 
their subordinates' performance. The researcher believes that the term of budget 
emphasis reflects a budget-constrained style which is meeting the budget. 
The questionnaire included the eight items with Likert scales anchored by "I" very 
important to 'T' no important (question number 7 in the questionnaire). Because of the 
nature of these scales reverse scoring was used for these items, so allowing 
corýparability with the other measures in the study. Although meeting the budget was 
only used to measure budget emphasis, the other seven items were also included in the 
questionnaire because this way avoids any bias when the respondents answer this 
question, as they will distribute their attention through eight different styles rather than 
one item. So, their answers would be more accurate. 
6-1-5-6 Leadership Style. Leadership style was measured using the instrument of 
Ohio State University "Leadership Behaviour Description Questionnaire", Form XII 
(Stogdill [1963]). This instrument uses a set of items to describe the frequency with 
which subordinates (the respondents) observe different types of leadership behaviour on 
the part of their superior, along the two dimensions of consideration and initiating 
structure. Each item is scaled from 'T' always to 'T' never acts like that. In order to 
avoid the questionnaire becoming too long, the twenty items were reduced to sixteen. 
The items which were discarde-d shared from the researcher' point of view similar 
meanings to some of the sixteen items included (question number 5 in the 
questionnaire. Items 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15 for initiation, and items 2,4,6,8,10,12, 
14,16for consideration). 
Each dimension was computed by summing the responses for the 8 items which 
represent each dimension (items 8,14,16 were reverse scored). Therefore, the 
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theoretical range for each dimension ranged from 840. Reliability test for consideration 
was 0.84,0.79,0.81, for British, Saudi and Arab samples respectively. For initiation 
structure reliability test recorded cc 0.85,0.65,0.73 for British, Saudi and Arab samples 
(see table 6-A-1). These results revealed a considerable levels of reliability for the two 
dimensions of leadership. 
6-1-5-7 Information Asymmetry. Since there was no measure of information 
asymmetry designed for use in field studies, one was developed by Dunk [1993]. The 
six items in the instrument are based on the definition of information asymmetry as well 
as on suggestions in the literature. The anchors were arranged on a seven-point Likert 
scale so that a response of (1) to any item would indicate that the superior had much 
more information, whereas a response of (7) would indicate that the subordinate had 
much more information than the superior. Dunk [ 1993,1995] focused on managers who 
reported more than 24 and excluded the others. He used this approach based on the 
definition of information asymmetry which he followed and which refers to those 
circumstances in which subordinates have more information than their superiors. 
From the research's point of view information asymmetry refers to both sides, 
either whether subordinates have more information than their superiors or vice versa. 
Information asymmetry means that there is a gap in work-related information between a 
subordinate and his/her superiors, regardless of who this gap in favours. The results of 
using either may includes bias as it focus only on one side. However, in order to check 
this point further, the instrument of Dunk [1993] was used as follows: first, in the 
moderating approach, the researcher used the whole respondents in each sample 
(British, Saudi, and Arab) to test the effect of information asymmetry. Then he split the 
answers to (a) for managers who scored more than 24, and (b) for managers who scored 
less than 24 and ran the analysis again to compare the results with those obtained from 
the whole respondents. Second, in the intervening approach the whole respondents were 
used because in the intervening model the researcher used only the respondent who 
answered all variables included in the four sub-models'. If the researcher focused only 
1. See the introduction of chapter eight for more details. 
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on respondents who scored more than 24 this would lead to an unacceptably low 
number of respondents. 
Dunk [1993] reported a . 88 for the reliability of this measure, and Dunk [1995a] 
reported reliability a= 0.79, therefore, this study employed this instrument (question 
number 6 in the questionnaire). The results of reliability test for each sample was (0.85, 
0.83 and 0.92) for British, Saudi, and Arab respectively. 
6-1-5-8 Budget Goal Difficulty and Clarity. The instruments of Steers [1976] 
with some modifications were used to measure both goals difficulty and clarity 
(question number 8 in the questionnaire). The instrument of budget difficulty consists of 
four items (items I to 4), whereas that of budget clarity consists of three items (items 5 
to 7). Both were used with a seven po int scale (items 1,6 were reverse scored). These 
two instruments were also used by Kenis [1979]. Reliability tests for those measures 
(see table 6-A-1) recorded cc 0.87,0.55 and 0.38 for budget difficulty, and cc 0.82,0.79 
and 0.46 for budget clarity for British, Saudi and Arab respectively. It is clear that the 
reliability tests of both budget difficulty and clarity for the Arab were lower than the 
other two samples. Therefore, caution should be exercised when the results of the Arab 
sample are interpreted. 
6-1-5-9 Locus of Control. The literature witnessed various measures of locus of 
control. For example Rotter [1966], La Rosa, and Levenson's [1973] measures. Rotter's 
measure consist of 23 question pairs, plus 6 filler questions. Internal statements are 
paired with external statements. One point is given for each external statement selected. 
Although Rotter's intemal-extemal (I-E) locus of control has been widely used in the 
literature, it has been criticised extensively with regard to its presumed 
unidimensionality, its inherent social desirability response bias (see Lefcourt [1991, 
p. 418]. 
The literature has also witnessed other measures of locus of control. One of which 
is that which was developed by La Rosa and which was used by Frucot and Shearon 
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[ 1991 ]. Kren [I 992b], for example, used a short measure of locus of control which was 
developed by Johnson & McGill [ 19 8 8] which consists of 15 items in a Likert format. 
Another measure of locus of control in the literature is that of Levenson [1973]. 
The instrument consists of three components each consisting of eight items along three 
dimensions as follows: internal (I) which measures the extent to which people believe 
that they have control over their own lives. Powerful others (P) concern the belief that 
other persons control the events in one's life. The third is Chance (C) which measures 
the degree to which a person believes that chance affects his/her experiences and 
outcomes. The dimension of chance is similar to external as both perceive that 
reinforcements are not contingent upon one's own action, but rather upon other factors 
such as fate or luck (chance). 
The measure of Levenson [1973] (question number 11 in the questionnaire) was 
selected to be employed in this study for many reasons. First, the instrument of Rotter 
[1966] was criticised extensively, as mentioned before, in addition, it requires 15 
minutes to be completed (see Lefcourt [1991], p. 420). This length of questionnaire 
would lower the response rate. Second, the instrument of La Rosa was developed in a 
doctoral thesis and it seemed to be in a different language. Third, the instrument of 
Johnson & McGill [1988] and which was used by Kren [1992b] was excluded as it has 
not been used extensively and thus its validity has not been established yet. 
With reference to the instrument of Levenson [ 1973 ], the researcher used only two 
dimensions which are internal and external (chance) and ignored the third one which is 
powerful others. This procedure is consistent with the previous work in -this area which 
only used these two dimensions (items I to 7 external, and items 8 to 14 internal). The 
instrument was used with some minor changes in wording to be suitable for this study 
(e. g. company was used instead of hospital). Fourteen items were used in this study with 
a 7-point Likert scale anchored by strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
In the moderating and intervening approaches the fourteen items were used 
altogether. But each of the two dimensions was also considered independently in the 
moderating approach in order to provide further support to the results. When each 
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dimension was used independently, answers for strongly agree were scored high "seven" 
and strongly disagree were scored low "one". But when the fourteen items were used 
altogether as one measure, answers of the external dimension were reverse scored, as 
strongly agree scored low "one", and strongly disagree scored high "seven" in order to 
make the two dimensions comparable. 
Reliability test for this instrument was 0.68,0.65, and 0.83 for British, Saudi and 
Arab respectively. These results revealed a considerable amount of reliability which was 
necessary to proceed using this measure. 
6-1-5-10 Ability of Superiors to Detect Slack. This variable was measured using 
Onsi's three items (question number 12 in the questionnaire, items 7 to 9). This measure 
has been used in previous research such as Lal et al [1996], a 0.76). Reliability test 
indicated in table 6-A-1 shows that this measure recorded a 0.75,0.9, and 0.9 for 
British, Saudi and Arab samples respectively. 
6-1-5-11 Budget Motivation. The extent to which budgetary participation affects 
the managers' extrinsic and intrinsic motivation were measured by using twelve items 
which were developed by Lawler and Suttle [1973]. Twelve items were used with a 
seven point Likert scales anchored by (1) extremely desirable to (7) extremely 
undesirable (question number 3 in the questionnaire, items I to 6 are extrinsic, and 7 to 
12 are intrinsic). Because of the nature of these scales reverse scoring was used for 
these items, so allowing comparability with the other measures in the study. Lawler & 
Suttle's instrument has been shown to be reliable, and has been widely used in the 
expectancy model developed by Ferris [1977b], Brownell and McIness [1986] and Mia 
[1987]. It was difficult to test motivation in this study in the context of the contingency 
theory as it requires asking respondents long questions. Brownell & McIness [1986], for 
example, asked their respondents to answer these questions twice; first, what these items 
mean to them as a result of goal accomplishment. Second, as a result of goal directed 
behaviour. So, this research asked respondents what are these extrinsic and intrinsic 
items mean to them as a results of meeting the budget. Reliability for this measure 
recorded a 0.89,0.91 and 0.82 for British, Saudi and Arab respectively. 
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6-1-5-12 Budgetary Slack. Managers' propensity to create budgetary slack was 
measured by using six items developed by Onsi [1973] (question number 12 in the 
questionnaire, items 1 to 6). This measure has been used extensively in much 
behavioural accounting research (some has used only four items instead of six). Six 
items were used instead of four because the scores of the four items and the six one 
were highly correlated. Figure 6.4 shows the correlations between the four and six items 
for each sample. 
Figure 6.4 
The relationship between the four and six items of budgetary slack 
All significant at . 01 
Figure 6.4 shows that the four and six items were highly correlated. Therefore it 
was decided to use the summation of the six items. Reliability test for this measure 
recorded a 0.8,0.66 and 0.35 for British, Saudi and Arab. The reliability of the Arab 
sample was lower than the British and Saudi samples, therefore, caution should be 
exercised when its results are interpreted. 
6-1-5-13 Performance. Within this area of research three measures have been 
widely used. All three measures are subjective as it is difficult in wide-ranging sample 
to use objective measures. Many studies (e. g. Govindarajan [1986], Merchant [1984]) 
argued that this approach is more appropriate for such kind of samples. An example of 
this subjective measures is that of Mahoney et al [1963]. This measure is a self-rating 
version which consists of eight performance dimensions with one overall effectiveness 
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dimension. The instrument calls for a rating from I (far below average performance) to 
7 (far above average performance) on each dimension, as well as for the global, or 
overall rating. The eight sub-dimensions of performance are planning, investigating, co- 
ordinating, evaluating, supervising, staffing, negotiating and representing. 
Another example of performance measures in this area is that of Gupta & 
Govindarajan [ 1984]. This is also a self-report version. A third example for performance 
was a self-rating of overall performance which was used by Merchant [1981,1984] & 
Brownell & Merchant [1991]. It is a single item measure which asks respondents to rate 
their department performance on a scale from one (well below average) to five (Well 
above average). 
The instrument of Mahoney [1963] was chosen for this study (question number 9 
in the questionnaire). It has been extensively used in this area of research (e. g. Brownell 
& McIness [1986], Kren [1992a], Dunk [1993]). The measures of both Gupta & 
Govindarajan [1984] and the single item one which was used by Merchant [1981] and 
his followers were excluded as the first has not been used extensively, whereas the 
second consist of a single item and thus it is difficult to assess its reliability. As 
mentioned earlier the instrument of Mahoney consists of eight items with an overall one. 
Mahoney et al [1963] concluded that about 55% of the variance in the overall rating is 
explained by the eight dimensions, while a ftuther 45% of the variance could be 
attributed to functional characteristics. 
To assess the variance of the overall item in each sample in this study with that 
explained by Mahoney [1963,1965], the procedure which was used in the previous 
studies was applied here by regressing the eight items on the global one and their results 




Percentage of variance ofthe eight dimensions on the 
global item 
w, 
British sample 03, "', 
Saudi sample 68 
Arab sample 69 
Brownell 1992a 60 
Brownell 1983 60 
Brownell & Mclness 1986 78 
(iovindarajan 1986 71) 
Dunk 1990 47 
Abcrriethy & Brownell 1997 52 
Subranianian & Ashkanasy 1997 50 
Choo &, Van 1997 59 
As shown in the table, in the current study 0.63) (British), 0.69 (Saudi), 0.69 
(Arab) of the variance was explained by the eight dimensions. So, the global dimension 
does reflect the overall performance. It indicates that the percentages of this study for all 
three samples were similar to those reported in previous studies. An additional check for 
this measure, and following the previous research in this area, correlations were 
computed for each of the eight specific perfOrmance dimensions the global ratino. Table 
6.9 indicates the results. 
Tab Ie6.9 
Correlation between global performance and each specific dimension 
Dimension 
1 2 1 4 s 6 7 s 
British Sample n 60 0,617 0.407 0.352 0.264 0,46 0 54 0,224 0 3.11, 
Sauch Sample nz 47 0.508 0.447 W644 0.664 0 755 0 517 0 198 0.367 
I 
Arab Sample n 37 M33 0.627 0.456 OMI 0.621 Oý047 0 254 0.38 
1 ienerrian 1974 () S5 041 019 0 33 044 036 04 1 
iiow ell 1982a n 40 i 0.57 0.5 
1 
028 0.51 1 0.42 
1 
() )- ý 
, ioý [I lal alall 1980 11 061 061 047 i2 0o 06", -IN 
1 0.01 1 0.05 
0,617 0.407 0.352 0.264 0,46 0 54 
0.508 0.447 W644 0.664 0 755 0 517 
M33 0.627 0.456 OMI 0.621 Oý047 
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Where; (1) planning, (2) investigating, (3) co-ordinating, (4) evaluating, (5) 
supervising, (6) staffing, (7) negotiating and (8) representing. From table 6.8 we find 
with exception of item number 7 "negotiating" all the other seven items were correlated 
with the global one. This confirmed that the global item does reflect the overall 
performance. It worth attracting the attention to the fact that this study used a7 point 
scale whereas some of other studies used a9 point scale. But this is not important in the 
previous analysis as long as we are not comparing the mean differences. 
However, in this study, and unlike previous research, the overall scores of the nine 
dimensions were used as an indicator of managers' performance. The researcher 
believes that this way is more accurate than using one item as it avoids any bias which 
may exist as a result of using one item even if the variance explained by the global item 
was similar to the previous studies. It is also consistent with the other measures 
employed in this study which used the summation of all items included in each measure. 
From table 6-A- I in the appendix of this chapter we can see that the results of using the 
summation of the nine items resulted a high reliability for all three sample in addition to 
the overall reliability of the three sample which recorded 0.86. 
6-1-5-14 Satisfaction. The literature has witnessed various measures of job 
satisfaction. (e. g. Brayfield & Rothe [1951], Kahn et at [1964], Minnesota [1967]). 
Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire (Weiss et al. [1967]) had the priority to be used in 
this study as it has been used extensively in this area of research. This measure has two 
versions, the first consists of 100 item, whereas the second consists of 20-item. 
Consistent with the previous works in this area which frequently focused on the short 
version, this research has also used it (question number 10 in the questionnaire). The 
MSQ questionnaire calls for a response on a five-point scale, anchored by (1) very 
dissatisfied to (5) very satisfied. 
In order to keep the questionnaire of a manageable length, the twenty items were 
reduced to only sixteen of the original questionnaire. The items which were discarded 
shared from the researcher' point of view similar meanings to some of the sixteen. items 
included. This measure was used with a minor chan ges in wording to three items 1,4, 
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and 12 (e. g. superiors was used instead of boss, and being busy all the time instead of 
being able to keep busy all the time). Reliability test indicated in table 6-A-1 shows that 
this measure recorded a 0.85,0.82, and 0.89 for British, Saudi and Arab samples 
respectively. 
6-1-5-15 Job Difficulty. It was measured using four items developed by Van de 
Ven & Delbecq [1974] (question number 13 in the questionnaire). The original measure 
consists of seven items, but in order to keep the research in a manageable limit only four 
items were used. Managers rated their perceived level of job difficulty on a seven point 
scale anchored at both ends (items 1,2,4 were reverse scored). A manager's overall 
scores for job difficulty was the sum of his or her scores for the four items. Cronbach 
alpha (table 6-A-1) recorded for this measure 0.39,0.36, and 0.73 for British, Saudi, and 
Arab samples. 
In spite of the fact that it is not acceptable to compare the results of this alpha with 
other studies which used seven items. It worth drawing attention that many researchers 
who used this measure have noticed a low reliability. Lau et al [ 1997, p. 182] reported 
0.47 for this measure and they mentioned that caution should be exercised in 
interpreting their results. Brownell and Dunk [1991] reported 0.57 for this measure and 
they considered it as a moderated level. Mia [1988] reported 0.55 and mentioned that 
further research is needed for this measure. 
According to the previous discussion it is not possible to say whether or not the 
low reliability reported in this study due to using of four items instead of seven for two 
reasons: first, the Arab sample recorded a high score for that (0.73). Second, the 
previous research failed to report high alphas for the full measure. However, consistent 
with Lau et al [1997] caution should be exercised when interpreting the results of this 
study for the low reliability, also when comparing the results of this study with others 
who used the full measure. 
6-1-5-16 Summary. This section has discussed the measures which the researcher 
selected to test the variables involved in the proposed model. The reliability was 
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checked individually for each culture. Reliability test recorded a high and acceptable 
alpha for the majority, but as the same time very few variables in some samples 
recorded a low reliability, so, caution should be exercised when interpreting their 
results. However, table 6-A-1 in the appendix of this chapter shows descriptive analysis 
which has been conducted for the measures in each sample. 
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6-2 Statistical Design 
This study adopted different statistical techniques to test both moderating and 
intervening approaches. Correlation, multiple regression, and path analysis were 
chosen as the most suitable techniques. The following section explains the theoretical 
framework for path analysis. 
6-2-1 Theoretical Framework of Path Analysis 
Path analysis is an application of regression and correlation. It is based on 
regression analysis, but it can provide a more useful graphic picture of relationships 
between several variables than is possible through other means. Path analysis 
assumes that the values on one variable are caused by the values of another. This 
requirement is not unique to path analysis, of course, but path analysis does provide a 
unique way of displaying explanatory results for interpretation. 
Tle method of path analysis was developed by Wright [1934] as a method for 
studying the direct and indirect effects of variables, where some variables are viewed 
as causes of other variables, which are viewed as effects. It is very important to 
mention here that path analysis is not a method for discovering causes, but a method 
applied to the causal model formulated by the researcher on the basis of knowledge 
and theoretical considerations. As Wright [ibid., p. 193] stated, 
"the method of path coefficients is not intended to accomplish the 
impossible task of deducing causal relations from the values of the 
correlation coefficients. It is intended to combine the quantitative 
information given by correlations with such qualitative information 
as may be at hand on causal relations to give a quantitative 
interpretation. " 
In fact, one of the features of the method is that in order to apply it, the 




Babbie [1990, p. 312] confirmed this when he reported: 
"although path analysis is an excellent way of handling complex 
causal chains and networks of variables, one must realise that path 
analysis itself does not tell the causal order of the variables, nor 
was the path diagram generated by computer. The researcher 
decided the structure of relationships among the variables and used 
computer analysis merely to calculate the pass coefficients that 
apply to the structure decided on" 
Path analysis has been used in much accounting and decision science research 
(for example Shields & Young [1993], Kren [1992a] , Brownell & McIness [1986], 
Mia [1987], and Flynn et al [1995]). The usefulness of path analysis is that its results 
provide information on the relative importance of the independent variables in terms 
of their effect on the dependent variables. In other words the feature of path analysis 
is that the researcher can construct the model and test the effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent one either directly or indirectly through other intervening 
variables, and compare the contribution of each of the indirect variables in 
comparison. 
From the introductory remarks it is evident that causal thinking plays an 
important role in the application of path analysis. In order to facilitate the 
understanding of causal relationships, it is important to distinguish between 
exogenous and endogenous variables. 
6-2-1-1 Exogenous and Endogenous Variables 
In causal models, a distinction is made between exogenous and endogenous 
variables. An exogenous variable is a variable whose variability is assumed to be 
determined by causes outside the causal model. Consequently, the determination of 
an exogenous variable is not under consideration in the model. An endogenous 
variable, on the other, is one whose variation is explained by exogenous or 
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endogenous variables in the system. Figure 6.5 illustrates both exogenous and 
endogenous variables. 
Figure 6.5 
The distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables 
As illustrated in figure 6.5, variables X, 13-r X2 are exogenous. The line between 
them which has arrowheads at both ends indicates the correlation coefficient, and this 
means that the relation between them is unanalysed in the system, and the researcher 
does not look for such relationship. 
Variables X3 8-' X4 are endogenous. The relationship between exogenous and 
endogenous variables is depicted by a line with one direction . Symbols which are 
beside these lines indicate path coefficients, and show the direct effect of a variable 
taken as cause of a variable taken as an effect. The conventional symbol for denoting 
path coefficient is pij, where i refers to the effect andj refers to the cause. 
An endogenous variable treated as dependent in one set of variables may also 
be conceived of as an independent variable in relation to other variables. Variable X3, 
for example, is taken as dependent on variables X, and X2. and as one of the 
independent variables in relation to variable X4- 
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6-2-1-2 Assumptions of Path Analysis 
The effective use of path analysis is based on a number of assumptions which 
are mentioned in most books and articles dealing with path analysis'. The most 
important of these assumptions are described below. 
1. Path-analytic models assume that the relationships among the 
variables are linear additive and causal. Consequently, curvilinear, 
multiplicative, or interactive relations are excluded. 
2. All error terms (residuals) are assumed to be uncorrelated with each 
other. 
3. There is a one-way causal flow in the system. That is, reciprocal 
causation between variables is ruled out. For example in figure 6.2, if 
X2 is taken as a cause Of X3, then the possibility Of X3 being a cause of 
X2 is ruled out. 
4. The variables are assumed to be measured on an interval scale2. 
I 
6-2-1-3 Path (Standardised) Coefficients and Regression Coefficients 
In path analysis all variables are expressed in a standard form (Z for example). 
It is important to mention here that there is a major difference between regression and 
path analysis, in ordinary regression analysis, a dependent variable is regressed on all 
the exploratory variables under consideration. On the other hand, in path analysis 
more than one regression analysis will usually be undertaken and that is why the 
regression coefficient is different from path coefficient. Path coefficients are known 
as "Beta" weight and they are computed automatically by professional statistical 
package such as SPSS and SAS. 
, 
, 1. 
See for example Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981] and Kerlinger& Pedhazur [1973]. 
2, For a discussion of the implication of weakening these assumption, see Land [1969], Boyle [1969], Duncan 
[1966]. Also Kerlinger and Pedhazur [1973] P. 309, reported that different researchers discussed and 
illustrated the application of path analysis to ordinal measures. 
6.35 
Chapter six 
6-2-1-4 Direct, Indirect and Total Effects (Contributions) 
Indirect effects are those parts of a variable's total effect which are transmitted 
or mediated by variables specified as intervening between the cause and effect of 
interest in a model. They tell us how much of a given effect occurs because the 
manipulation of the antecedent variable of interest leads to change in other variables 
which in turn changes the consequent variable. 
The direct effect of one variable on another is simply that part of its total effect 
which is not transmitted via intervening variables. It is the effect which remains when 
intervening variables have been held constant. 
Total effect is the summation of all paths (direct and indirect) that run between 
the first variable (s) in the model and the last one. The following example adopted 
from Wonnacott and Wonnacott [ 198 1] illustrates the method used to compare direct 
and indirect relationships. 
Figure 6.6 
Direct, indirect and total effects adopted from Wonnacott 
and Wonnacott 
, 32 .. 3 
. 62 b 
The total effect of Z, and Z2 on ZO is shown on table 6.8. As indicated in this 
table, the effect of Z, on ZO was tested through three different routes. The direct 
effect was the stronger effect on ZO and the three other routes had a weak effect on 
ZO, but in general it increased the total effect of Z, on ZO. 
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Table 6.10 
Analysis of direct indirect and total effect of Wormacott and Wonnacott' 
example 
Variable Type of Effect Effect 
Z2 Direct -. 05 
Indirect (. 38)(-. 28) - -. 10 
Total -. 15 
Z, Direct . 62 Indirect 
Via M (. 12)(-. 28) - -. 03 
Via Z2 (-. 32)(-. 05) - +. 02 
Via ZZ Z3 (-. 32)(. 3 8)(-. 28) - +. 03 
Total Effect . 
64 
The previous example shows the direct and indirect effects of age on children. 
As can be seen, the indirect effect has three routes. First, through education. Second 
through age at marriage. Third, through both education and age at marriage. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the two approaches adopted in the current study. 
Accounting literature suggests that there are two approaches that can be used to 
understand the effect of budget involvement on both managers' performance and 
satisfaction, and they are moderating and intervening approaches. The difference 
between these two approaches was introduced. After going through studies which 
considered the mentioned relationships and variables which were found to affect 
them, the current research adopted an integrative model which was analysed using 
moderating and intervening approaches. 
To test the integrative model, measures which were used extensively in 
previous studies in this area and it had proved their validity as measures of the 
variables required were chosen. United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia were chosen as 
sites to investigate the proposed model. Initial samples from both countries were used 
as a pilot studies. Contact was made with managers with companies in each country. 
The final sample consisted of 156 questionnaires represents three cultures; 65 British 
culture, 51 for Saudi culture, and 40 for Arab culture. 
This chapter also introduced the statistical technique which was used as the 
most appropriate for this study and which was has been used extensively in previous 
research. The next chapter introduces the analysis for the first approach which was 
applied in UK. 
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Appuidix of ChApTiER Six 
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7- Section 1 
7-1 An analysis of the Inter-Correlation Matrix 
I The British Sample ) 
This chapter will test the moderating model on the British sample. There are two 
statistical techniques will be used for this purpose, correlation and multiple regression 
analysis, each analysis will test a set of hypotheses. Therefore, this chapter was divided 
into two sections; the first analyses the inter-correlation between some variables used in 
the study. The second analyses the moderating role as hypothesised in chapter five. The 
results of this chapter will not be compared either with the previous work or with the 
other two samples used in this study. In order to avoid repetition, this comparison and 
explanations of the results will take place in chapter eleven. 
It worth attracting attention to the fact that as long as the size of the sample limits 
its results, therefore, the researcher used four terms which indicate the nature of the 
results. These four terins are: (a) strongly supported when the results are statistically 
significant and the direction of the effect is consistent with the research hypotheses. (b) 
weakly supported when the results are statistically insignificant and the direction of the 
effect is consistent with the research hypotheses. (C) strongly rejected when the results 
are statistically significant and the direction of the effect is opposite to the research 
hypothesis. (D) when the results are statistically insignificant and the direction of the 
effect is opposite to the research hypothesis. However, table 8-A-5 in the appendix of 
chapter eight summarises these results according to the above terms. 
7-1-1 The Contingency Variables 
7-1-1-1 Organisation Size. This research hypothesised that managers in big 
organisations perceive high degree of participation in budgetary process than those in 
the small ones. From table 7-A-1 at the end of this chapter we can see that organisation 
size and budgetary participation were positively related (n--64). This result provides a 
strong support to (H-I. I). 
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7-1-1-2 Environment Uncertainty. The result of the inter-correlation matrix was 
opposite to the research hypothesis (H-I. 2). Table 7-A-1 indicates a negative and 
significant relationship between budgetary participation and environment uncertainty 
(n-- 62). This counter-intuitive result may be explained by two possible reasons which 
are explained in chapter eleven. 
7-1-1-3 Process Automation. The inter-correlation matrix indicates that process 
automation had a positive effect on budgetary participation though statistically 
insignificant (n--50). This result provides a weak support to H-I. 3 which proposed a 
positive relationship between these two variables. On the other hand process automation 
had positive and significant relationships with both budget difficulty and budget 
emphasis. A possible interpretation for that is budget goals are more difficult in highly 
automated organisations, and hence, top management relies on budgets as a mean of 
controlling middle management activities. From the inter-correlation matrix we can find 
that budget emphasis and budget difficulty are positively and significantly related. This 
may support the previous interpretation. 
7-1-1-4 Product Standardisation. Based on the previous studies (Brownell & 
Merchant [1990]), the researcher proposed that organisations which their product are 
highly standardised, managers perceive low degree of budgetary participation (see 
p. 2.14). The result shown in the inter-correlation matrix indicates that product 
standardisation had a negative relationship with budgetary participation though it was at 
a statistically insignificant level. This result provided weak support to 114.4. 
7-1-2 Budgetary Participation, Performance, and Satisfaction 
Table 7-A-1 shows that budgetary participation had a positive and significant 
relationship with both managers performance and satisfaction. These results were 
consistent with H-II. la&b. They were also consistent with the literature review which 
proposes that when functional managers are involved in decision making, those 
managers perform better and be more satisfied than managers who are not involved. 
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Performance had significant relationships with some micro-level variables, such 
as superiors' ability to detect slack. This result may of value for top management to find 
various ways to control slack, as this has a better results on their managers' 
performance. 
It was also hypothesised (H-II. 2, p. 3.8) that managers allow their subordinates to 
participate in the budgetary process if they perceived themselves as having a high level 
of participation in the budgetary process. Table 7-A-1 shows that this proposition was 
weakly rejected. The inter-correlation matrix shows a negative relationship between 
these two variables though statistically insignificant. 
7-1-3 Budgetary participation and the Moderating VariabIes 
The results shown in table 7-A-1 indicates that budgetary participation had 
insignificant relationships with both motivation and slack. From this table we can find 
that the direction of the effect on budget motivation was negative (n-- 63). This result 
was opposite with (H-II. 6). With reference to the effect of budgetary participation on 
budgetary slack, the result showed a negative relationship but it was at a statistically 
insignificant level (n-- 63). So H-11.9 was weakly supported. 
On the other hand budgetary participation had a positive and significant 
relationship with budget emphasis (n-- 63). This result indicates that when managers are 
highly involved in their budgets, they are evaluated on the basis of budget-constrained 
style. Budgetary participation had also a positive and significant relationship with 
budget clarity (n-- 64). This conclusion is logical as when managers participate in 
budgetary process, budget' goals are much clear to them. 
7-14 Budget Motivation and Budgetary Slack 
Budget motivation had a positive and significant relationship with managers' 
performance (n-- 59). Budgetary slack had a negative and significant relationship with 
budget clarity (n-- 64), and this relationship means that when managers perceive their 
goals clear, their propensity to create slack decrease. This result highlights the 
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importance of budgetary participation as it has a positive effect on budget goal' clarity 
which in turn decrease budgetary slack. 
7-1-5 Other relationships 
This research hypothesised (H-I. 6, p. 2.19) that budget emphasis has a positive 
relationship with superiors' leadership style. When superiors have a leadership style 
characterised as high initiation structure, they would use budget emphasis as a rigid style 
of evaluation. The result as shown in the inter-correlation matrix indicates that initiation 
structure has a negative relationship with budget emphasis though it was statistically 
insignificant (n= 63). This result provided weak rejection to H-I. 6. 
Hypothesis (H-1.10, p. 2.28) stated that organisation size has a positive relationship 
with information asymmetry. The result shown in table 7-A-1 provides a weak support 
to this proposition (statistically insignificant). 
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7- Section 2 
7-2 An Analysis of the Moderating Approach 
for the British Sample 
This section will test the moderating role of some variables in the way 
hypothesised in chapter five. The moderating approach has been used extensively in 
this area (e. g. Brownell 1982b, Brownell & Hirst [1986], and Dunk [1993]). The 
results are indicated in figure 7-A-1 in the appendix of this chapter. The following 
discussion explains the nature of the results in detail. 
7-2-1 Budget Motivation 
To test this moderating role, the researcher used the regression equation which 
has been used extensively in the accounting literature (i. e. Nouri [1996], Mia [1988]). 
The formulation of this equations are as follows: 
Yl: '- PO+ PIXI + P2X2+ P3XIX2+4 (7.1) 
Y2ý-- PO+PIXI +P2X2+03XIX2+4 (7.2) 
Where: 
Y, = Performance 
Y2 = Satisfaction 
X, = Budgetary participation 
X2 = Budget Motivation 
The result indicated in table A-D-I in appendix D at the end of the thesis shows 
that budget motivation had a positive and significant moderating role between 
budgetary participation and managers' performance, and this result supported 
hypothesis H-II. 7. To check the nature of this relationship, further analysis was 
carried out using Schoonhoven's method [1981]. The following steps were 
undertaken: (a) taking the partial derivative of equation (7.1) over X,, (b) determining 
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the value of X2 (the inflection point) (c) plotting the joint effect of the main and 
interaction terms. Steps (a) and (b) above produced the following equations: 
d/dXl -ý P I+P3 X2 (7.3) 
X2 -"ý "P IIN (7.4) 
The results of the previous steps indicated that X2= 44.05. Figure 7.1 indicates 
the nature of the relationship in the previous test. 
Figure 7.1 
Modcrating role of budget motivation 
dy Perfomance 










Figure 7.1 shows that when managers' motivation to achieve their department' 
budget increases (scores above 44.05), the relationship between budgetary 
participation and performance also increases. This result was'consistent with some 
studies (i. e. Mia [1988]) as will be discussed in chapter eleven. 
To test the moderating role of budget motivation between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction, equation 7.2 was run, and table A-D-2 in appendix D at 
the end of this thesis indicates the result. The result indicated in this table shows that 
budget motivation had a negative moderating role 
, 
between budgetary participation 
and satisfaction though statistically insignificant. This result means when managers 
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are highly motivated to achieve budgets, high budgetary participation decrease their 
satisfaction, and so this result is contradictory to H-II. 8. 
7-2-2 Budgetary Slack 
To test the moderating role of budgetary slack on the relationship between 
budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction, equations similar to 
those used in budget motivation (7.1 & 7.2) were used substituting X2 with budgetary 
slack instead of budget motivation. The results of running those equations are 
indicated in tables A-D-3 & 4. 
The results shown in table A-D-3 indicate that budgetary slack had a significant 
moderating role between budgetary participation and performance (n= 59). To check 
the nature of this role equations 7.3 & 7.4 were employed, and this resulted X2 = 
12.29 as plotted in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 
Moderating role of budgetary slack 
dy Performance 
dX Budget Involvement 
. 75 n-59 
.5 
. 25 5.00 10.00 





The result shown in figure 7.2 illustrates the nature of the relationship. It is 
clear that when budgetary slack increase (scores above 12.29) high budgetary 
participation increases managers performance. This result was opposite to H-II. 11 
rejecting it. It was expected that high slack would decrease this relationship. To 
confirm understanding the nature of this results, further analysis was conducted after 
dichotornising both budgetary participation and budgetary slack to low and high 
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levels at the mid point of their scales and computing the mean ot'performance in each 
category. The results of this method are shown in table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 
Means of performance Under different low and high levels of both budgetary 
participation and budgetary slack 
Low budgetary participation High budgetary slack 40.33 
I ow budgetarý participation Low budgetary slack 44.87 
1 ligh budgetary participation - Low budgetary slack 47.57 
1 ligh hudgetaiN pailicipation - L(m bodpelarN , lack 48. ýo 
Plotting the results of table 7.1 are indicated in the following figure. 
Figure 7.3 confirms the previous result and indicates that, managers who have 
high propensity to create slack, high budgetary participation increases their 
performance. A possible explanation for this result is those managers put biased 
figures in their budget and hence they keep their performance within their limits. In 
other word, they perform well because the figures of their departments' budget 
already biased and participation helped them to do so. 
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F), vo-waN interaction bet,, %een budgctarý participation and budgelarN 
siack atlecting performance 
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The effect of budgetary slack between budgetary participation and satisfaction 
was tested and the result is shown in table A-DA The result indicates that budgetary 
slack had insignificant moderating role (n-- 60), and the direction of the effect was 
opposite to H-H. 12. This result means that high budgetary participation increased 
satisfaction for those managers who had low propensity to create slack. 
7-2-3 Budget Emphasis 
This research hypothesised that budget emphasis has a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and performance (H-I. 7a), satisfaction (H-I. 7b), and 
motivation (H-I. 8). To test the effect of budget emphasis on these three relationships, 
three equations, each of them similar to equation (7.1) were used. The results of 
running those equations are illustrated in tables A-D-5,6, and 7. 
The results indicated in these tables show that there was insignificant 
moderating role for budget emphasis affecting both performance (n= 59) and 
satisfaction (n= 60). With reference to H-1.7a, it worth attracting the attention to the 
fact that the direction of the effect was opposite to the hypothesis. This result means 
that high participation increased managers' performance when budget emphasis was 
low. The literature review in this area is in conflict, some studies (see section 2-5) 
argued that when managers are evaluated on the basis of budget emphasis, high 
participation increase their performance. Whereas others reported results which were 
similar to this study. However, in order to avoid repetition more explanations and 
analysis about these studies will take place in chapter eleven. 'On the other hand the 
results of H-1-7b were also opposite to the expected direction though it was at a 
statistically insignificant level. 
With respect to H-1.8 which hypothesised that budget emphasis has a positive 
moderating role between budgetary participation and motivation, the result shown in 
table A-D-7 indicates that budget emphasis had a significant moderating role (n-- 62). 
To check the nature of this moderating role, equations similar to 7.3 & 7.4 were used 




Moderating role of budget emphasis 
dy Budget Motivation 
dX Budget Involvement 
3.0 -- n= 62 
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The result illustrated in figure 7.4 supports H-1.8 as it shows that budgetary 
participation increased managers' motivation to achieve budget when budget 
emphasis was high. 
7-2-4 Leadership Style 
Hypothesis (H-I. 5, p. 2.18) stated that leadership style has a moderating role 
between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve budget. 
Consideration and initiation structure were examined separately. Same procedures 
used in the previous analysis were applied in this section using equations which were 
similar to 7.1 & 7.2. The results of these procedures are shown in tables A-D-8 for 
consideration (n-- 62) and A-D-9 for initiation structure (n-- 62). These tables show 
that neither styles had a significant moderating role between budgetary participation 
and budget motivation. It worth attracting the attention to the fact that the result 
shown in table A-D-9 indicates that the direction of the effect was consistent with H- 
1.5. This result provided weak support to the research hypothesis. 
7-2-5 Information Asymmetry 
This research hypothesised that information asymmetry has a moderating role 
between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve budget (H-1.9a) 
and budgetary slack (H-I. 9b). In other word, when managers are in positions of 
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having more work-related information than their superiors, high participation in 
budgetary process increases their motivation to achieve budget and also their 
propensity to create slack. 
The measure of information asymmetry includes asking respondents who have 
more information, whether managers or their superiors. Chapter six indicated that the 
measure consisted of six items on a seven point scale, so the theoretical range for the 
answers is from 6 to 42. Scores below 23 mean that managers are in positions of 
having less information than superiors, and scores above 25, mean that managers are 
in positions of having more information than their superiors. Managers who reported 
24 mean that they have the same information as their superiors. First, the effect of 
information asymmetry on both budget motivation and budgetary slack was tested 
using the whole measure, then answers were split into three groups. Group (1) for 
managers who have less information than their superiors, group (2) for managers 
who have more than their superiors, and group (3) for managers who have the same 
as their superiors. This resulted five cases under group 1, fifty five cases under group 
2, and two cases under group 3. The effect of information asymmetry on budgetary 
slack and budget motivation was tested using groups I&2. Group number 3 were 
excluded as there were only two cases and thus invalid to be analysed. 
Equations similar to 7.1 & 7.2 were employed in this section to test H-1.9a&b, 
and the results of running those equations are shown from tables A-D-10 to A-D-15. 
Table A-D-10 (n-- 62) indicates that information asymmetry had a positive 
moderating role between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to 
achieve budgets (statistically insignificant). This result provided weak support to H- 
I. 9a. 
From table A-D- II we can see that information asymmetry had a positive and 
significant interaction with budgetary participation affecting managers' propensity to 
create slack (p<. 05, n-- 62). To check the nature of this interaction, equations similar 
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Figure 7.5 indicates that when managers hold more information than their 
superiors, high budgetary participation increases their propensity to create slack. This 
result is consistent with H-I. 9b. To confirni the previous result, same procedures 
were employed for the cases "I& 2". Tables A-D- 12 to A-D- 15 shows the results. 
, 
The result shown in table A-D- 15 was consistent with the previous analysis as 
it showed that budgetary participation increased managers' propensity to create slack 
when they held more information than their superiors and figure 7.6 indicates that 
clearly. 
Figure 7.6 
Moderating role of information asymmetry on budgetary 
slack (group 2) 
dy Budgetary Slack 
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7-2-6 Budget Difficulty 
This research hypothesised that when budget goals are difficult, high 
participation in budgetary process will increase managers motivation to achieve 
budget (H-II. 3a) and decrease their propensity to create slack (H-II. 3b). These 
hypotheses were tested using equations similar to 7.1 & 7.2 and their results are 
shown in table A-D-16 & A-D-17. 
These tables show that budget difficulty had a positive interaction with 
budgetary participation affecting managers' motivation to achieve budget though it 
was statistically insignificant (n--63). The result also showed that budget difficulty 
had a negative interaction with budgetary participation affecting managers' 
propensity to create slack though statistically insignificafit as well. These two results 
provided weak support to H-11.3a&b. 
7-2-7 Budget Clarity 
It was hypothesised that budget clarity has a positive moderating role between 
budgetary participation and managers' performance (H-II. 4a) and satisfaction (H- 
I1.4b). Again, equations similar to 7.1 & 7.2 were employed and their results are 
indicated in tables A-D-18 & A-D-19. From those tables we can see that budgetary 
participation had a negative interaction with budget' goals clarity affecting both 
performance and satisfaction though they were statistically insignificant. These 
results consequently opposite to the research hypotheses H-II. 4a&b. 
7-2-8 Locus of Control 
This research hypothesised that locus of control moderates the relationship 
between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. In other 
word, it was proposed that when internal managers participate in budgetary process, 
their propensity to create slack will decrease. Chapter six mentioned that locus of 
control was measured using an instrument consists of fourteen items; seven in an 
internal scheme and the rest in an external scheme. In the inter-correlation matrix and 
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path analysis the whole instrument (fourteen items) was used, but in this section, and 
to provide sufficient evidence to this hypothesis, each scheme was used as a variable. 
When each scheme was used independently, answers for strongly agree were 
scored high "seven" and strongly disagree were scored low "one". But when the 
fourteen items were used altogether as one measure, external scheme were reverse 
scored, as strongly agree scored low "one", and strongly disagree scored high 
"seven7. 
To test the role of locus of control as a moderating variables for each scheme, 
the researcher developed the following model in the way used in the previous tests. 
Y-`ý PO +PI XI +P2 X2 +P3 XIX2 +4 (7.5) 
Where 
Y =Budgetary Slack 
X, =Budgetary participation 
X2 = Locus of Control "internal scheme" 
To use the external scheme, X2 was substituted with X3 "external scheme" and 
the equation was run again. The results are shown in tables A-D-20 and A-D-21 (n= 
62). The results of these tables indicate that there is an interaction between budgetary 
participation and locus of control affecting managers' propensity to create slack. To 
check the nature of this relationship, equations similar to 7.4 & 7.5 were employed, 




Moderating role of locus of control 
(internal scheme) 
dy Budgetary Slack 
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Moderating role of locus of control 
(external scheme) 
dy Budgetary Slack 
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Figures 7.7 (internal scheme) indicates that managers who reported high scores 
in this measure (scores above 32.6), high participation decreased their propensity to 
create slack. Figure 7.8 (external scheme) indicates that managers who reported high 
scores in this measure (scores above 25.2), high participation increased their 
propensity to create slack. These results provided strong support to H-II. S. 
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7-2-9 Ability of Superiors to Detect Slack 
This research hypothesised (H-11.10, p. 3.22) that when the ability of managers' 
superiors to detect slack increase, high participation in budgetary process by those 
managers decrease their propensity to create slack. Again, equations similar to 7.1 
was used and run. The result shown in table A-D-23 (n-- 59) indicates that superiors' 
ability to detect slack moderate negatively the relationship between budgetary 
participation and budgetary slack though statistically insignificant. This result 
provide weak support to the research hypothesis. 
7-2-10 Job Difficulty 
This research hypothesised (H-I-11, p. 2.30) that when job is difficult, high 
participation in budgetary process increases managers' performance. According to 
this hypothesis job difficulty has a positive moderating role. The result of this 
hypothesis is shown in table A-D-24 (n-- 58). The result indicates that job difficulty 
had a negative moderating role between budgetary participation and managerial 
performance though statistically insignificant, and hence it provided weak rejection 
to the research hypothesis. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter tested the research hypotheses using the moderating approach. 
These hypotheses as indicated in chapter five composed ortwenty eight macro-and 
micro-level ones. Some of these hypotheses were tested by correlation analysis and 
the rest were tested by multiple regression. The results have showed that seven 
hypotheses were strongly supported yielding rate (25%). Nine hypotheses (32.1%) 
were weakly supported, and that means although the results were statistically 
insignificant, the effect was in the direction anticipated suggesting that these 
hypotheses have some creditability. Two hypotheses (7.2%) were strongly rejected 
and ten (35.7%) were also weakly rejected. 
However, in order to avoid repetition, the end of chapter eight will provide a 
brief summary about the similarities and differences between the results of the 
moderating approach which were introduced in this chapter and those of the 
intervening approach which will be explained in the next chapter. Table 8-A-5 in the 
appendix of chapter eight also summarise these results. 
7.18 
Chapter seven 












0, =; = 
; &. , p: ý 















(ijn: iWIU jjý3p. g 
JOIJUO') 10 11.10 
1, ýpj il 
tz 
ill i. cl 
Itýýt: 








i! ý -a' ," 
lit 






8- Chapter Eight 
An Analysis of the Intervening Approach 
for the British Study 
In this chapter, research hypotheses will be re-tested using the intervening 
approach introduced in chapter five. At the end of this chapter there is a summary of the 
results, and chapter eleven will introduce ftirther explanations for these results with 
respect to the effect of culture. As mentioned before, the proposed model was divided 
into four sub-models to facilitate testing the hypotheses. The mathematical equations 
necessary to test the four sub-models were developed and run (se e Appendix Q. The 
path diagrams for the results of the four sub-models are illustrated in figures 8-AI to 8- 
A-5 in the appendix to this chapter. As the sample sizes are different in all variables, so 
in order to avoid bias in the analysis, only the respondents who answered all variables 
involved in the four sub-models have been used. This resulted in 48 valid cases. On the 
other hand, since the size of the sample limits this study, and path analysis for some 
equations (A-C-1 to 6) involved a large number of variables with a relatively small 
number of respondents', each hypothesis was also individually tested. 
The whole model shown in chapter five was designed to test the intervening role 
for the variables proposed in this study. Each sub-model provides the results of a large 
number of hypotheses in one test. Whereas the individual test was designed to test the 
intervening role for each particular variable. Both analyses lead to the same results, but 
equations in the whole model involve a large number of variables which consequently 
require a large number of respondents to provide sufficient reliability to the results. 
Therefore, each hypothesis is tested individually to provide ftirther support for the 
results of the four sub-models. Table 8-A-5 at the end of this chapter shows the results 
of both the individual tests and the whole model. 
To test the contingent role individually in the way hypothesised, the following 
model was used and it is shown in figure 8.1. 
1. Appendix C shows the sample size for each equation. 
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X3ýP3. IXI+P3.2X2+P3. aXa 
(8.1) 
X2 -, ý P2.1 XI + P2. b Xb (8.2) 
Figure 8.1 
Testing research hypotheses individually using path analysis 
Where, X, = budgetary participation, X2 = the relevant contingent variable, X3 = 
the dependent variable (i. e. perfon-nance, satisfaction, slack or motivation), and Xa 8-' Xb 
are standard residual. The results of the research hypotheses according to the intervening 
approach are discussed below. The results of the individual test are shown in appendix E 
at the end of the thesis. 
8-1 The Effect of the Contingency Variables on the level of Budgetary 
participation 
The effect of the contingency variables on budgetary participation is shown in 
figure 8-A-1 in the appendix to this chapter. The test was conducted using multiple 
regression which included the four contingency variables as independents on budgetary 
participation. In chapter seven the effect of each variable was individually tested using 
coffelation analysis. 
Figure 8-A-1 (whole model) indicates that organisation size had the largest 
positive coefficient though it was statistically insignificant. Its sign was consistent with 
(H-1.1). The next largest positive contribution was for technology "process automation". 
Again its sign was consistent with (H-I. 3, p. 2.14) though it was statistically 
insignificant. Product standardisation had a very weak positive contribution to 
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managers' participation. This contradicts (H-I. 4, p. 2.15) but the coefficient was not 
significant. Environment uncertainty had a negative relationship (but insignificant) with 
budgetary participation opposite to H-1.2. 
The results of the individual test (see table 7-A-1) for process automation, 
environment uncertainty, and organisation size were similar to those of obtained from 
the whole model, but the sign 
- 
of the size was significant. The sign of product 
standardisation was negative, and hence it is different from that shown in figure 8-A-1 
(whole model). With reference to H-1.4, coefficients for the whole model and individual 
test were small and statistically insignificant. 
8-2 Budgetary participation, performance, and satisfaction 
From table 8-A-1 (sub-model 1) in the appendix of this chapter it can be seen that 
budgetary participation had a positive and significant contribution to managers' 
performance. 
The result sub-model I was consistent with hypothesis H-H. Ia which postulated a 
positive relationship between budgetary participation and managerial performance. The 
result of the individual test for this hypothesis was also consistent with sub-model I as 
budgetary participation had a positive and significant relationship with managerial 
performance (n--59). 
With reference to the relationship between budgetary participation and 
satisfaction, the results of sub-model 2 shown in table 8-A-2 indicate that budgetary 
participation was related positively and significantly with managers' satisfaction. The 
results of the individual test shown in table 7-A-1 (n--61) was consistent with the results 
of sub-model 2. These results -are supportive to research hypothesis H-II. lb which 
postulated a positive relationship between these two variables. 
8-3 Budgetary participation, motivation and budgetary slack 
Figure 8-A-2 (sub-model 1) in the appendix to this chapter shows that budgetary 
participation had a negative and significant contribution to managers' motivation to 




budgetary participation had a negative (statistically insignificant) relationship with 
budget motivation (n--63). The results of sub-model I and the individual test were 
opposite to the hypothesis H-II. 6 which postulated a positive relationship. However, 
chapter eleven provides possible explanations. 
On the other hand, the results of sub-model 3 (figure 8-A4) showed that 
budgetary participation had a weak (statistically insignificant) negative contribution to 
budgetary slack. The result of the individual test (n--63) was consistent with sub-model 
3 as budgetary participation had a negative relationship with budgetary slack (but 
insignificant). The results of sub-model 3 and the individual test provide a weak support 
to H-II. 9. 
8-4 Budget Motivation 
Hypothesis H-II. 7 stated that when managers are highly motivated to achieve their 
budget, high participation enhanced managerial performance (H-II. 7) and satisfaction 
(H-II. 8). Since this hypothesis was formulated based on the moderating approach, it was 
necessary to translate it according the intervening approach to indicate the anticipated 
relationships between these three variables. Budget motivation according to the 
moderating approach plays a positive moderating role, therefore, using the intervening 
approach we can argue that budgetary participation increases managers' motivation to 
achieve their budget which in turn increases their managerial performance and 
satisfaction. Figure 8-A-2 (sub-model 1) shows that budget motivation had a negative 
and significant intervening role between budgetary participation and managerial 
performance. This result was opposite to the anticipated direction. Table 8-A-1 at the 
end of this chapter shows that the contribution of budgetary participation to managers' 
performance via budget motivation was negative and equal to (-27%) of the direct 
effect. The results of the individual test showed an insignificant intervening role for 
budget motivation between budgetary participation and budgetary slack (n--58). The 
path coefficient in the individual test was so close to zero (. 008) that would be 
misleading to attribute a definite sign to the coefficient. Section 11-1-2-6 (p. 11.25) 
provides more possible explanations. 
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With reference to H-II. 8, the results of sub-model 2 (figure 8-A-3) indicate that 
budget motivation had a negative role between budgetary participation and managers' 
satisfaction at statistically insignificant level. The result of the individual test has also 
showed insignificant intervening role for budget motivation between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction (n--60). Path coefficient was also close to zero and it was 
difficult to attribute a definite sign to the coefficient. 
8-5 Budgetary Slack 
It was proposed that when managers' propensity to create slack is high, high 
participation decreases their perfonnance (H-II. 11) and increases their satisfaction (H- 
11.12). The translation of these hypotheses according the intervening approach are 










I Budgetary ________________ participation ( Satisfaction 
Figure 8.2 Figure 8.3 
Translation of H-11. II according to the intervening 
Translation of H41.12 according to the intervening 
approach approach 
Figures 8.2 & 8.3 show two possibilities for each hypothesis (signs above the 
arrows indicate the first possibility, whereas those below arrows indicate the second 
possibility). The first possibility argues that if high participation decreases managers' 
propensity to create slack, that would lead in turn to high performance (figure 8.2) and 
low satisfaction (figure 8.3). The second possibility argues that if managers participation 
-I increases managers' propensity to create slack, that would lead in turn to low 
performance (figure 8.2) and high satisfaction (figure 8.3). 
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The results shown in 'figures 8-A-4 (sub-model 3) and 8-A-5 (sub-model 4) 
indicate that budgetary slack had insignificant role on both relationships. The results of 
the individual test for H-H. II (n--5 9) and H-H. 12 (n=60) were consistent to those of sub- 
models 3&4. The direction of the effect of both the whole model and individual test 
was opposite to the anticipated direction of H-H. 11. On the other hand the results of the 
whole model provided weak support to H-H. 12 whereas the results of the individual test 
weakly rejected it (see table 8-A-5 in the appendix to this chapter). 
8-6 Budget Emphasis 
It was proposed that when budget emphasis is high, participation in budgetary 
process increases performance (H-1.7a), satisfaction (H-1.7b), and motivation (H-1.8). 
Figures 8-A-2 (sub-model 1) and 8-A-3 (sub-model 2) show the results. Again, a 
translation of these hypotheses according the intervening approach is: when managers 
participate in budgetary process, their superiors exercise more emphasis on meeting the 
budget. This leads in turn to high performance, satisfaction, and motivation. With 
reference to H-1.7a, the results of the whole model indicated that budget emphasis had a 
negative intervening role (statistically insignificant) between budgetary participation and 
performance. Tables 8-A-1 shows that the contribution of budgetary participation to 
managers' performance via budget emphasis was negative and equal to (44 %) of the 
direct effect. The result of the individual test (n=59) was consistent with the results of 
sub-model 1. However, both results did not provide any support to H-I. 7a. 
With reference to the effect of budget emphasis on managers' satisfaction (H- 
I. 7b), figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-3 (sub-model 2) show that budget emphasis had a positive 
intervening role in this relationship at statistically insignificant level. Table 8-A-2 in the 
appendix to this chapter shows the contribution of budgetary participation on managers' 
satisfaction via budget emphasis which was positive and equal to (18 %) of the direct 
effect. These results provided weak support to the research hypothesis (H-I. 7b) which 
postulated a positive contingent role for budget emphasis between budgetary 
participation and managers' satisfaction. The results of the individual test (n=60) were 
also opposite to the research hypothesis though statistically insignificant. 
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H-I. 8 postulates that budget emphasis has a positive contingent role between 
budgetary participation and motivation relationship. Figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-2 (whole 
model) show that budget emphasis had insignificant intervening role in this relationship. 
The result of the individual test (n7-62) was consistent with the whole model though 
statistically insignificant. However, the results of both analysis provided weak support 
to H-I. 8. 
8-7 Leadership Style 
Hypothesis (H-I. 5, p. 2.19) stated that when superiors have a leadership style 
characterised by low initiation structure and high consideration, high participation will 
increase their motivation to achieve the budget. Although the moderating approach is 
the best approach to test this hypothesis, it was tested also here to see if there is any 
association between these three variables either to confirm or reject the results of the 
moderating approach. A possible translation for this hypothesis is shown in the figure 
8.4 below. 
Figure 8.4 
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Figure 8.4 indicates that when managers participation in budgetary process, this 
will be associated with low initiation structure when in turn increases their motivation. 
Figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-2 (sub-model 1) show that both styles (consideration and initiation 
structure) had insignificant intervening role in this relationship. The result of the 
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individual test (n--62) was consistent with the result of sub-model 1. Both results were 
opposite to the research hypothesis at statistically insignificant level. 
It was also hypothesised (H-I. 6, p. 2.19) that budget emphasis has a positive 
association with consideration and a negative one with initiation structure. It was not 
possible to test this relationship using the whole model, as it did not hypothesise 
associations between the first set of the intervening variables. It was possible to test this 
hypothesis by the individual test. It worth attracting the attention to the fact that the 
results of path analysis and correlation analysis are identical if the relationship is 
considered only for two variables. However, the results were also insignificant and their 
signs were opposite to H-I. 6 (n--63). 
8-8 Information Asymmetry 
This research hypothesised that when managers are in a position of having more 
information than their superiors, high participation will increase their motivation (H- 
1.9a) and their propensity to create slack. On the other side, when superiors are in a 
position of having more information than their subordinates, that will lead to low 
motivation and low slack. The translation of this hypothesis according to the intervening 
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Figure 8.5 Figure 8.6 
Translation of 11-1.9a according to the intervening 
Translation of H-I. 9b according to the intervening 
approach approach 
As discussed in chapter six information asymmetry was measured using a scale 
range from I "whereas superiors have more information than their subordinate" and 7 
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"whereas subordinates have more information than their superiors". Therefore, 
according to the intervening approach shown in figures 8.5 & 8.6, high participation in 
budgetary process will decrease information asymmetry in favour of superiors. This will 
decrease both their motivation and slack (sign + means when information asymmetry 
decreases, motivation also decreases). 
The result of sub-model I (figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-2) showed that information 
asymmetry had an insignificant intervening role between budgetary participation and 
managers' motivation to achieve budget. The direction of the effect was opposite to H- 
1.9a. On the other hand, the direction of the individual test (n=62) was consistent with 
the research hypothesis though at a statistically insignificant level. 
With reference to H-1.9b the result of sub-model 3 (figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-4) shows 
that information asymmetry had an insignificant role between budgetary participation 
and budgetary slack. The direction of the effect was opposite to the research hypothesis. 
On the other hand the direction of the individual test (n--62) was consistent with H-1.9. b 
though at a statistically insignificant level. 
This research also -postulates (H-I. 10) that information asymmetry and 
organisation size are positively related. Again, it was not possible to test this proposition 
using the whole model, but the result of the individual test (n--64) was consistent with 
the correlation analysis as they provided weak support to H-1.10. 
8-9 Budget Goals Difficulty 
This research hypothesised that when budget goals are high, high participation 
will increase managers' motivation (H-II. 3a) and decrease their propensity to create 
slack (H-II. 3b). These hypotheses can be translated according to the intervening 
approach as follows; when managers participate in budgetary process, this implies their 
agreement to accept more responsibilities and as a result they perceive their budget 
goals are more difficult. This will lead in turn to high motivation and low slack. 
The results illustrated in figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-2 (sub-model 2) show that budget 
difficulty had a negative intervening role between budgetary participation and managers' 
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motivation (statistically insignificant). On the other hand, the results of the individual 
test (n--63) found a positive and significant intervening role for budget difficulty which 
was consistent with H-II. 3a. Figure 8.7 shows this relationship clearly. 
Figure 8.7 
The intervening role of budget difficulty on managers' 
motivation 
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The results shown in figure 8.7 indicate that budget goal difficulty had a 
significant intervening role between budgetary participation and managers' motivation 
to achieve budget. As indicated in the previous figure, budgetary participation increases 
budget goals difficulty which increases their motivation to achieve budget. 
With reference to H-H. 3b which postulates that budget difficulty has a negative 
contingent role between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create 
slack. The results of the sub-model 3 (figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-4) and the individual test 
(n7-63) provided strong support to this hypothesis. This hypothesis was also supported 
by the moderating approach in that the sign of the effect was correct though the 
coefficient was statically insignificant (see table 8-A-5 in the appendix to this chapter). 
8-10 Budget Goals Clarity 
This research postulated that when budget goals are clear, high participation 
increases managerial performance (H-II. 4a) and satisfaction (H-II. 4b). The contingent 
role for budget clarity using the intervening approach proposes that budgetary 
participation increases budget goal clarity which consequently increases managers' 
performance and satisfaction. The results of the sub-model I& sub-model 2 (see figures 
8.11, 
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8-A-2 & 8-A-3) indicate that budget clarity had a negative intervening role for both 
relationships though the coefficients were statistically insignificant. These results were 
opposite to the research hypotheses which postulated a positive intervening role for 
budget goal clarity. 
Table 8-A-1 (sub-model 1) shows that the contribution of budgetary participation 
on managers' performance via budget clarity was negative and equal to (-15%) of the 
direct one. When budget clarity was used in an intervening role between budgetary 
participation and managers' satisfaction, the results shown in table 8-A-2 reported a 
negative role equal to (-62%) of the direct effect. On the other hand, the results of the 
individual test provided weak support to H-IIAa (n=59) & H-II. 4b (n--61) because the 
coefficients were statistically insignificant. The results of the whole model and the 
individual test were statistically insignificant and thus they do not provide sufficient 
support to the research hypothesis. 
8-11 Locus of Control 
It was hypothesised (H-II. 5, p. 3.15) that locus of control has a contingent role 
between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. In other 
word, when internals participate in budgetary process they are less likely to create slack 
than externals. Again, although the moderating approach is more suitable for this 
hypothesis, the intervening approach has also been tested. A possible translation for this 
hypothesis according to the intervening approach is that when managers participate in 
budgetary process, it gives more self-confidence to a group of managers (internals) who 
seek responsibilities and this group are less likely to create slack. Figure 8.8 may 




Translation of H-II. 5 according to the intervening approach 
As shown in figure 8.8 internals (high scores in locus of control) desire high level 
of participation in the budgetary process and they are less likely to create slack. The 
results of sub-model 3 (figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-4) show insignificant support for an 
intervening role for locus of control between budgetary participation and slack. The 
direction of the effect was consistent with H-II. 5. On the other hand, the direction of the 
individual test (n--61) was opposite to the research hypothesis though it was at a 
statistically insignificant level. 
8-12 Ability of superiors to Detect Slack 
This research postulated (H-11.10, p. 3.22) that when superiors have high ability to 
detect slack high participation will decrease managers' propensity to create it. The 
translation of this hypothesis according to the intervening approach is shown in figure 
8.9. 
Figure 8.9 
Translation of H-H. 10 according to the intervening approach 
Ability of superiors 
+ to detect stack 




As indicated in figure 8.9 when managers participate in the budgetary process, 
their superiors will have more work-related information which is provided by the 
managers by which the superiors' ability to detect slack increases. Consequently when 
superiors ability to detect slack increases, managers' propensity to create slack will 
decrease. 
The results of sub-model 3 (figures 8-A-1 & 8-A-4) showed an insignificant 
intervening role for superiors' ability to detect slack between managers' participation 
and slack. The direction of the effect was opposite to the research hypothesis. On the 
other hand, the results of the individual test (n--59) weakly supported H-ILIO as the 
signs were correct but at a statistically insignificant level. The results of both the whole 
model and the individual tests are insignificant and they do not support to the research 
hypothesis. 
8-13 Job Difficulty 
This research hypothesised H-I. 11 (p. 2.30) that when a job is difficult, high 
participation increases managerial performance. Again, the translation of this hypothesis 
is similar to that explained in the section of budget goals difficulty. It is possible to 
argue that when managers participate in the budgetary process, it implies their 
agreement to accept higher levels of job difficulty, which may result in higher levels of 
managerial performance. 
The results of sub-model l&2 (figures 8-A-2 & 8-A-4) and the individual test 
were similar as they found that job difficulty has an insignificant intervening role. From 
table 8-A-1 at the appendix of this chapter it can be seen that the contribution of 
budgetary participation to managerial performance via job difficulty was very weak and 
equal to (-1.2 %) of the direct effect. This result provides a weak rejection of H-LI 1. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Research hypotheses were tested on a sample of British managers using the two 
analytical approaches adopted in this study. Chapter seven discussed the results of the 
moderating approach, and this chapter re-tested the hypotheses using the intervening 
approach. These complementary approaches provided evidence about the robustness of 
the conclusion for each hypothesis. As the size of the sample used in this study is 
limited, and some equations in the whole. model involved a large number of variables, 
therefore, an individual test for each hypothesis was also done using path analysis. 
The results explained in chapter seven (moderating model) and chapter eight 
(intervening model) provided evidence that supported some hypotheses but contradicted 
others. This section summarises the similarities and dissimilarities between the results 
of the two approaches. No explanations for each hypothesis will be considered here, as 
this will discussed fully in chapter eleven. Table 8-A-5, however, summarises the results 
of both approaches. From this table we can classify the results of the hypotheses using 
the two approaches into four groups according to the statistical significance of the tests 
as follow: 
First group. Hypotheses which were either supported or rejected strongly using the two 
approaches. The following hypotheses fell into this group: the positive impact of 
organization size on budgetary participation (H-1.1), and of budgetary participation on 
managers' performance (H-11.1a) and of satisfaction (H-11.1b) were statistically 
significant in the direction anticipated. On the other hand, environment uncertainty was 
strongly rejected in the two approaches. In path analysis (the whole model) this 
hypothesis was weakly rejected whereas it was strongly rejected where using the 
individual test. 
Second group. Hypotheses which were either weakly supported or weakly rejected by 
both approaches. These results were not significant at p: 50.1. Thus the results of the 
analysis, while not providing conclusive evidence are at least suggestive that the 
hypotheses have some credibility. Again many hypotheses fell into this group. For 
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example, the positive impact of process automation on budgetary participation (H-I. 3) 
was weakly supported in the two approaches. On the other hand, the effect of budget 
emphasis (H-I. 7a) between budgetary participation and managerial performance, and the 
effect of budget motivation between budgetary participation and satisfaction (H-II. 8) 
were weakly rejected in the two approaches. 
Third group. Hypotheses which were strongly supported or rejected by one approach 
and weakly by the other. Hypotheses which fell into this groups are: the effect of budget 
emphasis between budgetary participation and motivation (H-I. 8), and locus of control 
as a contingent variable between budgetary participation and slack. Both hypotheses 
were strongly supported by the moderating approach and weakly by the intervening one. 
Other hypotheses such as the effect of budget goals difficulty between budgetary 
participation and both motivation (H-11.7a) and slack (H-II. 7b) were strongly supported 
by the intervening and weakly by the moderating. On the other hand, the role of 
budgetary slack as a contingent variable between budgetary participation and 
performance was rejected strongly by the moderating and weakly by the intervening one. 
These results may reflect the appropriateness of the approach adopted for each 
hypothesis in the British sample. Although neither Brownell & McIness [1986] nor Mia 
[ 1988] explicitly explored the dimension of culture, we can argue this proposition based 
on their results which were applied in two different cultures. However, chapter eleven 
will indicate this matter in detail. 
Fourth group: On. several occasions the results of one approach contradict those 
computed from the other, but neither approaches were statistically significant. The 
sample failed to cast any light on these hypotheses. It was difficult to draw conclusion 
about the role information asymmetry (H-1.9a), budget emphasis on satisfaction (H- 
1.7b), product standardisation and budgetary participation (H-I. 4), budget clarity and 
both performance and satisfaction (H-II. 4a&b). However, chapter eleven will provide 
more explanation about the result of each hypothesis in detail. 
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9- Section 1 
9-1 An Analysis of the Inter-Correlation Matrix 
j The Saudi and Arab study ) 
This chapter will re-test the research hypotheses using samples of Saudi and Arab 
managers. Consistent with chapter seven, research hypotheses will be tested in two 
sections, the first uses correlation analysis to test a group of theses hypotheses, and the 
second uses multiple regression analysis to test the rest. It worth drawing the attention 
that this section will provide no comparison with the British and other studies as this 
will be discussed more fully in chapter eleven. 
9-1-1 The Contingency Variables 
9-1-1-1 Organisation Size. From tables 9-A-1 & 9-A-2 in the appendix of this 
chapter, we can find that organisation size had insignificant relationship with budgetary 
participation for both Saudi (n--40) and Arab samples (n--26). The correlation 
coefficients for both were in the anticipated direction. Correlation coefficient was a bit 
higher for the Arab sample, and if we consider the fact that the size of the sample limits 
this results, it is possible to conclude that H-1. I (p. 2.8) was supported for both samples. 
9-1-1-2 Environment Uncertainty. The research hypothesised (H-I. 2) that 
environment uncertainty has a positive relationship with the level to which managers are 
involved in setting their department budget. The results shown in table 9-A-1 & 9-A-2 
indicate a strong rejection for this hypothesis for both samples. The researcher provided 
two possible explanations for this rejection, and they are discussed in chapter eleven. 
9-1-1-3 Process Automation. Based on the literature review, this research 
hypothesised (H-I. 3) that process automation has a positive relationship with the degree 
to which managers participate in budgetary process. The result shown in table 9-A-1 
provided weak rejection for the Saudi sample (n--38) as the sign was opposite to H-1.3 
though statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the result of the Arab sample shown 
in table 9-A- I has strongly supported this hypotheses (n-- 16). 
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9-1-1-4 Product Standardisation. The inter-correlation matrixes in the appendix 
of this chapter show that product standardisation had insignificant relationship with 
budgetary participation for the Saudi (n=41) and Arab (n--16) samples. Although both 
results were statistically insignificant, their signs were opposite to H-1.4 (p. 2.15). The 
result of the Arab sample is highly considerable than the Saudi one as the correlation 
coefficient was high (0.345) although the number of respondents were small. This result 
mean that the Arab functional managers' participation is high in organisation which 
their products are highly standardised. 
9-1-2 Budgetary participation, Performance, and Satisfaction 
Table 9-A-2 in the appendix of this chapter shows that budgetary participation 
was positively and significantly related to Arab managers' performance and satisfaction. 
These results were consistent with H-11. I a&b. On the other hand, from the results shown 
in the inter-coffelation matrix in table 9-A-1, we can see that the Saudi results provided 
weak support to the research hypotheses because they were statistically insignificant 
(n=46 for performance & n=45 for satisfaction). 
With reference to H-11.2 (p. 3.7) which proposes that managers give their 
subordinates a high degree of participation in budgetary participation when those 
managers are highly involved in setting budgets. The results shown in tables 9-A-1 & 9- 
A-2 indicate that this proposition has been weakly rejected for both samples. The results 
of Saudi and Arab samples were insignificant and their signs were opposite to the 
research hypothesis. 
9-1.3 Budgetary participation and moderating variables 
This research hypothesised that when managers involved in sýetting their budget 
they will be highly motivated to achieve it. The results of Saudi and Arab samples were 
similar. Their signs were consistent with (H-II. 6) though statistically insignificant. With 
reference to the effect of budgetary participation on budgetary slack, the result of both 
samples showed insignificant relationship between these two variables. But it worth 
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attracting attention to the fact that the sign of the Arab sample was consistent with H- 
US. 
9-14 Other relationships 
Hypothesis (H-1.6) stated that budget emphasis has a positive relationship with 
superiors' leadership style. When superiors are characterised as high initiation structure, 
they would stress on using budget emphasis as a style of evaluation. The result of the 
inter-correlation matrix for the Arab sample indicate that this hypothesis was strongly 
supported (n--38), whereas the Saudi result was opposite to H-1.6) though statistically 
insignificant (n=50). Again, possible explanation about this difference will take place in 
chapter eleven. 
It was also hypothesised (H-I. 10) that organisation size has a positive relationship 
with the degree of information asymmetry between managers and their superiors. The 
results, however, were insignificant for both Saudi and Arab samples, but the sign of 
the Arab sample was opposite to the research hypothesis. 
9.4 
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9- Section 2 
9-2 An Analysis of the Moderating Approach 
j The Saudi and Arab samples ) 
This section will test the moderating role of some variables in the way 
hypothesised in chapter five for Saudi and Arab samples. Consistent with chapter seven, 
the results of the hypotheses will be indicated in figures 9-A- I& 9-A-2 in the appendix 
of this chapter. The results of running the necessary equations are indicated in appendix 
D at the end of the thesis. The following discussion explains the nature of the results in 
detail. 
9-2-1 Budget Motivation 
This research hypothesised that budget motivation has a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and both performance (H-II. 7), and satisfaction (H- 
11.8). To test these hypotheses the researcher employed equations which were similar to 
7.1 and 7,2 (p. 7.6). The results are shown in tables A-D-I & 2. From these tables we 
can find that budget motivation had insignificant moderating role between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction for Saudi sample (n=41) and the 
Arab one (n--30). However, the signs of the Saudi results were consistent with H-II. 7 
and opposite to H-II. 8. At the same time the signs of the Arab results were opposite to 
both hypotheses. Chapter eleýen will provide possible explanations for these results in 
detail. 
9-2-2 Budgetary Slack 
To test the moderating role of budgetary slack on the relationship between 
budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction, equations similar to 
those 7.1 & 7.2 were employed. Substituting X2 with budgetary slack instead of budget 
motivation. The results of those equations are shown in tables A-D-3 and 4. The results 
illustrated in those tables show that budgetary slack had insignificant moderating role 
between budgetary participation and performance for Saudis (n=45) and Arabs (n--32). 
The sign of Saudi sample, however, was opposite to H-IM 1. 
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With reference to the effect of budgetary slack on managerial satisfaction (H- 
11.12), the results shown in table A-D-4 indicate insignificant role for this variable for 
both samples. The sign of the Arab sample was opposite to the expected direction. 
9-2-3 Budget Emphasis 
This research hypothesised that budget emphasis plays a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and performance (H-1.7a), satisfaction (H-I. 7b), and 
motivation (H-I. 8). To test the effect of budget emphasis on these three relationships for 
Saudi and Arab samples, six equations each of them was similar to equation 7.1 (chapter 
seven) were employed. The results of those six equations are illustrated tables A-D-5,6, 
and 7. 
The results shown in these tables indicate that budget emphasis had insignificant 
moderating role between budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction 
for Saudi and Arab samples. The signs of both samples were opposite to expected 
direction, and thus we can conclude that H-I. 7a&b were weakly rejected. 
With reference to H-I. 8, table A-D-7 shows that budget emphasis had a negative 
intervening role between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve 
budgets for the Saudi sample at statistically insignificant level. On the other hand, the 
sign of the Arab sample was consistent with the research hypothesis though statistically 
insignificant. The result of the Saudi sample means that when both budgetary 
participation increases managers motivation when budget emphasis is low. 
9-2-4 Leadership Style 
H-I. 5 stated that budgetary participation increases managers' motivation to 
achieve budget when their superiors have a leadership style characterised as low 
initiation structure or high consideration. The necessary equations were developed and 
run. The results are shown in table A-D-8 and 9. These tables show neither initiation 
structure nor consideration had significant moderating role affecting managers' 
motivation to achieve budgets in Saudi and Arab samples. 
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Initiation structure had a positive moderating role between budgetary participation 
and budget motivation for Saudi and Arab samples at a statistically insignificant level. 
These results were opposite to H-I. 5 providing weak rejection to it. 
9-2-5 Information Asymmetry 
The moderating role of information asymmetry between budgetary participation 
and both budget motivation (H-I. 9a) and budgetary slack (H-I. 9b) was tested. As 
mentioned earlier (section 7-2-5), measuring information asymmetry included asking 
respondents who had more information. Scores below 23 mean that managers are in 
positions of having less information than superiors; scores above 25 mean that managers 
are in positions of having more information than their superiors; 24 indicated equality 
First, the effect of information asymmetry on budgetary slack was tested. Then 
and in order to provide sufficient support to the hypotheses, answers were split into 
three groups. Group I for managers who have less than their superiors. Group 2 for 
managers who have more than their superiors, and group 3 for managers who have the 
same as their superiors have. This resulted 20 cases for group 1,24 cases for group 2, 
and 3 cases for group 3 for Saudi sample. For the Arab sample the results were 9 cases 
for group 1.24 cases for group 2, and 2 cases for group 3. Consistent with chapter 
seven, same procedures were followed. The effect of information asymmetry was tested 
using the whole sample, then same procedure was repeated for groups 1&2, but 
number 3 was excluded as they involved small number of cases. The necessary 
equations were developed and run, and their results are shown in tables A-D- 10 to A-D- 
15 in appendix D at the end of the thesis. 
Table A-D- II shows that information asymmetry had a positive moderating role 
between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack though 
statistically insignificant. In other term, although the results for both Saudi and Arab 
samples were insignificant, they provided a weak support to H-1.9b. 
With reference to the effect of information asymmetry as a moderating role 
between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve budgets, table A- 
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D-10 indicates that the Saudi sample provided weak support to H-I. 9a. On the other 
hand, the result of the Arab sample has strongly rejected this hypothesis. Table A-D-10 
shows that budgetary participation and information asymmetry interacted with each 
other affecting managers' motivation. To provide an explanation about the nature of this 
interaction, same procedures applied in chapter 7 were repeated using equations similar 
to 7.3 & 7.4. This resulted X2= 32.6. Figure 9.1 shows the result. 
Figure 9.1 
Moderating role of information asymmetry affecting budget 
motivation for Arab sample 
dy Budget Motivation 
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The result shown in figure 9.1 indicates that when managers were in positions of 
having more work-related information than their superiors, their motivation to achieve 
budget decreased. This results was opposite to H-1.9a. A possible explanation for this 
result is when managers have more work-related information than their superiors, they 
may believe that they are in a position of holding more information about their budget 
and can control information embodied in the budget reports, and thus they can control 
the way they are evaluated. 
9-2-6 Budget Difficulty 
It was hypothesised (H-II. 3) that budget difficulty plays moderating roles between 
budgetary participation and both motivation and slack. When budget' goals are difficult, 
high participation increases managers' motivation to achieve budgets, and decreases 
9.8 
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their propensity to create slack. To test these moderating roles, same procedures in the 
previous analysis were followed, and the results are shown in table A-D- 16 & 17. 
The previous tables show that budget difficulty had insignificant moderating role 
affecting motivation and slack for Saudi and Arab samples. From these tables we can 
find that the signs were opposite to H-II. 3a&b providing weak rejection for each. 
9-2-7 Budget Clarity 
This research hypothesised that budget clarity plays moderating roles between 
budgetary participation and both performance (H-II. 4a) and satisfaction (H-II. 4b). The 
results of Saudi and Arab samples are shown in tables A-D- 18 & 19. From these tables 
we can see that the results were insignificant for both hypotheses. With reference to H- 
IIAb the signs of the two samples were in the expected direction. It worth drawing 
attention to the fact that the results of the path analysis, as will be mentioned later, has 
strongly supported this hypothesis. On the other hand, with respect to H-IlAa the sign of 
the Arab sample was in the unexpected direction. Again, possible explanations will take 
place in chapter eleven. 
9-2-8 Locus of Control 
It was hypothesised (H-II. 5) that locus of control plays a moderating role between 
budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. Necessary equations 
were developed and run for both samples, and their results are shown in table A-D-22. 
Although the results for both Saudi and Arab samples were insignificant, their signs lent 
weak support to the research hypothesis. 
9-2-9 Ability of Superiors to Detect Slack 
Hypothesis (H-II. 10) stated that superiors ability to detect slack has a moderating 
role between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. 
Necessary equations were developed and run for both samples, and their results are 
shown in table A-D-23. From these tables we can see that the ability of managers' 
superiors to detect slack had insignificant moderating role between budgetary 
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participation and budgetary slack. The sips of the Arab sample was consistent with the 
research hypothesis, whereas the sign of the Saudi sample was opposite to it. 
9-2-10 Job Difficulty 
It was hypothesised (H-1.11) that job difficulty has a positive moderating role 
between budgetary participation and performance. To check this hypothesis for Saudi 
and Arab samples, necessary equations were developed and run, and their results are 
shown in table A-D-24. The results shown in this table indicate that job difficulty had 
insignificant moderating role for both samples. However, the sign of the Saudi sample 
was consistent with H-I. 1 1, whereas the Arab one was opposite to it. A good 
explanation to the Arab sample was explored using the intervening approach in the 




Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter tested the research hypotheses using the moderating approach and 
samples from Saudi (locals) and Arab (non-locals) managers. These hypotheses as 
indicated in chapter five composed of twenty eight macro-and micro-level ones. Some 
of these hypotheses were tested by correlation analysis and the rest were tested by 
multiple regression. The results have showed that four hypotheses were strongly 
supported for the Arab sample yielding rate (14.2%), whereas nothing was strongly 
supported for the Saudi one. Twelve (42.8%) hypotheses for the Saudi sample and nine 
(32.14%) for the Arab were weakly supported, and that means although the results were 
statistically insignificant, the effect was in the direction anticipated suggesting that these 
hypotheses have some creditability. One (3.57%) hypothesis for the Saudi sample, and 
two (7.14%) hypotheses for the Arab were strongly rejected. Fifteen (53.5%) hypotheses 
for the Saudi sample and twelve (42.8) for the Arab were weakly rejected. 
However, in order to avoid repetition, the end of chapter ten will provide a brief 
summary about the similarities and differences between the results of the moderating 
approach which were introduced in this chapter and those of the intervening approach 
which will be explained in the next chapter. Table 10-A-9 in the appendix of chapter 
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10- Chapter Ten 
An Analysis of the Intervening Approach 
for Saudi and Arab samples 
In this chapter, the proposed model will be tested using path analysis for Saudi 
and Arab samples. The mathematical equations necessary to test the proposed model 
were developed and run (see Appendix C). The path diagrams for these results are 
illustrated in figures 10-A-1 to 10-A- 10 in the appendix of this chapter. It worth 
drawing attention to the fact that as long as sample size are different in all variables, and 
in order to avoid bias in the analysis, the researcher has used the respondents who 
answered all variables involved in the four sub-models for Saudi and Arab samples. 
This resulted 32 cases for Saudi sample and 23 cases for the Arab sample. Again, 
consistent with the British sample, this chapter will re-test the research hypotheses also 
individually to provide sufficient support to the whole model (see page 8.2). The results 
are discussed below. Table IO-A-9 at the end of this chapter shows the results of the 
individual tests and the whole model. 
10-1 The Effect of the Contingency Variables on the Level of Budgetary 
participation 
The effects of the contingency variables on budgetary participation for Saudi and 
Arab samples are shown in figures 10-A-I & 10-A-5 in the appendix to this chapter. 
The tests were conducted using multiple regression which included the four contingency 
variables as independents on budgetary participation. In chapter nine the effect of each 
variable was individually tested using correlation analysis. 
The results of the Saudi sample were similar to those obtained using the inter- 
correlation matrix explained in chapter nine (see table 9-A-2 at the end of chapter nine). 
The effects were opposite to the research hypotheses with respect to environment 
uncertainty (H-I. 2), process automation (H-I. 3), and product standardisation (H-1.4). The 
result of organisation size (H-I. 1) was also consistent with the inter-correlation matrix 
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though it was at a statistically insignificant level. However, the results of the individual 
test is shown in table 9-A-1. 
The results of the Arab sample showed similar signs with those obtained from the 
inter-correlation matrix for environment uncertainty (H-I. 2), process automation (H-I. 3), 
and product standardisation (H-1.4). But for organisation size (H-I. 1), the sign was 
opposite to the hypothesis. The number of respondents for this test was quite small (10). 
The researcher believes that the result of the inter-correlation (table 9-A-2) gives more 
reliable support. 
10-2 Budgetary participation, performance and satisfaction 
The results of the four sub-models of the Arab sample showed that budgetary 
participation had a positive significant contribution on both managers' performance and 
satisfaction (n--23). The results of the individual test were identical to those obtained in 
the inter-correlation matrix (table 10-A-2 in the appendix of this chapter) where 
budgetary participation had significant relationships with both performance (n=34) and 
satisfaction (n--33). 
With reference to the Saudi sample, the results of the whole model (sub-models 
1&3) showed that budgetary participation had an insignificant relationship with 
managers' performance (n--32). The direction of the effect, however, was opposite to H- 
IIA a. On the other hand, the individual test also failed to find a significant relationship 
for budgetary participation on managers performance though the direction of the effect 
was consistent with H-Il-la. The coefficients for both test were quite low and thus it is 
difficult to draw a conclusion from them. 
10-3 Budgetary participation, motivation and budgetary slack 
Figure 10-A-2 (sub-model 1) shows that budgetary participation had a positive 
relationship with managers' motivation to achieve budgets for the Saudi sample though 
the coefficient was at a statistically insignificant level. The results of the individual test 
were consistent with sub-model 1. These results were consistent with H-11.6. On the 
other hand, the effect of budgetary participation on slack was also insignificant for the 
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whole model and the individual test, and the direction of the effect for both was 
opposite H-11.9. 
The results of the whole model for the Arab sample (figure 10-A-7) show that 
budgetary participation had a negative relationship with budget motivation at a 
statistically insignificant level. The individual test also failed to find a significant 
relationship with respect to this hypothesis. However, the direction of the effect was 
consistent with H-U. 6. With reference to the effect of budgetary participation on 
budgetary slack, figure 10-A-9 (sub-model 3), and the individual test indicated that the 
results for both were consistent with H-II. 9 though the coefficients were statistically 
insignificant. 
10-4 Budget Motivation 
It was proposed that budget motivation plays a positive contingent role between 
budgetary participation and both performance (H-II. 7) and satisfaction (H-11.8). The 
translation of these hypotheses were discussed in the chapter eight (p. 8.4). Figures 10- 
A-2 & 10-A-7 show the results of Saudi and Arab samples. In both samples budget 
motivation had an insignificant intervening role between the above mentioned 
relationships. The signs of both samples were opposite to H-11.7 & H-II. 8 as they were 
negative. So, it is possible to say that the research hypotheses H-II. 7 & H-II. 8 were 
weakly rejected. 
The results of the individual test were similar to the results of the whole model for 
both Saudi and Arab samples where budget motivation had an insignificant role between 
budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction. However, the Arab 
results produced positive signs in the expected direction for both hypotheses but at a 
statistically insignificant level. 
10-5 Budgetary Slack 
It was hypothesised that when managers' propensity to create slack is high, high 
participation will decrease managerial performance (H-II. 11) and increase job 
satisfaction (H-II-12). Again the translations of these hypotheses according to the 
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intervening approach were discussed in section 8-5. Figures 10-A-4 and 10-A-9 
indicate that there were insignificant roles for budgetary slack on the above mentioned 
relationships for Saudi and Arab samples. 
The results of the whole model (n--32) and the individual test (n--43) for the Saudi 
sample produced signs which were consistent with H-ILI I though they were at a 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, only the result of the individual test for the 
Arab sample (n--32) produced signs which were consistent with the research hypothesis. 
With reference to H-11.12, the results of the whole model (n--32) and the individual test 
(n=43) produced signs which were opposite to the anticipated direction though the 
coefficients were statistically insignificant. The results of the whole model (n--23) and 
the individual test (n--3 1) for the Arab sample were similar as both showed insignificant 
intervening role for budgetary slack between budgetary participation and satisfaction. 
However, the signs of the individual test of the Arab sample were consistent with H- 
11.12. 
10-6 Budget Emphasis 
This research hypothesised that budget emphasis plays a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and performance (H-1.7a), satisfaction (H-1.7b), and 
managers' motivation to achieve budgets (H-I. 8). The Saudi results as shown in figures 
10-A-2 (sub-model 1) & 10-A-3 (sub-model 2) indicate that budget emphasis had an 
insignificant intervening role for all of these hypotheses. The direction of the effect was 
consistent with the research hypotheses. The results of the individual test for H-I. 7a 
(n=46), H-1.7b (n=45), H-I. 8 (n--45) were similar to those of the whole model as budget 
emphasis has insignificant intervening role for all three hypotheses. The direction of the 
effect in the individual test was consistent with the anticipated direction only for H-I. 8. 
The results of the Arab sample were similar to those of the Saudi sample as 
budget emphasis has an insignificant intervening role for all three hypotheses. ' The 
direction of the effect in the whole model was opposite to H-I. 7a&b. On the other hand, 
the results of the whole model and the individual teýt were consistent with H-1.8, and it 




The intervening role of budget emphasis between budgetary 
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Figure 10.1 shows that although there was a direct relationship between budgetary 
participation and managers' satisfaction, there was also another indirect effect through 
style of evaluation. Managers' participation in budgetary process was associated 
positively with the style of evaluation (budget emphasis), and this style consequently 
increased their satisfaction. This result provided evidence to the previous results as will 
be discussed in chapter eleven. 
10-7 Leadership Style 
Hypothesis H-I. 5, (p. 2.19) stated thdt, leadership style plays a contingent role 
between budgetary participation and managers motivation to achieve their budgets. The 
results shown in figures 10-A-1,10-A-2,10-A-6, and 10-A-7 indicate that both styles 
had insignificant intervening roles between budgetary participation and managers' 
motivation to achieve budgets for both samples. 
The directions of the effect for both samples were opposite to H-I. 5. The results of 
the individual test for Saudi (n=44) and Arab (n--32) samples were consistent with those 
of the whole model. On the other hand, it was hypothesised (H-1.6, p. 2.19) that budget 
emphasis has a positive relationship with consideration and a negative one with 
initiation structure. It was not possible to test this relationship using the whole model, as 
indicated in an early section, as the proposed model did not consider any association 
between the first group of the intervening variables (see figure 5-A-3, p. 5.17) -as all 
proposed relationships were linear. It was possible to test this hypothesis using the 
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individual test. The individual test as mentioned before is conducted by correlation 
analysis which its results are shown in table 9-A- I& 9-A-2. 
10-8 Information Asymmetry 
This research hypothesised that when managers are in a position of having more 
information than their superiors, high participation will increase their motivation (H- 
1.9a) and satisfaction (H-I. 9b). Chapter eight has explained the translation of these 
hypotheses according to the intervening approach. From figures 10-A-1,10-A-2,10-A- 
6,10-A-7 it can be seen that information asymmetry had an insignificant role in this 
relationship for both Saudi and Arab samples. 
The direction of the effect in the whole model was consistent with the H-I. 9a for 
the Saudi sample, whereas it was opposite to it for the Arab sample. For H-1.9b, the 
results of the Saudi sample for the whole model were opposite to the anticipated 
direction whereas they were consistent with the research hypothesis for the Arab 
sample. On the other hand, the results of the individual test for the Saudi and Arab 
samples were consistent with both H-1.9a &b though they were statistically 
insignificant. (see table I O-A-9 in the appendix of this chapter). 
This research hypothesised (H-1.10) that information asymmetry is positively 
related with the size of the organisation. Again, it was not possible to test this 
proposition in the whole model, but the results of the individual test which used 
correlation analysis are shown in tables 9-A-1 & 9-A-2. 
10-9 Budget Goal Difficulty 
Hypothesis (H-11.3a) stated that budget difficulty has a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve their budget. The 
results of sub-model I and the individual test were similar as budget difficulty had an 
insignificant intervening role for Saudi and Arab samples. However, the directions of 
the effect in both tests were opposite to the research hypothesis. The directions of the 
effects effect were also consistent with the moderating approach which failed to find a 
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significant contingent role for budget goal difficulty between budgetary participation 
and motivation and the effect was also opposite to H-II. 3a. 
The results of hypothesis H-II. 3b, which postulates that budget goal difficulty has 
a negative contingent role between budgetary participation and budgetary slack are 
shown in figures I O-A-4 &1 O-A-7. From those figures it can be seen that budget goal 
difficulty had an insignificant intervening role between budgetary participation and 
managers' propensity to create slack. The signs of the Saudi and Arab results were 
opposite to H-I-9b and at a statistically insignificant level. The results of the individual 
test for both Saudi (n--46) and Arab (34) samples were consistent with those of the 
whole model. 
10-10 Budget Goal Clarity 
This research hypothesised that budget clarity has a positive contingent role 
between budgetary participation and both performance (H-II. 4a) and satisfaction (H- 
11.4b). The results of the Arab samples in the whole model provided weak support for 
these propositions as the directions of the effect were consistent with the research 
hypotheses. The result of the whole model of the Saudi sample was consistent with H- 
11.4a, whereas it was opposite to H-II. 4b. On the other hand, the results of the individual 
test provided weak support to H-II. 4a for the Saudi sample (n--45), and strong support to 
the Arab sample as shown in the figure 10.2. 
Figurc 10-2 
The intervening role of budget clarity between budgetary 
participation and performance for Arab sample 











Figure 10.2 shows that budgetary participation increases budget goal clarity which 
in turn increases managerial performance. The results of the individual tests for H-II. 4b 
for both Saudi and Arab samples provided strong support in the anticipated direction as 
shown in figure 10.3 
Figure 10-3 
The intervening role of budget clarity between budgetary participation and 
satisfaction for Saudi and Arab samples 
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Figure 10.3 shows that high participation increases budget goal clarity for both 
Saudi and Arab samples, which consequently increased job satisfaction. These results 
were also consistent with the results of the moderating approach (see table 10-A-9). 
10-11 Locus of Control 
It was hypothesised (H-II. 5) that locus of control has a contingent role on 
managers' propensity to create slack. In other words, "internal managers" have low 
propensity to create slack when they perceive high degree of participation in the 
budgetary process. 
The results shown in figures I O-A- 1,1 O-A-4,1 O-A-6, and I O-A-9 in the appendix 
of this chapter indicate that this variable (locus of control) had a negative intervening 
role between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack for both 
samples, and it was insignificant for the Saudi sample but significant for the Arab one. 
The direction of the effect for both samples was consistent with H-H. 5. The results of 
the individual test for both Saudi (n=47) and Arab (n--34) samples were consistent with 
those of the whole model and the directions of the effect were also consistent with H- 
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11.5). A possible explanation for these results is that "internals" managers perceive a 
high degree of participation which affects their propensity to create slack negatively. 
However, chapter eleven will discuss this point further. 
10-12 Superiors' ability to Detect Slack 
Hypothesis (H-11.10) stated that the ability of managers' superiors to detect slack 
has a contingent role between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. From the 
results of sub-model 3 shown in figures I O-A- 1,1 O-A-4, I O-A-6,1 O-A-9 we can see that 
there was an insignificant role for this variable. The signs were opposite to H-11.10 for 
both samples. The direction of the individual test was similar to sub-model 3 for the 
Saudi sample (n=48), whereas the direction of the Arab sample was consistent with H- 
II. 10 though it was statistically insignificant. 
10-13 Job Difficulty 
It was hypothesised (H-1.11) that job difficulty has a contingent role between 
budgetary participation and managerial performance. The results of sub-model I&3 for 
both Saudi and Arab samples indicate that job difficulty had an insignificant intervening 
role between budgetary participation and managerial performance, and the signs of the 
direction were opposite to H-I. 1 1. 
On the other hand the results of the individual test were similar to sub-models I 
3 for both Saudi and Arab samples where the signs were opposite to H-1.11. But the 
result of the Arab sample was significant though it was opposite to the anticipated 
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The result shown in figure 10.4 indicates that budgetary participation reduced 
managers' job difficulty, which consequently increased their performance. This result 
revealed that budgetary participation increased performance when job difficulty was 
low. 
However, the previous discussion has provided evidence that some hypotheses 
were supported either strongly or weakly, and the rest were rejected also either strongly 
or weakly. The following section will summarise the results of Saudi and Arab samples 
for both approaches. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
Research hypotheses were tested on two samples consisting of Saudi (locals) and 
Arab (non-locals) managers using the two analytical approaches adopted in this study. 
Chapter nine discussed the results of the moderating approach, and this chapter re-tested 
the hypotheses using the intervening approach. These complementary approaches 
provided evidence about the robustness of the conclusion of each hypothesis. Again, 
consistent with the British sample, as the size of the sample used in this study limited its 
results, and some equations in the whole model involved a large number of variables, 
therefore, an individual test for each hypothesis was also done using path analysis, 
The results explained in chapter nine (moderating model) and eight (intervening 
model) provided evidence that some hypotheses supported the literature whereas others 
contradict them (see chapter eleven for more details). Table 10-A-9, however, 
summarises the results of both approaches for the two samples. Again, this section 
summarises the similarities and dissimilarities between the results of the two 
approaches. No explanations for each hypothesis will be considered here, as this will 
discussed fully in chapter eleven. From this table we can classify the results of the 
hypotheses using the two approaches into four groups according to the statistical 
significance of the tests as follows: 
First group: Hypotheses which were either supported or rejected strongly using the two 
approaches. The following hypotheses fell into this group: the positive impact of 
process automation on budgetary participation for the Arab sample (H-1.3), the positive 
impact of initiation structure on budget emphasis for the Arab sample (H-I. 6), the 
positive effect of budgetary participation on managerial performance and job 
satisfaction for the Arab sample (H-II. la&b). On the other hand, environment 
uncertainty was strongly rejected in the two approaches for both Saudi and Arab 
samples. 
Second group: Hypotheses which were either weakly supported or weakly rejected by 




analysis, while not providing conclusive evidence are at least suggestive that the 
hypotheses have some credibility. Again many hypotheses fell into this group. For 
example, the positive impact of organisation size on budgetary participation (H-I. 1), the 
effect of information asymmetry between budgetary participation and motivation (H- 
I. 9a) for the Saudi sample, the effect of budgetary participation on performance (H- 
Il. I a), satisfaction (H-II. I b), and motivation (H-II. 6) for the Saudi sample, the effect of 
budget clarity between budgetary participation and performance (H-II. 4a), the effect of 
budgetary participation on slack (H-II. 9) for the Arab sample. All of those hypotheses 
were weakly supported in the two approaches. On the other hand, the effect of process 
automation on budgetary participation (H-I. 3) for the Arab sample, the effect of budget 
difficulty between budgetary participation and slack (H-11.3b). All of theses hypotheses 
were weakly rejected in the two approaches. 
Third group: Hypotheses which were strongly supported or rejected by one approach 
and weakly by the other. Hypotheses which fell into this groups are: the effect of budget 
emphasis between budgetary participation and satisfaction for the Arab sample (H-I. 7b), 
the effect of budgetary participation on satisfaction for the Saudi sample (H-II. 1b), the 
effect of budget clarity between budgetary participation and perfonnance (H-11.4a) and 
on satisfaction (H-II. 4b). All of theses hypotheses were strongly supported by an 
approach and weakly by another. On the other hand, the effect of budget emphasis 
between budgetary participation and performance for the Arab sample (H-I. 7a), the 
effect of information asymmetry between budgetary participation and motivation (H- 
. 9a). 
These two hypotheses were rejected strongly by an approach and weakly by the 
other. 0 
Fourth group: In several occasions the results of one approach contradicted those 
computed from the other, but neither approaches were statistically significant. The 
sample failed to cast any light on theses hypotheses. It was difficult to draw conclusion 
about the role budget emphasis between budgetary participation and satisfaction (H- 
1.7b) for the Saudi sample, and motivation (H-1.8) for both Saudi and Arab samples. 
However, chapter eleven will provide more explanation about the result of each 
hypothesis in detail. * 
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11- Comparative Study, summary and Conclusion 
11-1 Comparative study and cultural 
differences 
Chapters 2&3 discussed the aims of this study, the literature review on which the 
research hypotheses the proposed model have been developed. Chapter four has argued 
that culture plays a contingent role in some relationships in this area of research. 
Chapters five and six introduced the structure of the proposed model, the research 
methodology adopted to test the hypotheses, and defined the sites of the field study, 
which were Saudi Arabia and UK. Chapters seven to ten have examined the results of 
both Saudi and British samples with respect to the research hypotheses. 
Although Hofstede's cultural dimensions discussed in chapter six provided clear- 
cut evidence that Saudi and British cultures are substantially different, the research 
hypotheses have been based on studies which were conducted in UK and other sites that 
have similar cultural dimensions. No cultural differences have been embodied in the 
research hypotheses as almost all the literature is based on a western culture. 
Nevertheless, as there is a lack in the literature regarding the role of culture on some 
variables considered in this study, this research investigates the matter ftirther by 
applying the proposed model in three samples each of which has its own cultural 
characteristics. 
This chapter will compare the results of the three studies. For certain hypotheses 
and partially explain the differences between the studies. So, this chapter will consider 
the implications of the literature on cultural differences and proposes some new 
hypotheses that indicate the expected changes that cultural differences would make to 
the original ones. These new hypotheses can be tested against the empirical data from 
the field studies. The comparative results for the three studies for each of the original 
hypothesis are set out in table II -A- I in the appendix to this chapter. 
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11-1-1 Macro-level hypotheses 
11-1-1-1 Organisation size and budgetary participation (H-1.1). 
From the literature review it was concluded that in big organisations, top 
management adopts decentralised decision making in order to run their activities 
effectively and smoothly. As a consequence lower management will be more involved 
in planning processes such as budgets because they have more accurate information in 
their own area of responsibilities. Hypothesis H-LI states that in large organisations 
there will be more participation in budgetary process by functional managers than in 
small organisatiOns. In relation to this hypothesis, the researcher did not expect any 
cultural differences between the Saudi and British organisation-S, as the concept of 
decentralisation itself is not culturally dependent, rather it depends on the structure of an 
organisation as well as the personality of superiors whether or not they have 
authoritative trends. 
Table 6-A-1 in the appendix to chapter six indicates that the mean of the size of 
the British sample was 4.2, which reveals an equal distribution of their existence in both 
large and small organisations. Arab managers were observed to be in a smaller 
organisations rather than large ones (mean = 3.2). The Saudi managers have reported a 
mean of 5.2 that reveal that they work in large organisations rather than small ones. 
From table 6.1 it can be seen that the Saudis reported a high level on uncertainty 
avoidance. According to the explanation of Hofstede [ 1994], people in such country fear 
of ambiguous situations and avoid risks. This interpretation may explain why Saudi 
managers work in large organisations. Labour turnover in such organisations are usually 
lower than the small ones. 
However, the results of the British study strongly supported the research 
hypothesis that argues when organisation size increases, budgetary participation also 
increases. Although the results of the Saudi and Arab samples have reported 
insignificant relationship between organisation size and budgetary participation, the 
effect was in the expected direction. The size of both samples shown in table 1 1-A-1 is 
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small and may limit the results, so it is possible to say that they do not contradict the 
research hypothesis. 
To confirm the nature of this results ftu-ther, size variable was dichotornised into 
low and high levels at the mid point of their scales, then the mean of budgetary 
participation was run for each group as indicated in table 11.1. 
Table 11.1 
Means of budgetary participation at low and high levels of 
organisation size 
British Saudi Arab Ovcrall 
Small Organisations 27.7 30.29 32.27 29.6 
Big Organisation 32.18 33.17 36.25 33.04 
The results shown in table 11.1 are consistent with H-LI which argued that 
managers' participation in the budgetary process is greater in big organisations; than in 
small ones. The previous results, particularly the British one, confirmed the literature 
review which proposed this relationship. They were consistent with the results of 
Merchant [1984] and Lyne [1988] who supported this argument. Whereas it was 
contradictory to Ezzarnel who failed to support this proposition in his study which was 
conducted in the UK. The results of both Ezzamel and this study produced different 
results within the same country. A possible explanation is that the Ezzamel's sample 
consisted of financial directors whereas the sample of this study was a combination of 
different department managers. Considering the fact that budget preparation is the 
responsibility of the financial manager of an organisation regardless its size, we can 
conclude that the result of Ezzainel was completely logical. 
To check this point further, correlation analysis was run only for the accounting 
managers. The result was not significant, but the correlation coefficient was higher. The 
sample size for this procedure was 9, which is low, but similar to the Ezzamel study. 
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11-1-1-2 Environment uncertainty and budgetary participation (H-1.2). 
Hypothesis H-I. 2 states that in situation of high environment uncertainty, there 
will be high participation in budgetary process to reduce uncertainty. It was not expected 
that culture will play a role in this proposition as, so far, no evidence from previous 
studies supported that. The results shown in table II -A- I provided a strong rejection for 
this hypothesis in the three samples. Although the direction of the effect was opposite to 
the anticipated direction, the results lent support to the fact that culture has no effect in 
this area. 
This counter-intuitive result may be explained by two possible reasons. First, it is 
possible to argue that when there are high levels of uncertainty, senior management will 
have little confidence in the arguments advanced by departmental managers in 
participative situations. Rather than have to accept what they cannot evaluate, due to the 
high levels of uncertainty involved, they may choose to make decisions themselves and 
thus reduce managers participation in decision making. Secondly, it is possible to 
reverse the usual logic for the association between a high level of uncertainty and high 
budgetary participation. It may be that as a result of participative budgetary procedures, 
the level of uncertainty is reduced. So, the participative process results in an increased 
sharing of information and a reduction in uncertainty, leading to the association of 
budgetary participation and low uncertainty. 
The results of the British sample and that of Ezzamel [1990] do not agree. He 
found (p. 190) a positive relationship between environment uncertainty and managers' 
participation in budgetary process, whereas the result of this study was the opposite. 
These contradictory results could be attributed to the nature of his sample which was 
discussed in the previous section. To check that, correlation procedures were ran for 
accounting managers only for environment uncertainty-participation relationship. The 
result was insignificant and the sign remained in the same direction (positive). 
Although Govindarajan [1986, p. 504] found an insignificant relationship between 
participation and environment uncertainty, the sign of his correlation coefficient was 
consistent with this study. Further research in this area is needed. 
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11-1-1-3 Process automation and budgetary participation (H-1.3). 
Hypothesis H-I. 3 states that managers will exercise high participation in the 
budgetary process in highly automated companies than in low automated ones. Again, 
the researcher did not expect that culture would play a role in this proposition as, so far, 
no evidence from previous studies suggested that. The results of the British and Arab 
samples were similar as their signs were in the anticipated direction, though it was 
insignificant for the British sample. On the other hand, the results of the Saudi sample 
contradicted those of British and Arab samples as it provided weak rejection of this 
hypothesis. 
In section 2-3-1 (p. 2.12) Brownell & Merchant [ 1990] argued two possibilities for 
this relationship. The first proposed a negative relationship with participation, and the 
second proposed a positive relationship. Thus, the result of the Saudi sample was 
consistent with the first point of view, whereas the results of both British and Arab 
samples were consistent with the second point of view. The results of Mann-Whitney 
test in table 6.2 show that there was a significant difference between both Saudi and 
Arab and Saudi and British for process automation, whereas no difference was observed 
between the British and Arab samples. This difference can be also observed from table 
6-A-1 (p. 6.38) where the mean of process automation reported by Saudi managers 
(14.1) was higher than both British (11.5) and Arab (11.2). 
The higher mean for process automation of the Saudi sample revealed that Saudi 
managers exist to some extent in highly automated organisations rather than the low 
automated ones. Brownell & Merchant [1990] argued that in highly automated 
organisations, control increases over the manufacturing process, and thus reduces the 
role of budgetary control and consequently managers' participation. The Saudi study 
provides support to this proposition though statistically insignificant. 
Merchant [1984] tested the relationship between process automation and 
participation. The measure of participation he used embodied the following three 
aspects: how much influence on budget plans managers have, personal involvement in 
budgeting and time spent in budget related activities. The results showed that process 
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automation had a positive relationship only with the first item, whereas no such 
relationship was observed for the other items. This result is consistent with the Arab 
sample and it is also similar to the British one, but inconsistent with the Saudi sample. 
11-1-1-4 Product standardisation and. budgetary participation H-1.4. 
Based on the literature review, Hypothesis H-1.4 states that in low standardised 
organisations managers exercise a higher degree of participation in the budgetary 
process than in high standardised ones. Again, this research did not expect any cultural 
differences in this hypothesis as, so far, no evidence from previous studies suggested 
that. The results of British, Saudi, and Arab samples found a non-significant relationship 
between product standardisation and budgetary participation. However, British sample 
showed weak support to H-I. 4 whereas the Saudi and Arab samples provided weak 
rejection of it. The result of the British sample was consistent with that of Merchant 
[1984] where product standardisation had a negative and insignificant relationship with 
budgetary participation. 
11-1-1-5 The contingent role of leadership style between budgetary participation 
and motivation (H-1.5). 
Based on the literature review, hypothesis H-I. 5 states that leadership style plays a 
contingent role between budgetary participation and managers' motivation to achieve 
their budget. The explanation of this hypothesis using the moderating and intervening 
approaches were discussed in the relevant chapters. The researcher expected that when 
superiors have a leadership characterised as low initiation structure and high 
consideration, high participation will increases managers' motivation to achieve budget. 
Table 6.1 (p. 6.2) indicates-that both Saudi and Arab culture are more collectivist 
than British. Hofstede [1994, p. 67] mentioned that relationships for high collectivism 
countries prevail over tasks, and also the relationship between employer and employees 
is perceived in moral terms. Therefore, it is expected that initiation structure in such 
countries plays a positive role on the relationship between budgetary participation and 
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managers' motivation. Accordingly, this positive role requires the following change in 
hypothesis H-I. 5 for the Saudi and Arab samples. 
0 In the Saudi and Arab cultures - when managers' superiors have a 
leadership style characterised as high initiation structure, high 
participation increases their motivation. 
The British results do not lend sufficient evidence for this hypothesis as both 
moderating and intervening approaches produced contradictory signs though statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the results of the Saudi and Arab samples were similar 
as both showed that initiation structure had an insignificant contingent role between 
budgetary participation and motivation. Table 11-A-1 indicates weak rejection to the 
original hypothesis. However, these results give some support to the revised hypothesis, 
that is, cultural factors explain the differences between the British and other studies. 
It should be noted that the role of consideration in H-I. 5 was not clear. A possible 
explanation of this issue is that both dimensions (consideration and initiation structure) 
were positively and significantly related in the three samples. The conflicting role of 
consideration in this area of research was also observed in some previous research. 
DeCoster & Fertakis [1968, p. 241] found that budget-induced pressure and 
consideration were positively related, where they expected a negative or at least little 
evidence of a positive correlation between the two variables. 
11-1-1-6 Initiation structure and budget emphasis (H-I. 6). 
Hypothesis H-1.6 states that managers are more likely to be evaluated on the basis 
of budget emphasis if their superiors have a leadership style characterised by high 
initiation structure. As mentioned in the previous section, it is expected that initiation 
structure has a positive role in collectivism countries than individualism countries. 
Thus, initiation structure and budget emphasis are expected to be unrelated in 
collectivism countries. This positive role requires the following change in hypothesis H. 
1.6 for the Saudi and Arab samples. 
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0 In Saudi and Arab sample, initiation structure has no significant 
relationship with budget emphasis. 
The results shown in table 11-A-1 indicates that initiation structure had no 
significant relationship with budget emphasis for both Saudi and British samples. The 
direct of the effect was opposite to the original hypothesis. On the other hand, the result 
of the Arab sample has strongly supported the original hypothesis as initiation structure 
and budget emphasis were positively related. A possible explanation for the result of the 
Arab sample which was particularly different from the Saudi one is that superiors who 
are characterised as initiation structure use budget emphasis more strictly for non-locals. 
11-1-1-7 Budget emphasis 
This variable has been used extensively in this area of research and has been 
viewed differently in previous work. Some scholars (e. g. Brownell [1982] and Dunk 
[1989]) interpreted budget emphasis as "budget profif' which included by meeting the 
budget and also the profit in the long run. Others (Dunk [1993]) interpreted it only as 
meeting the budget. This study adopted the second opinion as it viewed budget 
emphasis similar to the original classification of Hopwood budget-constrained style 
which is measured only by meeting the budget. 
This research proposed that when superiors put high emphasis on meeting budget, 
subordinates' participation in budgetary process is associated positively with 
performance (H-I. 7a), satisfaction (H-I. 7b), and motivation (H-I. 8). With respect to the 
expected influence of culture on theses three hypotheses, Hofstede [1994, table 4.2, 
p. 96] mentioned that managers in masculine countries are expected to be decisive and 
assertive. From table 6.1 (p. 6.2) we can see that Saudi and Arab countries reported 
lower level on this scale in comparison with UK. Therefore, it is expected that British 
managers will perceive that their superiors exercise higher budget emphasis to evaluate 
their performance than the Saudi and Araý samples. Regarding H-I. 7a&b and H-I. 8, it is 
possible to argue the following changes with respect to the original hypotheses. 
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0 In the British sample, high budget emphasis will play a positive 
contingent role between budgetary participation and both managerial 
performance and motivation, and a negative role between budgetary 
participation and managers'satisfaction. 
0 In the Saudi and Arab samples, high budget emphasis will play a 
negative contingent role between budgetary participation and 
performance and a positive contingent role between budgetary 
participation and both satisfaction and motivation. The reason is that 
Saudi andArab managers may expect that participation will lead to low 
level of budget emphasis instead of high emphasis because budget is a 
part ofterarchical control system. 
In table 6.2 (6.8) the Mann-Whitney test shows no significant difference between 
the three samples with respect to budget emphasis. Table 6-A-1 (p. 6.38) indicates also 
that the three samples reported similar means which are high. The results of the related 
hypotheses are discussed below. 
11-1-1-7-1 Budget emphasis as a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and performance (H-1.7a). 
The result shown in table II -A- I indicates that H-I. 7a was weakly rejected for the 
British sample. On the other hand, the result of the Arab sample lent a strong rejection 
for this hypothesis using the intervening approach. The result indicates that when Arab 
managers were highly involved in setting budget, their superiors exercised high 
emphasis on meeting budget and that affected their performance negatively. Although 
the result of the Arab sample was opposite to H-1.7a, it was consistent with the revised 
hypothesis. On the other hand, the Saudi results did not provide significant evidence to 
this hypothesis either for the original or the revised one. 
It was mentioned in section 6-1-5-5 that the measure of budget emphasis used in 
this study was different from that used by Brownell [1982b] and Dunk [1989]. 
Tberefore, it is not possible to compare the results of the three samples with the 
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previous works without unifying the measures used. To do that the researcher used the 
global item discussed in chapter six as a measure of performance. Budget emphasis was 
measured again using the summation of both meeting the budget and concern with the 
cost'. The results of this procedure are indicated in table A-D-25 in appendix D at the 
end of the thesis. These results indicate significant interaction between budgetary 
participation and RAPM (reliance on accounting performance measure) affecting the 
performance of the British managers (p<0.1). To check the nature of this interaction the 
same procedure using equations 7.3 &7.4 which was discussed in chapter seven was 
followed here. This resulted X2=4.6, and the figure 11.1 indicates this interaction 
clearly. 
Figure 11.1 
The moderating role of RAPM between budgetary participation 
and performance 
dy Global performance 
dX Budgetary articipation 
0.075 
0.05 







The result shown in figure 11.1 indicates that when RAPM increases, budgetary 
participation increases managerial performance. So, this result is inconsistent with Dunk 
[1989] who reported negative role for budget emphasis between budgetary participation 
and performance. The result of this study provided evidence that the measure of budget 
emphasis influence the relationship between budgetary participation and performance. 
However, the results of both this study and that of Dunk [1989] need to be investigated 
1. To distinguish between the concept of budget emphasis adopted in this study "budget-constrained style" and that 
used in the previous studies "budget profit" RAPM was used as a term which reflect budget profit. 
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further as they were conducted in the same country (UK) and produced inconsistent 
results. 
On the other hand, the results of the British study indicated in figure 11.1 are 
consistent with those of Brownell [1982b] who found a similar positive impact of 
budget emphasis and also inconsistent with that of Brownell and Hirst [Australia, 1986] 
who did not find this relationship. This subject requires ftuther research before any 
conclusion can be drawn. 
With reference to the results of both Saudi and Arab samples shown in table A-D- 
25, we can see that both samples reported positive effect for RAPM between budgetary 
participation and performance though statistically insignificant. Therefore, we can argue 
that budget-constrained style has a negative effect on the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managerial performance whereas budget profit leads to positive effect. 
11-1-1-7-2 Budget emphasis as a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and satisfaction (H-1.7b). 
H-I. 7b states that when superiors exercise high budget emphasis, high 
participation will increase managers' satisfaction. The results shown in table 11-A-1 
indicate that both British and Saudi results did not provide sufficient evidence for this 
hypothesis. But the result of the Arab sample showed a significant intervening role for 
budget emphasis between budgetary participation and managers' satisfaction. 
The expected effect of culture on this relationship was explained in section 11.7. It 
was expected that in Saudi and Arab countries, which reported low scores on a 
masculine measure, budget emphasis increases the relationship between budgetary 
participation and managers' satisfaction. So, the results of the Arab sample support this 
argument. 
Harrison [1993] found that high reliance on accounting performance measures in 
superiors' evaluative style was associated with lower tension and high job satisfaction in 
high power distance and low individualism countries (Singapore). Whereas low reliance 
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on accounting performance measures was associated with lower tension and high job 
satisfaction in low power distance and high individualism countries (Australia). 
UK was classified as having similar cultural dimensions to that of Australia, 
whereas Singapore was classified as having cultural dimensions similar to the Arab 
countries (see Hofstede, [1994], figure 3.1 p. 54). Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
the result of Harrison [1993] which was applied in Singapore will be similar for both 
Saudi and Arab samples. From tables 7-A-1,10-A-1,10-A-2 we can find that budget 
emphasis (meeting the budget) was positively and significantly related to managers' 
satisfaction for both Saudi and Arab samples. Whereas no significant relationship was 
observed for the British sample though the direction of the effect was positive. When 
the effect of RAPM (meeting budget and concern with cost) was tested on managers' 
satisfaction, same conclusion was drawn. Accordingly, the results of Saudi and Arab 
sample lend support to Harrison [1993]. 
Again, to provide an unbiased comparison with the study of Brownell [1982b], 
RAPM was tested again as a moderating variable between budgetary participation and 
managers' satisfaction. The results are shown in table A-D-26. The results show that 
RAPM was a positive moderator between budgetary participation and managers' 
satisfaction for both British and Arab samples though statistically insignificant. 
Whereas the results of Saudi sample was in the opposite direction and also statistically 
insignificant. The results of both British and Arab sample provide weak support for 
Brownell [1982b]. 
11-1-1-7-3 Budget emphasis as a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and motivation (H-I. 8). 
H-1.8 states that when superiors exercise high budget emphasis, budgetary 
participation increases managers' motivation to achieve budget. The results shown in 
table 11-A-1 indicate that the British results strongly supported this proposition, 
whereas the results of both Saudi and Arab samples did not provide sufficient evidence 
for this hypothesis, neither for the original hypothesis nor to the revised hypothesis with 
respect to the culture. 
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11-1-1-8 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry refers to the extent to which subordinates are expected to 
have more work-related information than their superiors. In decentralised organisations, 
subordinates are in positions of having more work-related information more than their 
superior, whereas in the centralised ones, superiors have more work-related information 
than their employees. 
Hofstede [1994, P-67] mentioned that in collectivist countries, in which the 
interest of the group prevails over the interest of individuals, an employer-employee 
relationship is perceived in moral terms like a family link. He also mentioned that in 
such societies harmony should always be mentioned and direct confrontations avoided. 
Tberefore, it is expected that in collectivism countries the gap between superiors and 
their subordinates with respect to work-related information is less than the individualist 
ones. 
Hofstede categorised Arab countries as collectivism and UK as an individualism 
one, and the Saudi were more collectivist than the other Arab countries. It is expected 
that information asymmetry in Saudi and Arab samples are perceived less than in the 
British one. Regarding H-I. 9a&b and H-I. 10, it is possible to argue the following 
changes in these hypotheses with respect to the culture. 
0 nen Saudi managers gocals) are in positions of having more 
information than their superiors, high budgetary participation will 
increase their motivation and decreases their slack 
0 Although Arab managers (non-locals) share the Saudi managers cultural 
dimensions, they may feel less job security than the Saudi managers. 
Therefore, high budgetary participation by managers who are in 
positions of having more information than -their superiors will increases 
their propensity to create slack and decreases their motivation. 
in table 6.2 (6.8) the Mann-%itney test showed no significant difference between 
Saudi and Arab samples with respect to information asymmetry. Table 6-A-1 (p. 6.38) 
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indicates that the mean of information asymmetry for both Saudi and Arab samples were 
less than the British sample. The Saudi mean (25.4) was almost close to the mid-point 
(24) where there is no information asymmetry between subordinates and their superiors, 
whereas it was higher for the Arab sample (27.5). 
11-1-1-8-1 Information asymmetry as a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and motivation (H-1.9a). 
Hypothesis H-1.9a states that when managers are in positions of having more 
information than their superiors, high budgetary participation increases their motivation 
to achieve budget. The result of the British sample shown in table 11 -A- I indicates that 
the signs computed in the whole model contradict those computed in the individual test, 
but neither were statistically significant, so both do not provide sufficient evidence for 
this hypothesis. 
The result of the Saudi sample provided weak support to H-1.9a as the sign was in 
the anticipated direction. On the other hand, the result of the Arab sample strongly 
rejected this hypothesis. The results discussed in chapter nine showed that when the 
Arab managers (non-locals) are in positions of having more information the their 
superiors, budgetary participation decreases their motivation to achieve budget. 
Although this result was opposite to H-I. 9a, it was consistent with the revised 
hypothesis. Thus these differences between the previous studies can be at least partially 
explained by cultural factors. 
11-1-1-8-2 Information asymmetry as a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and slack (H-1.9b). 
H-1.9b proposed that when managers' are in positions of having more information 
than their superiors, high budgetary participation increases their propensity to create 
slack. The result of the moderating approach of the British sample has strongly 
supported this proposition. The results of the Saudi and Arab samples in both 




Although the result of the Saudi sample provided weak support to H-I. 9b, it was 
opposite to the revised hypothesis which was discussed in page (11.14). This may 
indicate that culture has no effect in this area for both locals and non-locals. 
11-1-1-8-3 Information asymmetry and organisation size (H-1.10). 
This research postulated that when organisation size increases, information 
asymmetry also increases. In other word, when an organisation size increases, 
subordinates hold more information than their superiors. The researcher expected that 
culture has no effect in this area. From table II -A- I we can see that this hypothesis was 
weakly supported for both British and Saudi samples, whereas the Arab has weakly 
rejected it. 
11-1-1-9 Job difficulty as a contingent role between budgetary participation and 
performance (H-1.11). 
Based on the literature review, H-I. 11 postulated that when a job is difficult, high 
budgetary participation increases managerial performance. With reference to the 
expected effect of culture on this relationship, Hofstede [1994, table 5.2, p. 125] 
mentioned that in strong uncertainty avoidance countries, people prefer acceptance of 
familiar risks, and they fear ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks. On the other 
hand people in weak uncertainty avoidance countries are comfortable in ambiguous 
situations and with unfamiliar risks. From table 6.1 (p. 6.2) we can see that Saudi and 
Arab countries reported higher scores on uncertainty avoidance than UK. Therefore, it is 
it is possible to argue the following changes in the related hypotheses with respect to the 
original one. 
0 For Saudi and Arab managers Budgetary participation will enhance 
managerial performance when thejob is less difficult. 
The results shown in table II -A- I indicate that the British sample weakly rejected 
H-1.11, whereas the Arab sample has strongly rejected this proposition. The result of the 
Arab sample which was discussed in chapter ten showed that high budgetary 
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participation decreases job difficulty which consequently increased their performance. 
In other word, budgetary participation enhanced Arab managers performance when job 
was less difficult. Although the results of the Arab sample rejected the original 
hypothesis it was consistent with the expected change in the revised hypothesis. The 
results of the Saudi sample show that the direction of the effect of the moderating 
approach contradicts that of the intervening approach, but as neither were statistically 
significant so they do not provide support for H-I. 1 1. A possible reason for the 
differences between the Saudi and Arab samples is the effect of uncertainty avoidance, 
where "fear of ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks" is high for non-local 
managers. 
The most surprising result was that of the British sample. Based on studies which 
were conducted in countries which share similar cultural dimensions to the UK, it was 
expected that budgetary participation would enhance managerial performance when a 
job is difficult. The result of the British sample was opposite to those of Mia [1989] and 
Orpen [1992]. However, it is unlikely to attribute the differences between the results of 
this study and those of Mia [1989] and Orpen [1992] to the shorten measure used in this 
study. 
11-1-2 Micro-level hypotheses 
11-1-2-1 Budgetary participation and both performance and satisfaction (11- 
Il. la&b). 
H-II. 1 proposes that budgetary participation increases managers' performance and 
satisfaction. In table 6.1 (p. 6.2) Hofstede's study reported high scores on power distance 
(80) for Arab countries. Saudi Arabia according to the study of At-Twaijri & Al- 
Muhaiza reported scores far lower than those reported by Hofstede (61). However, 
although the new score of power distance was less, it is still in the high level. On the 
other hand, Arab countries reported low scores on individualism (38) according to the 
study of Hofstede. Saudi Arabia reported a similar score (41) according to the study of 
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At-Twaijri & AI-Muhaiza. Again, both scores classified Saudi Arabia as a collectivist 
country. 
Hofstede [1980,1994] mentioned that in high power distance countries 
centralisation is more popular and subordinates are expected to be told what to do. 
Participation, therefore, is likely to be exercised in low power distance countries than 
the high ones. 
On the other hand, in high individualism country, every one looks after 
himself/herself and his/her immediate family. In contrast, in low individualism 
(collectivist) countries every one takes into consideration the interest of him/her self and 
the people around. Hofstede [ 1980,1994] mentioned that in low individualism countries 
there is a belief in group decision making which is considered to be better than 
individual decision making. Management in the low level countries is management by 
groups. Therefore, participation in collectivism countries is likely to be more common. 
It is clear that participation is likely to be exercised in countries which are 
characterised as low power distance and low individualism, whereas it is unlikely to be 
exercised in countries which are characterised as high power distance and high 
individualism. Hofstede [1994] mentioned that many countries which scored high power 
distance, scored low individualism. According to the figure of Hofstede which was 
divided into for quadrants, only one country falls in both low power distance and 
collectivism quadrant, while five fall in both high power distance and individualism. 
The rest countries fall either in high power distance/collectivism or low power 




Classification of the sites of the previous research in the area of 
budgetary participation according to their cultural dimensions 
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Harrison [1992] mentioned that the majority of countries, according'to the results 
of Hofstede, have relative levels of both power distance and individualism that are 
compensatory in respect of their combined effect on the appropriateness of participation. 
He also argued that this compensatory effect allows the suggestion that there will be no 
difference in the appropriateness of participation between the companies which have a 
combination of high power distance and low individualism and vice versa. 
According to the explanation of Harrison [1992], and although the literature 
witnessed contradictory results with respect to the effect of budgetary participation on 
both performance and satisfaction, this research does not expect any cultural effect on 
the relationship between budgetary participation and both managers' performance and 
satisfaction. Involving managers in budgetary process will insure, to some extent, 
realistic figures based on those managers' experience which imply their advanced 
approval, and thus this it will lead to higher performance and satisfaction. 
The results shown in table II -A- I indicates that H-Il. Ia was strongly supported 
for both British and Arab samples, whereas it was weakly supported for the Saudi 
samples. With reference to the effect of budgetary participation on satisfaction the 
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results shown in table 11-A-1 indicate that this hypothesis (H-II. 1b) was strongly 
supported in the three cultures. 
The results of H-II. la were consistent with the literature review. It supported 
Brownell [1982b] which was conducted in the USA, Frucot and Shearon [1991] which 
was conducted in Mexico, Nur [1993] which was conducted in Indonesia and 
Subramanian and Ashkanasy [1997] which was conducted in Australia. However, the 
result of the Saudi study was consistent with Gul et all [1995] which was conducted in 
Hong Kong as both found a positive relationship between budgetary participation and 
performance though both were statistically insignificant. The results of the three 
samples were contradictory to Lau et al [1995] which was conducted in Singapore, as 
they found a negative relationship between participation and managerial performance. 
The results of H-II. 1b supported the findings of Frucot and Shearon [1991] and 
Kenis [1979] which concluded a positive relationship between managers' participation 
in budgetary process and their satisfaction. It should be noted that managers 
performance and satisfaction were highly correlated only in the British and Arab 
samples. These results are logical as when managers perform well, they are also highly 
satisfied. 
To provide unbiased comparison with the previous research which used only the 
global item of performance, the effect of budgetary participation on managerial 
performance was also tested using only this item. The results are shown in table 11.2 . 
Table 11.2 
The effect of different measures of performance on the 
relationship between BP and performance 
Budgetary Participation 
British Saudi Arab 
Performance (nine items) 0.565 ** 0.085 0.473 ** 
Global Performance 0.480 0.012 0.414 
n 59 46 34 
os. 01 4.05 
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From table 11.2 we can see that correlation coefficients using the nine items as a 
measure of performance were higher than the global one. These results provided 
evidence for the effectiveness of the measure used and also show that the results for 
both measures were consistent with the previous work in 
ihis area. 
It should be noted that the mean of performance of the Arab sample as shown in 
table 6.2 (p. 6.8) was significantly different than both Saudi and British ones. A possible 
interpretation for this result is non-locals (in general) may be feel less job security and 
that makes them do their best to perform better. 
11-1-2-2 Perceived budgetary participation and subordinates participation (H. 
11.2). 
H-II. 2 states that when managers perceive a high degree of budgetary 
participation, they allow their subordinates high degree of participation. With respect to 
the expected effect of culture on this relationship, Hofstede [1994, table 3.3, p. 67] 
mentioned that in collectivism countries harmony should be always maintained and 
relationship prevails over task. Therefore, the researcher argues that H-II. 2 applies only 
for Saudi and Arab samples. The results shown in table I 1-A- I indicates that there was 
a negative relationship between managers participation in budgetary process and their 
subordinates participation in the three samples though statistically insignificant. The 
samples for this question were very small, so their results may be inconclusive. 
11-1-2-3 Budget difficulty and clarity 
Budget difficulty refers to the extent to which managers perceive their budget 
goals are difficult, whereas budget clarity refers to the extent to which budget goals are 
clear for those responsible for implementing them. This research postulated that when 
budget goals are difficult high budgetary participation increases managers' motivation to 
achieve budget (H-11.3a) and decreases their propensity to detect slack (H-II. 3b). With 
reference to budget clarity, it was also postulated that when budget goals are clear, 
budgetary participation will increases managers' performance and satisfaction. 
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Hofstede's work can again be used to predict the effect of culture on these 
relationships. Hofstede [1994, table 5.2, p. 125] mentioned that in strong uncertainty 
avoidance countries, people prefer acceptance of familiar risks, and they fear ambiguous 
situations and unfamiliar risks. He also argued that motivation in this category comes 
from security. On the other hand people in weak uncertainty avoidance countries are 
comfortable in ambiguous situations and with unfamiliar risks and they are motivated by 
achievement. From table 6.1 (p. 6.2) we can see that Saudi and Arab countries reported 
high scores on uncertainty avoidance comparing with UK. Therefore, it is it is possible 
to argue the following changes in the related hypotheses with respect to the original 
ones. 
0 For the Saudi and Arab samples, budgetary participation will enhance 
managers' performance when budget goals are less dijfzcult. On the 
other hand when budget goals are difficult, budgetary participation 
increases their propensity to create slack 
0 For the British sample, -when budget goals are clear, high participation 
will decreases their performance and satisfaction. 
11-1-2-3-1 The contingent role of budget difficulty between budgetary 
participation and both motivation and slack (H-11.3a&b). 
The results shown in table 11-A-1 indicate that H-II. 3a&b have been strongly 
supported for the British sample whereas they have been weakly rejected for both Saudi 
and Arab samples. Although the Saudi and Arab samples did not provide strong support 
for the two revised hypotheses, they were consistent with the expected changes. Overall 
there is limited support to the thesis that cultural differences help to explain the role of 




11-1-2-3-2 The contingent role of budget clarity between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction (H-11.4a&b). 
With respect to H-II. 4a&b, table I I-A-I shows that both Saudi and Arab samples 
have strongly supported these two hypotheses whereas the British sample did not 
provide sufficient evidence for their results. These results show that both Saudi and 
Arab samples share some cultural characteristics which may be do not affect a particular 
relationship. 
11-1-2-4 Locus of control as a contingent role between budgetary participation and 
slack (H-II. 5). 
H-II. 5 proposed that locus of control has a contingent role between budgetary 
participation and slack. In other word, internal managers are less likely to create slack 
when they are involved in setting budget. It was not expected that culture will affect this 
hypothesis as locus of control mainly depends on human personality rather than the 
culture. Of course aspects of human personality are derived from culture as shown in 
figure 4.1 (p. 4.3), but finally the effect of culture and human personality is summarised 
by the perception of an individual. 
However, the results shown in table II -A- I indicate that the effect of locus of 
t 
control as a contingent variable between budgetary participation and managers' 
propensity to create slack was strongly supported by both British (moderating approach) 
and Arab (intervening approach). Although the result of the Saudi sample was not 
significant, the signs of both approaches were in the expected direction providing some 
credibility for this hypothesis and its applicability across cultures. 
11-1-2-5 Budgetary participation and budget motivation (H-11.6). 
H41.6 states that when managers participate in budgetary process they will be 
highly motivated to attain figures embodied in their department budget which implied 
their acceptance. Therefore, it is not expected that culture will cause any effect in this 
relationship. The results shown in table II -A- I indicates that the British sample has 
strongly rejected this hypothesis, whereas the Saudi sample provided weak support for 
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it. The Arab sample does not provide any sufficient evidence for this proposition as 
coefficients computed by correlation contradicted those obtained using the whole model, 
but neither were statistically significant, so it is ditricult to draw a reliable conclusion 
from them. 
The British result was disappointing as it was opposite to the literature. This result 
means that when managers participate in budgetary process they are less motivated to 
implement it. This result contradicts those of both Searfoss & Monczka [1973] and 
Kenis [19791. To check this matter ftirther correlation analysis was run between 
budgetary participation and both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation'. The results are 
shown in table 11.3 
Table 113 
The relationship between budgetary participation and 
extrinsic. intrinsic and overall motivation 
Budgetary Participation 
British Saudi Arab 
Extrinsic Motivation 0.059 0.162 0.380 
Intrinsic Motivation -0.1 0.037 -0.129 
Overall Motivation -0.026 0.113 0.181 
n 63 45 33 
* . 05 
The results shown in table 11.3 indicate that extrinsic motivation (e. g. pay raise, 
promotion) had a positive effect with budgetary participation in the three culture and it 
was statistically significant for the Arab sample. Whereas budgetary participation had a 
negative relationship with the intrinsic motivation though statistically insignificant. The 
results of the Arab sample reveal that non-locals are highly motivated by extrinsic 
valences. A possible explanation for this that extrinsic motivation may be implies high 
it was mentioned in section 6-1-5-11 that motivation was measured by both intrinsic and extrinsic valences. 
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job security to non-locals than the intrinsic ones, and it is also consistent with one of the 
aims of non-locals who come to Saudi Arabia which is earning money. 
11-1-2-6 Motivation as a contingent role between budgetary participation and 
performance (H-II. 7). 
H41.7 states that motivation has a moderating role between budgetary 
participation and managerial performance. This hypothesis was tested by Brownell and 
McIness [1986] and they found no significant intervening role between budgetary 
participation and performance. Whereas Mia [1988] re-tested this hypothesis using the 
moderating approach and he concluded a positive moderating role between budgetary 
participation and performance. Both studies tested motivation in the context of the 
expectancy theory. With respect to the effect of culture on this relationship, this 
research, as it has been argued in the previous section, does not expect that motivation 
has cultural differences. 
The results of the three samples are shown in table II -A- 1. As shown the results 
was completely confusing in the three samples. The results of Saudi and Arab samples 
did not provide significance evidence about the effect of motivation as a contingent role 
between budgetary participation and managers' performance. But the most surprising 
results were those of the British sample. The result of the moderating approach for this 
sample provided strong support to the findings of Mia [1988] as motivation had a 
significant and positive contingent role between budgetary participation and 
performance. On the other hand, the result of the intervening approach was not 
consistent with that of the moderating approach. 
In section 8-4 it was mentioned that the translation of H-II. 7 according to the 
intervening approach is as follows: high budgetary participation increases managers 
motivation, which in turn increases their performance. Therefore, the rejection of this 
hypothesis means that high budgetary participation will decrease motivation which in 




Figure 113 Figure 11.4 
The result of using motivation as an intervening variable The positive and negative role of motivation on 
between budgetary participation and performance in UK performance according to the intervening approach 
The result obtained from the intervening approach as shown in figure 11.3 
indicates that budgetary participation had a negative and significant relationship with 
motivation, and motivation had in turn a positive relationship with performance. 
Although Brownell & McIness did not find a significant intervening role for motivation 
between participation and performance, the signs of the effect in this study were 
consistent with their results. For example, they found a positive relationship between 
performance and both motivation and budgetary participation as shown in figure 11.3. 
On the other hand they stated that (p. 597) the most important findings in their study was 
the negative relationship between participation and M in the expectancy model. 
The results of -the individual test for this hypothesis also found a positive 
relationship for performance with both motivation and participation, whereas the 
coefficient of the relationship between participation and motivation was quite small 
(. 008) so it is difficult to draw a reliable conclusion from it. 
From table 11-A-1 we can see that the sample size of the whole model 
(intervening approach) was 48, whereas the sample size of the moderating approach was 
58. Therefore, it was necessary to check whether or not the sample sizes have an effect 
on this conflicting results. To do so the moderating role of budget motivation was tested 
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The result shown in figure 11.5 indicates that motivation had a positive and 
significant moderating role (scores over 46.5, p: 50.1) between budgetary participation 
and performance. This result is consistent with those shown in table A-D-I (appendix D 
at the end of the thesis) which supported the argument that the sample size has no effect 
on this relationship. However, where the result of the moderating approach was 
consistent with Mia [1988] -and 
the result of the intervening approach -to some extent- 
consistent with Brownell & McIness [1986], the problem could be attributed to the 
theory itself. Brownell & McIness [ibid. ] mentioned (p. 598) that expectancy models 
have sometimes shown a rather weak relationship to effort and performance. This may 
reveal that this matter needs finther investigation as the results of Saudi and Arab 
sample could not provide evidence to this hypothesis as they were statistically 
insignificant. 
11-1-2-7 Motivation as a contingent role between budgetary participation and 
satisfaction (H-II. 8). 
H-11.8 states that motivation has a positive contingent role between budgetary 
participation and managers' satisfaction. The results shown in table II -A- I indicate that 
this proposition was weakly rejected -for. both British and Saudi samples in the two 
approaches adopted in this study. Whereas the Arab sample provided contradictory 
results from the two methods and thus little evidence to support or reject the hypothesis. 
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11-1-2-8 Budgetary slack. 
It was mentioned in section 3-6 that budgetary slack implies that managers 
intentionally build excess requirements for resources into the budgets, or knowingly 
understate productive capability. The reason behind this phenomenon is to protect 
themselves against uncertainty as they are dealing with future. Hofstede, as indicated in 
many place in this chapter, mentioned that people in strong uncertainty countries prefer 
acceptance of familiar risks, and they fear of ambiguous situations and unfamiliar risks. 
On the other hand, people in weak uncertainty avoidance countries are comfortable in 
ambiguous and with unfamiliar risks. As Saudi Arabia and Arab countries reported high 
scores in this dimension, therefore, it is it is possible to argue the following changes in 
the related hypotheses with respect to the original ones for Saudi and Arab samples. 
0 For Saudi and Arab sample, Managers' participation in budgetary 
process increases their propensity to create slack 
0 When Saudi and Arab managers have high propensity to create slack, 
high participation increases their performance. 
With respect to the effect of culture on H-Il. 10 which argues that when superiors 
have high ability to detect slack, high participation will decreases their slack, no cultural 
differences is expected as it depends on the policy of an organisation rather than the 
culture itself 
From table 6.2 (p. 6.8) we can see that there was no significant differences between 
Saudi and Arab samples with respect to budgetary slack, whereas both of them were 
significantly different from the British sample. This result provides evidence that the 
propensity of slack is similar between these to samples. Table 6-A-1 (p. 6.38) shows that 
both Saudi and Arab samples reported similar means to budgetary slack which was 
lower than the British managers. Although the results of Saudi and Arab samples were 
unexpected, they were consistent with those of Ueno and Wu [1993] who noticed that 
managers in Japan were less likely to create slack than USA managers. In figure 11.2 
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Japan was categorised as high power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance, whereas 
UK was similar to USA cultural dimensions. 
The results of the three samples showed that there was insignificant relationship 
between budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. The direction 
of the effect of both British and Arab sample were consistent with H41.9, whereas the 
result of the Saudi sample was opposite to it, but on the other hand was consistent with 
the expected change which was argued to the original hypothesis. Again, although the 
result of the Arab sample was consistent with the original hypothesis it was opposite to 
the expected change which was based on the cultural differences. There are two possible 
explanations for the result of the Arab sample. First, from table 6.1 (p. 6.2) we can see 
that the Saudi managers reported very high scores on uncertainty avoidance compared 
with the Arab sample which may lead to this difference between these two samples. 
Second, it is possible to argue that when Arab managers (non-locals) participate in 
budgetary process, they may feel more job security when they participate in budgetary 
process which may lead them to decreases their propensity to create slack. 
Although the results of both British and Arab samples were not significant, the 
direction of the effect was consistent with the results of Onsi [1973] and Merchant 
19851 who found that participative budgets and budgetary slack are negatively related. 
The results shown in table II -A- I indicate that the British sample provided strong 
rejection to H-H. II as budgetary participation enhanced managers' performance when 
budgetary slack was high. The results of both Saudi and Arab samples did not provide 
sufficient evidence for this hypothesis as results from one approach contradicted those 
from another, but where neither were statistically significant, therefore, it is not possible 
to draw conclusions from them. 
On the other hand, the results of both British and Arab sample did not provide 
sufficient evidence for both H-IIAQ & H-II. 12, whereas the Saudi result has weakly 
rejected these hypotheses. With respect to H-11.10, the result shows that when superiors 
ability to detect slack is low, high participation decreases managers' propensity to create 
slack. With reference to H-H. 12, the results means that budgetary participation enhanced 
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managers' satisfaction when slack is high, but the result was opposite to that. However, 
no possible explanations could be provided for these two results. 
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11-2 Summary and conclusion 
11-2-1 Brief summary and conclusion. 
The area of budgetary participation has been investigated extensively by many 
scholars over the past three decades. This issue started when some researchers found 
that imposed budget or "pseudo-participation" has negative consequences on managers 
attitudes toward their job and companies (e. g. performance and satisfaction). Budgetary 
participation was perceived as the suitable approach to provide those managers with 
favourable attitudes towards their job and organisation. Initially it was expected that 
such favourable attitudes would be universal, but some studies found different results. 
Some scholars reported either negative or insignificant association between 
budgetary participation and managers attitudes toward their job and organisations. 
Therefore the contingency theory was applied in this area to reconcile these 
contradictory findings. Efforts have been made to find out which variables may play 
contingent roles between budgetary participation and both managers' performance and 
satisfaction. The results uncovered the fact that many organisational variables (e. g. 
organisation size, environment uncertainty, leadership style, style of evaluation) as well 
as behavioural variables (e. g. locus of control, motivation, slack) had the expected 
contingency roles. Finally culture has been used as a possible contingent role which may 
reconcile this conflicting area. Many researchers adopted Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
and applied these in different countries. 
Prompted by the inconclusive results in this area, this research was designed to 
provide more insight into this issue. First of all, the limitations of the previous work 
were considered carefully to provide a base for this study. Some of the many limitations 
of the previous research are set out below. 
0 Much of the previous work considered a limited number of variables 
which consequently limited their results. 
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0 The researchers who adopted a model and replicated it did not use a 
precise replication. They either used different measures or applied it in 
different cultures. 
0 Two analytical approaches were used to test the contingency model, 
namely, the moderating and intervening. Although they are 
complementary, very few attempts have been made to apply both to test a 
particular model. 
0 Most of the previous attempts which investigated the effect of culture in 
this area of research used samples from two different countries. Little 
attention has been paid to test a particular model using two samples of 
managers (locals and non-locals) within the single country. 
Based on the points discussed above, this research was designed to fill in the gaps 
in this area in three ways. First, an integrative model was developed. This model 
consisted of the most important eighteen variables which have been frequently used in 
the literature. The proposed model consisted of twenty eight hypotheses. Some 
hypotheses were replications to assess the robustness of previous results, whereas the 
rest were developed to investigate matters that had not received much attention so far. 
Second, the proposed model was designed to be tested using both the moderating and 
intervening approaches to provide sufficient support for this model. Third, the proposed 
model was applied in two different countries. Saudi Arabia and UK were chosen 
because they are culturally different. In Saudi Arabia two samples were also selected 
from Saudi (locals) and Arab (non-locals) managers. 
The overall sample used in this study consisted of 65 British managers from 20 
companies, 51 Saudi managers from 15 companies, and 40 Arab managers from 17 
companies. The conclusion of the results with respect to the main issues of this study are 
discussed below. 
First - The results of the integrative model adopted in this study provided a clear 
picture which summarised systematically the relationship between macro and micro 
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level variables. The results showed that the contingency variables (technology, 
organisation size, environment uncertainty) were the main determinants of budgetary 
participation. Budgetary participation had a positive direct effect on managers' 
performance and satisfaction. The results showed that there were many organisational 
variables (e. g. budget emphasis, job difficulty) as well as behavioural variables (e. g. 
locus of control, motivation, slack) which played contingent roles between budgetary 
participation and both performance and satisfaction. 
Second - with respect to the effect of culture, the results revealed that budgetary 
control practices are culturally dependent. The findings of this study showed that there 
are substantial cultural differences between UK and Saudi Arabia. Even within the 
Saudi Arabia, budgetary control practices are different in some aspects between Saudis 
(locals) and Arab (non-locals). For example the British results found that budget 
emphasis had a positive contingent role between budgetary participation and motivation 
to achieve their budget. Budget goal difficulty had a negative contingent role between 
budgetary participation and managers' propensity to create slack. Budgetary slack had a 
positive contingent role between managers' participation and their performance. 
Whereas such roles were not observed in the Saudi and Arab samples. 
On the other hand, there were dissimilarities between Saudi and Arab samples in 
some aspects. For example, budgetary participation had a positive impact on Arab 
managers' performance; technology (product standardisation) had a positive impact on 
budgetary participation; budget emphasis had a positive contingent role between 
budgetary participation and managers' satisfaction; budgetary participation had a 
significant positive relationship with managers' performance. Such aspects were not 
observed in the Saudi sample. 
The study has revealed similarities in many aspects between the three samples. For 
example, the negative effect of environment uncertainty on budgetary participation, the 
positive role of budgetary participation on' managers' satisfaction, the positive role of 
organisation size on budgetary participation were culturally independent. 
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Third, with respect to the effect of the analytical approach, the study found that 
both moderating and intervening approaches are complementary and necessary to 
explore any contingent role. More specifically, this research found that some contingent 
roles were supported by an approach whereas the other approach did not support these 
roles. For example the contingent role ofjob difficulty for the Arab sample was revealed 
using the intervening approach whereas the moderating approach did not provide 
significant evidence for this role. The negative contingent role of budget emphasis 
between budgetary participation and British managers' performance was revealed by the 
intervening approach whereas the moderating approach did not support that. 
I However, the results generally showed that although there was a direct 
relationship between budgetary participation and both managers' performance and 
satisfaction, there were also indirect relationships through various organisational and 
behavioural variables. The integration of macro and micro level variables, the effect of 
culture, the analytical approach all of these aspects are important to understand the 
positive and negative effects of participatory budget approach. 
11-2-2 Research limitations and issues for further research. 
As with any research, this study has also its limitations. These limitations will be 
highlighted as they should inform ftniher research. The first limitation was considered 
earlier in chapter 6 that the samples in this study were small and selected non-randomly. 
So it is possible to apply the proposed model using a big and random sample either in 
various organisations. or in a single one. 
Although this research argued that culture has an effect on budgetary control 
practices, it did not employ any cultural measures. Therefore, it is possible to apply the 
proposed model in two different countries using Hofstede's cultural dimensions to test 
what dimensions affect a particular relationship. 
To check whether national culture prevails over the host culture, it is possible to 
apply the proposed model using two samples of managers who have the same 
nationality but work in different countries. For example, it would be possible to select 
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, Oeav department manager 
n accounting at the am a Ph., O. Jtudent in accounting at the 
,:, jniversit! f of j3vistol 
(, England), doing research in the I 
area of the budgetary control process. IM. 1 field studies 
includes a wide-ranging sample of J36tish and 5audi 
companies. 
7he enclosed questionnaire includes some 
questions asking for your opinions and how you feel 
about some points of your budqetý performance, 
satisfaction, your superior and the environment that you 
are working in. 
C411 your answers will he used for scientific 
purposes and will be kept strictly confidential. j3oth you 
and your company will not be mentioned in my study as 
,. 7 am dealing with a wide-ranging sample. 
,: /t is important that you answer the questions as 
accurately as you can, as the success of the study 
depends on the frankness and care with which you 
answer these questions. 
jUlease do not leave any questions and items blank. 
and thank you in advance for participating in my study. 
, 
3incereig yours 





Please answer the following demographic questions: 
Your Age is: 
Less than 25 F-1 26-35 36-45 
46-55 F7 More than 55 
Your Nationality: 
British Saudi F7 From other 
Arabic country 
From far east Other (please 
countries specify) ............................ 
Length of your work in the company ............ years and ............ 
Length of your work in the present job ***** ------- years and ............ 





Other( please specify ...................................... 
How many employees are under you: ...................... 
Number of managerial level under you: ...................... 
Your job title: General manager Assistant general manager 
Department supervisor Assistant department supervisor 
General foremen 
Area of majorjob content: 
Production 171 
Sales, marketing, and advertising F-1 
Finance and accounting F-I 
Personnel and training F7 




The following items can be used to describe the role which Ejou play in the 
development of the budget for your group. Please respond by ticking a number from 
I to 7 on the scale for each of the following items: 
I- How much are you involved when the 
Not Involved Fully Involved 
budget is being set ?I11213141516171 
2- How would you describe the explanation Very Arbitimy/ or Illogical Very Sound and/ or Logical 
given by your superior when budget revisions 
are made. II11213 
14 151617 
3- How often do you state your requests, Never Very Frequently 
opinions and/or suggestions about the budget I to your superiors without being asked. 
4- How much influence do you feel you have 
None Very linportant 
on the final budget ?I11213141516171 
5- How do you view your contribution to the Very Unimponmt Very Imponat 
budget ? My contribution is: I11213141516171 
6- How often does your superior seek your Never Very Frequently 
requests, opinions and/or suggestions when 1121314151617 
the budget is being set ? 
Question 2 
Now, are your subordinates involved in setting the budget? 
Yes, they are involved = No, they are not involved 
If your answer was yes, please describe the degree of participation which you 
give your subordinates when the budget is being set , please tick in the appropriate 
box 
I- My subordinates have a high degree of 
influence in the determination of their 
budget. 
2- My subordinates are really have little 























Quite I Strongly 
A-A-4 
Appendix A 
3- The setting of my budget is pretty much 
under their control 
4-I usually asks for my subordinates 
opinions and thoughts when determining 
the budget goals 
5- My budget is not finalized until my 








































Listed below twelve items which you can either do or receive in meeting the 
budget for your department, please indicate how desirable each item is by ticking the 
appropriate number 
I- Pay raise 
2- Respect from boss 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I1123516171 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I11213516171 




6- Respect from peers 
7- Giving help to other 
8- Job security 
9- Setting higher standard for 
yourself 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I11235161-71 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I1121314516171 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I1123415161 7_1 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I1123516171 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I11213 1'4 5161 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I11213516171 




10 - Not feeling too tired at work 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I112131 4_1 516171 
II- Time at work passing fast 
12 - Feeling of accomplishment 
0 Question 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I112314516171 
Extremely Desirable Extremely Undesirable 
I112314516171 
Indicate the frequency with which the following items apply in yourjob ? 
I- Certain about which method is best 
2- Have all necessary information 
Never occasionally hay'the time I frequently I alwM I 
II 
occasionally halffhe time equently I always 
3- Difficult to determine whether the right Never Occasionally hatf the time 
Iftequently always 
decision was taken II 
4- Environmental changes frequently 
affect decision 
5- Uncertain about how to act 
6- Certain about job adjustments to deal 
with environmental change 
7- Frequently encounter new or unusual 
problems 
8- Can tell if actions were effective 
9- In doubt about how to obtain 
infonnation 
10 - Can tell if expectations of others 
were met 
11 - Difficult to determine whether method 
used was effective 
12 - Certain about howjob is done 
Never occasionally hat(the time frequently always 
Never occasionally hatf the time I ftequently I a n 
Never occasionally hao'the time Le, ue Ily always 
occasionally hatf1he time frequently always 
Never occasionally halfthe time I frequently always] 
1 -1 
occasionally ha the ti e equently always 
Never occasionally halfthe time Ifrequently always 
I Never occasionally halfthe time Ifre uently always 




The following items could be used to describe your supervisor, please tick the 
appropriate box for each item 
I- Lets group members know what is 
expected of them. 
2- Is friendly and approachable. 
3- Encourages the use of uniform 
procedures. 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
JAIways Often Occasionally Seldom- Never act like 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Neva act Ue that 
F 
4- Does little things to make it pleasant to 
be a member of the group. 
5- Tries out his ideas in the group. 
6- Puts suggestions made by the group 
into operation. 
7- Makes his attitudes clear to the group. 
8- Keeps to himself / herself. 
9- Makes sure that his/her part in the 
group is understood by the group 
members. 
10 - Looks out for the personal welfare of 
group members. 
II- Schedules the work to be done. 
12 - Is willing to make changes. 
13 - Maintain definite standards of 
performance. 
14 - Refuses to explain his actions. 
Always E 
I OfteL [ý±ionally - Seldom Never act like that I I I I-I s rý Often m Occasionally Seldom Never act lik-I e that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that L 
Alw ays Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
Always Oflen Occasionally Seldom Never act like 
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15 - Asks that group members follow 
standard rules and regulations. 
16 - Acts without consulting the group. 
Always Often Occasionally Seldom Never act like that 
IA]ways Often I Occasi ýSeldom I Never act like Eq I 
-- 
II I I 
Question 6 
Please 
respond to each of the following questions by ticking a number from I to 
7. 
I- In comparison with your superior, 
'Peri' U" We have about the same I have much better 
who is in possession of better 
'better 
inflortion quality of information informatiott 
information regarding the activities 1121314151617 
undertaken in your area of 
responsibility. 
2- In comparison with your superior, 
who is more familiar with the nature of 
the work in the area of your 
responsibility. 
3- In comparison with your superior, 
who is more certain of the performance 
potential of your area of responsibility. 
4- In comparison with your superior, 
who is more familiar technically with 
the work of your area of responsibility. 
5- In comparison with your superior, 
who is better able to assess the potential 
impact on your activities of factors 
external to your area of responsibility. 
6- In comparison with your superior, 
who has a better understanding of what 
can be achieved in your area of 
responsibility. 
My supenorr bas much We have about the same I have much better 
better information quality of information information 
I11 2 3 1 41 5 6 1 71 
My superiorr hu much We have about the ume I have much better 
better information quality of information information 
2 3 45 6 7 
My auperiorr has much We have about the same I have much better 
better information quality ofinformation information 
I112 13 14 1_5 16 171 
My superiorr has much We have about the urne I have much better 
better informittion 
. 
quality ofinformation information 
II 12 13 1415 16 17 
My superiorr hn much We have about the same I have much better 
better infornation quality of information information 





your superior is evaluating your performance how much importance do 
you think he attaches to the following item ? 
I- How well I cooperate with colleagues 
My concem with costs 

































1 2 3-- j41 5 
4- How much effort I put into the job 
5- My concem with quality 
6- Meeting the budget 
7- My attitude toward my work and 
company 



























































1 2 3- 
[4 
The following items describe how difficult and clear you feel about your budget, 
please tick a number from I to 7 which best describe how you feel 
I-I should not have too much difficulty 
in reaching my budget goals; they appear 















1 - 1 
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2- My budget goals are quite difficult to 
attain. 
3- My budget goals require a great deal 




























I I - F- 
4- It takes a high degree of skill and 
know-how on my part to attain fully my 
budget goals. 
5- My budget goals are very clear and 
specific, I know exactly what my budget 
goals are. 
6-I think my budget goals are 
ambiguous and unclear. 
7-I understand fully which of my 
budget goals are more important than 
others. I have a clear sense of priorities 












































Please tick the number which you feel most accurately describes your 
performance with respect to the following work dimensions in the area of 
responsibility under your control. use the following scale as a reference: 
I -Far below average performance 5- Little above the average 
2- Below average 6- Above the average 
3 -Little below average 7- Far above the average performance 
4- Average 
I- (Planning) Determining goals, 
policies, and courses of 'action 




2- (Investigating) Collecting and 
preparing of information, usually in the 12 131415 form of records, reports, and accounts 
[e. g., measuring output, record keeping, 
job analysis] 
3 (Co-ordinating) Exchanging 
information with people in the 
organization other than your 
subordinates in order to relate and 
adjust programs [ e. g., expediting. 
liaison with other managers, arranging 
meeting]. 
I11 
4- (Evaluating) Assessment and 
appraisal of proposals or of reported or 
observed performance [e. g., employee 
appraisals, judging output records, 
product inspection]. 
5- (Supervising) Directing, leading, 
and developing your subordinates. 
6- (Staffing) Maintaining the work 
force of your unit or of several units 
[e. g., selecting and promoting 
employees]. 
7- (Negotiating) Purchasing, selling, 
or contracting of goods or services 
[e. g., tax negotiations, contracting 
suppliers, collective bargaining, 
advertising ] 
8- (Representing) Advancing the 
general interests of my organization 
through speeches, consultation, 2 
contacts with individuals or groups 
outside the organization 





The following items address your feelings about you job, your work 
environment, and your company. Please tick the relevant box to indicate how you 
feel about each item. Please be sure to tick just one box on each line. 
VS Means I am very satisfied with this aspect of my job. 
S Means I am satisfied with this aspect of my job. 
N Means I can't decide whether I am satisfied or not with this aspect of my 
job. 
DS Means I am dissatisfied with this aspect of my job. 
VDS Means I am very dissatisfied with this aspect of myjob. 
On my present job, this is how I feel about : 
Being busy all the time 
The chance to work alone on the job 
3- The chance to do different things 
from time to time 
4 *- The way my superior handles 
subordinates 
5- The competence of my supervisor in 
making decisions 
6- Being able to do things that don't go 
against my conscience 
7- The way my job provides for steady 
employment 
8- The chance to do things for other 
people 
9- The chance to tell people what to do 
VS S N DS VDS 
1 7 - 1 
- - I I T F 
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10 - The chance to do something that 
makes use of my ability 
11 - The way company policies are put into 
practice 
12 - My total compensation for the amount 
of work I do. 
13 - The chance for advancement on this 
job. 
14 - The freedom to use my own judgment. 
15 - The chance to try my own methods of 
doing the job. 
16 - The working conditions. 
Question 11 




you indicate to what extent you believe in the following items, please 
tick the scale from I to 7 for each item 
I- When I get what I want, it's usually 













2-I have often found that what is going 
to happen will happen. 
3- It's chiefly a matter of chance whether 
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4- Its not always wise for me to plan too 
far ahead because many things turn out 
to be a matter of good or bad fortune. 
5- Whether or not I get to be a leader 
depends on whether I'm lucky enough to 
be in the right place at the right time. 
6- Often there is no chance of protecting 
my personal interests from bad luck 
happenings. 
7- It is impossible for anyone to say how 
long I will work in the company 
8-I am usually able to protect my 
personal interests. 
9- When I make plans, I am almost 
certain to make them work. 
10 -I can pretty much determine what 
will happen in my life. 
II- My behavior will determine whether 
I will continue in my work or not. 
12 - When I get what I want, it is usually 
because I worked hard for it. 
13 - How many friends I have depends 























































































































14 - Whether or not I get to be a leader 

















will you please describe to what extent do you believe in the following 
items by ticking the appropriate box 
I- To protect himself, a manager 















2- The plant manager sets two levels of 
standards: one between himself and 
production (sales) manager, and another 
standard between himself and top 
management, to be safe. 
3- In good business times, the plant 
manager accepts a reasonable level of 
slack in a departmental budget. 
4- Slack in the budget is good to do 
things that cannot be officially approved. 
5- With some skill, a manager can make 
his performance unit just as he wants. 
6- The finance controller is "considerate" 
to the departmental manager who needs to 
attain the budget. 
7- The plant manager has enough, 
information to know if there is slack in a 
departmental budget. 
8- Top management receives detailed 
information on the plant activities by 
department and product. 
9- Top management has a way of 































































































The following questions describe the nature of your work, please tick a 
number from 1 to 7. 
I- To what extent is there a clearly No Extent Great Extent defined body knowledge or subject 
matter which can guide you in doing 
your work? 
2- To what extent is there an No Extent Great Extent 
understandable sequence of steps than 12 
can be followed in doing your work? 
3- During the course of your work, how Never All the time 
often do you come across specific 
difficult problems that you don't know 
how to solve it? 
4- If there is something that you don't 
know how to handle in your work, to 
what extent can you go to some one else 
for an answer to the problem? 
No Extent Great Extent 
I11213141516171 
Question 14 
(To be answered by whether by production manager if there is one or finance manager) 
This 
question aims to d- escribe the technology used in your company on the 
basis of process automation and product standardisation: 
First: Process Automation 
I- Which of the following categories best describes the most automatic piece of 
equipment used in your company ? please tick one of the following 
A-A- 16 
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- Hand tools and manual machines. 
- Powered machines and tools. 
- Single - Cycle automatics and self-feeding 
machines. 
- Automatics that repeat cycles. 
- Self - Measuring and adjusting by feedback. E-1 
- Computer controlled. 
- None of the above 
2- Which of the following categories best describes the ma)oritly of the production 
equipment used in your company ? please tick one of the following 
- Hand tools and manual machines. 
- Powered machines and tools. 
- Single - Cycle automatics and 
self-feeding machines. 
- Automatics that repeat cycles. 
- Self - Measuring and adjusting by feedback. 
- Computer controlled. 
- None of the above 
3- Which of the following'best describes how finished products are evaluated ? 
please tick one of the following 
- Personal evaluation only. No measuring 
instruments are used. 
- Partial measurement. Some aspects of 
output are measured. 
- Full measurement. Measurements are used 
over virtually the whole of output to compare 






Second : Product Standardization 
How would you characterize the production of your company on the following 
standardization scale ? please tick one 
- Each unit custom- made. 
- Products differ but have common 
components. 
- Products basically alike , with only minor differences; e. g. models, add-on features. 
- Products completely standardized. I 
Number of employee in your company (in the site that you work in): 
I 1- 101-150 
3- 201 - 25C 






Thank you for answering this questionnaire, the following is a general 
questions about the questionnaire itself, will you please spend another minutes to 
answer the following items : 
Not too long Too long 
The length of the questionnaire I112131415671 
2- The time you spent in filling the questionnaire ............ Minutes 
3- Which, if any, of the questions were difficult to understand, why ? 
A-A- 18 
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4- Which, if any, of the response (scale) sections were difficult to understand, why? 
Any further suggestions 
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0 Attention to details organisational culture: Managers in high attention to details 
culture focus on accuracy and details. Managers are analytical, precise, and careftil. 
On the other hand, managers in low attention to detail are likely to pay less attention 
to detail and precision. 
0 Budget constrained style or budget emphasis: is a style of evaluation, it means 
superiors major concern when evaluating his subordinate is on the basis of his ability 
to meet budget targets 
0 Budget goal clarity refers to the extent to which budget goals are clear to those who 
are responsible for implementing them; it ranges from very ambiguous to very clear 
0 Budgetary Participation: the extent to which managers are involved in setting their 
department budgets and they can express frankly and freely their opinions and 
influence the budget figures 
0 Budgetary slack: the amount by which managers intentionally build excess 
requirements for resources into the budgets, or knowingly understate productive 
capability. 
0 Closed system culture: the organisation and its member feel to be closed and 
secretive, even among insider; only very special people fit into the organisation. New 
members need more than a year to feel at home 
0 Collectivism: a cultural dimension which reflects the relationship among individuals 
in a society. The interest of people in these societies prevails interest of individual. 
Every one seek the interest of himself and people around him. 
0 Consideration leadership: Consideration 'refers to the extent the leader exercises 
friendly relationships with his subordinates, depending on trust and respect for their 
feelings 
0 Contingency theory (general): its concept means that their is no universal system 
applicable in all circumstances, the most appropriate system is one which takes into 
consideration situational variables 
0 Contingency theory in management accounting: it is based on the premise that their is 
no universally appropriate accounting system which applies equally to all 
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Appendix -B 
organisations in all circumstances, rather, it is suggested that particular feature of an 
appropriate accounting system will depend upon the specific circumstances in which 
organisation find itself 
0 Culture: collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one 
human group from another 
0 Decentralisation: the extent to which decisions are taken by senior and middle 
management managers rather than top managers 
0 Differentiation: the difference in cognitive and emotional orientation among 
managers in different functional departments 
0 Dysfunctional behaviour: it is undertaken by subordinates to assist them in receiving 
favourable performance evaluation or to express, their attention against top 
management (e. g., information distortion, resistance) 
0 Employee oriented culture: concern for people, people feel that their personal 
problems are taken into account, the organisation takes a responsibility for employees 
welfare. The important decisions tend to be made by groups and committees. 
0 Environment: environment is thought of as the totality of physical and social factors 
that are taken directly into consideration in the decision making behaviour of 
individuals in the organisation. 
0 Femininity: stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and 
women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life 
0 Functional differentiation: the difference in cognitive and emotional orientation 
among managers in a different functional departments 
0 Heroes: Persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who process characteristics highly 
prised in the culture and serve as model for behaviour (e. g. people see same 
television shows and movies) 
0 Individualism: a cultural dimension which reflects the relationship among individuals 
in a society. The interest of individual in these societies prevails the interest people 
of. Every one seek the interest of himself and his immediate family. 
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0 Initiation structure: initiation structure refers mean that the leader is like structure his 
and his subordinates roles toward organisation goals 
0 Innovation organisation culture: managers in high innovative OC are expected to 
seek new opportunities, task risks, experiment, and unconstrained by formal polices 
and practices. Managers in low innovative OC are expected to value conservatism, to 
be rules-oriented, and to be risk-averse. 
0 Intervening variable: it is a variable that intervene the relationship between two 
variables, it is mean the relationship between two variables exist through a third one. 
its purpose to check how effect the direct effect between the two original variables 
has comparing with the indirect through the intervening one. It can be tested through 
some statistical technique such as path analysis 
0 Job oriented culture: concern for completing the job, people experience a strong 
pressure to complete the job, organisation does not take into account employees' 
personal problem. In such culture, important decisions tend to be made by individuals 
0 Leadership: Leadership may be considered as the process (act) of influencing the 
activities of an organised group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal 
achievement 
0 Locus of control: is a psychological and expectancy variable, its concern how people 
perceive events around them. In other word how people perceive the consequences of 
their action, is it due to fate (externals), luck or it is the results of their own action 
(internals) 
0 Loose control culture: People feel no one think of cost meeting times are only kept 
approximately, and jokes about the company and the job are frequent 
0 Masculinity: stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men 
are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are 
supposed to be more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life 
0 Moderating variable: it is the variable which moderate the relationship between two 
variables. When the relationship between two variables is not constant in all 
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circumstances, that mean there is a third variable which moderate these two variable 
and affect the sign of correlation and the degree of its effect 
0 Motives: learned influences on human behaviour that lead us to pursue particular 
goals because they are socially valued. 
0 Non-Accounting evaluation style: accounting data does not play an important when a 
manager is being evaluated 
0 non-locals are people who live in a culture not of their own of origin for some time. 
0 Normative culture: major emphasis is on correctly following organisation procedures, 
which are more important than results; in matters of business ethics and honesty, the 
unit's standards are high 
0 Open systems culture: Members consider both the organisation and its people open to 
newcomers and outsider; almost anyone would fit into the organisation, and new 
employees need only a few days to feel at home 
0 Parochial culture: People feel that organisation's norm cover their behaviour at home 
as well as on the job. When the company hire employees, it takes into account their 
social and family background as much as their job competence 
0 Path analysis: it is just an application of regression and correlation. It is actually 
based on regression analysis, but it can- provide a more useful graphic picture of 
relationships between several variables than is possible through other means 
0 Perceived environment uncertainty: the level to which managers perceive the 
environment in the area they work are vague and unclear. Any decisions they take 
they are not quite sure about its consequences. For example, it includes the nature of 
the industry itself whether it develop rapidly such as computers industry. It includes 
as well the political economical circumstances. - 
0 Power Distance: the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally 
0 Pragmatic units: major emphasis on meeting customer's needs, results are more 
important than correct procedures 
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0 Process automation: the level to which an object is being made by machine, it ranges 
from non-automation to fully automation. Automation means self-acting capability 
0 Process oriented culture: concern with mean, people perceive themselves as avoiding 
risks and making only a limited effort to their jobs, it is routine-based environment 
0 Professional culture: People consider their private lives their own business. When the 
company hire employees, it takes into account their job competence only 
0 Profit conscious evaluation style: the performance of a manager is evaluated on the 
basis of his ability to increase the general effectiveness of his department in the long 
run 
0 Results oriented culture: concern with goals, people perceive themselves as 
comfortable in unfamiliar situations 
0 Rituals: Collective activities that are technically superfluous but are socially essential 
within a culture, they are therefore carried out for their own sake (e. g. people perform 
the same sports and leisure activities) 
0 Routineness: it means how variety people perceive to their daily work, it ranges from 
they do same job every day to they have something different to do every day 
0 Social withdrawal: it is a type of dysfunctional behaviour and can be classified as a 
form of resistance. It can be vied as a number of indices which reflect the quality of 
relations between superiors and subordinates (e. g., subordinates' trust in, and respect 
for, superiors 
0 Symbols: Words, gestures, pictures, or objects that carry a particular meaning within 
a culture, (e. g. people dress the same, by same product and use the same fashionable 
words) 
0 Task environment: the set of stimuli to which an organisation is exposed and to 
which it attempts to respond. It also refers to the portion of the total environment that 
is relevant for organisational goal setting and goal attainnient. It includes: customer, 
suppliers of material labour, competitors, and regularity group such as governmental 
agencies and unions. 
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0 Tight control culture: People in such culture describe their work envirornnent as cost- 
conscious, meeting times are kept punctually, jokes about company and jobs are rare 
0 Uncertainty avoidance: The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by uncertain or unknown situations 
0 Values: Non-specific feelings of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, normal and 
abnormal, rational and irrational - feelings that are often unconscious and rarely 






Path Equations and Results 
T'his appendix shows the equations which have been developed to test the four 
sub-models shown in chapter five. Based on the explanation of those four sub- 
models, sixteen equations were used (A-C- I to A-C-16). It was mentioned in section 
5-3-2 (p. 5.10) that the effect of the contingency variables (size, environment 
uncertainty, technology) remain the same in all sub-models, therefore only one 
equation were used for this purpose which is A-C- 16. From figure 5.7 (p. 5.12) we 
find that budgetary participation affects the first group of intervening variables which 
consists of nine variables, therefore nine equations were used and they are A-C-7 to 
A-C-15. Then to test sub-model I which postulates that budgetary participation 
affects performance directly and indirectly through the first group of intervening 
variables and budget motivation, two equations were used and they are A-C-1 and A- 
C-5. 
To test sub-model 2 which postulates that budgetary participation affects 
satisfaction through the first group of intervening variables and budget motivation, 
two equations were used and they are A-C-5 which was also used in sub-model 1, in 
addition to another equation which is A-C-2. To test sub-model 3 which postulates 
that budgetary participation affects performance through the first group of 
intervening variables and budgetary slack, two equations were used and they are A- 
C-3 and A-C-6. Finally, to test sub-model 4 which postulates that budgetary 
participation affects satisfaction through the first group of intervening variables and 
budgetary slack, two equations were used. The first was A-C-6 which was also used 
in sub-model 3, in addition to another equation which is A-C4. The following part 
indicates these equations and their results. 
X17 ý-- P17.5 X5 + P17.6 X6 + P17.7 X7 + P17.8 X8 + P17.9 X9 + P17.10 XIO + P17.11 X1 I+ 
P17.12 X12 + P17.13 X13 + P17.14 X14 + P17.15 X15 + P17. aXa (A-C-1) 
X18-2 P18.5X5 +P18.6 X6+ P18.7 X7 + P18.8 X8 + P18.9 X9 + P18.10 XIO + P18.11 XI I+ 
P18.12 X12 + P18.13 X13 + P18.14 X14 + P18.15 X15 + P18. b Xb (A-C-2) 
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X17'*'ý P17.5 X5 + P17.6 X6 + P17.7 X7 + P17.8 X8 + P17.9 X9 + P17.10 XIO + P17.11 XI I+ 
P17.12 X12 + P17.13 X13 + P17.14 X14 + P17.16 X16 + Pl7c Xc (A-C-3) 
X18 =PIS. 5X5+P18.6X6+P18.7X7+P18.8X8+P18.9X9+PIS. IOXIO+P18. lI Xl I+ 
PI'S. 12 X12 + P18.13 X13 + P18.14 X14 + P18.16 X16 + P18. d Xd (A-C-4) 
X15 ý- P15.5 X5 + P15.6 X6 + P15.7 X7 + P15.8 X8 + P15.9 X9 + P15.10 XIO + P15.11 Xil + 
P15.12 X12 + P15.13 X13 + P15.14 X14 + P15. e 
Xe (A-C-5) 
X16 - P16.5 X5 + P16.6 X6 + P16.7 X7 + P16.8 X8 + P16.9 Xg + P16.10 XIO + P16.11 XI I+ 
P16.12 X12 + P16.13 X13 + P16.14 X14 + P16. f Xf (A-C-6) 
X6 ý P6.5 X5 + P6. g 
Xg (A-C-7) 
X7 = P7.5 X5 +P7. h Xh (A-C-8) 
X8 = P8.5 X5 + P8. j Xj (A-C-9) 
X9 = P9.5 X5 + P9. k Xk (A-C-10) 
XIO = PIO. 5 X5 + PIO-i Xi (A-C- 11) 
XI I =PII. SX5 +Pll. mXm 
(A-C-12) 
X12 =--P12.5 X5 + P12. n Xn (A-C-13) 
X13: -- P13.5 X5 + P13. o 
Xo (A-C-14) 
X14 = P14.5 X5+ P14. r Xr 
(A-C-15) 




X, =Organisation Size 
X2 = Environment Uncertainty 
X3 = Process Automation 
X4 = Product Standardisation 
X5 Budgetary Participation 
X6 Budget Emphasis 
X7 Consideration 
X8 Initiation Structure 
Xg Information Asymmetry 
XIO Budget Difficulty 
XII Budget Clarity 
X12 Locus of Control 
X13 Ability to Detect Slack 
X14 Job Difficulty 
X15 = Budget Motivation 
X16 = Budgetary Slack 
X17 = Performance 
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A-D- I 
Appendix D 
i No. of Table No. Description of Table hypotheses Notes 
A-D-I Moderating Effect of Budget Motivation on Performance H-II. 7 
A-D-2 Moderating Effect of Budget Motivation on Satisfaction H-11.8 
A-D-3 Moderating Effect of Budgetary Stack on Performance H-11. II 
A-D-4 Moderating Effect of Budgetary Slack on Satisfaction H-11.12 
A-D-5 Moderating Effect of Budget Emphasis on Performance H4.7a 
A-D-6 Moderating Effect of Budget Emphasis on Satisfaction H-1.7b 
A-D-7 Moderating Effect of Budget Emphasis on Motivation H-I. 8 
A-D-8 Moderating Effect of Consideration on Motivation H-I. 5 
A-D-9 Moderating Effect of initiation Structure on Motivation H4.5 
A-D- 10 Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Motivation H-1.9a 
r-Whole 
Measure 
A-D- II Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Slack H-1.9b Whole Measure 
A-D-12 Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Motivation H-1.9a Case One 
A-D-13 Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Motivation H-1.9a Case Two 
A-D-14 Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Slack H-1.9b Case One 
A-D- 15 Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on Slack H-1.9b Case Two 
A-D-16 Moderating Effect of Budget Difficulty on Motivation H41.3a 
A-D- 17 Moderating Effect of Budget Difficulty on Slack H-11.3b 
A-D- 18 Moderating Effect of Budget Clarity on Performance H-IlAa 
A-D-19 Moderating Effect of Budget Clarity on Satisfaction H-11.4b 
A-D-20 Moderating Effect of Locus of Control On Slack H-11.5 Internal Scheme 
A-D-21 Moderating Effect of Locus of Control On Slack H41.5 External Scheme 
A-D-22 Moderating Effect of Locus of Control On Slack H-II. 5 Whole Measure 
A-D-23 Moderating Effect of Supcriors'Ability to Detect Slack on Slack H-11.10 
A-13-24 Moderating Effect of Job Difficulty on Performance 
A-D-25 1 Moderating Effect of RAPM on Performance H-1.7a 
-4 




Variables Bt statistics Significance 
I British Y- Performance n-5 
Saudi 
n -. 41 
Arab British Saudi 
n-30 n-58 1 -41 
Arab 1 British Saudi 
n=30 n-58 n - 41 
Arab 
n- 30 
XI Budgetary Participation -0.837 -0.624 2.127 -1.73 -0.652 2.27 
, 0.089 ns 0.031 
X2 Budget Motivation -0.504 -0.29 0.792 -1.93 -0.721 1.64 0.058 ns ns 
XI * X2 0.019 0.009 -0.022 2.45 0.718 -1.6 0.017 ns 
Constant 66.8 65.73 -21.4 4.21 2.35 -0.662 0 0.024 0.51 
Table A-D-2 
Variables Bt statistics 
- 
Significance 
Y= Satisfaction British n- 60 
Saudi 
n-40 
Arab Brii7vs hT 
n-30 n- 60 
Saudi Arab 
n- 40 n-30 
British Saudi 
n- 60 n- 40, 
Arab 
n-30 
XI Budgetary Participation 0.835 1.38 0.539 0.993 1 1.58 0.384 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Motivation 0.27 0.416 -0.146 0.636 1.09 -0.202 ns ns ns 






0.005 -0.664 -1.21 








Variables Bt statistics Significance 













XI Budgetary Participation 
_ 
-0.381 -0.261 0.427 -1.026 -0.53 0.386 ns ns ns 
X2 Budgetary Slack . 1.007 -0.849 -0.179 -1.99 -1.15 -0.103 1 0.051 ns ns 
XI *X2 0.031 0.02 0.004 2.06 0.885 0.083 0.043 ns ns 
Constant 1 60.28 60.58 40.9 4.77 3.9 1.01 00 0.32 
Table A-D4 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 













XI Budgetary Participation 















XI * X2 -0.001 0.003 1 -0.036 -0.038 
0.148 -0.601 ns ns ns 
Constant 54.6 55.7 1 4.7 2.22 4.13 0.093 0.03 0 0.92 
Table A-D-5 













n- 59 n-46 
Arab 
n- 34 
X1 Budgetary Participation 0.029 0.782 0.09 0.094 1.16 0.136 ns 'ns ns 
X2 Budget Emphasis -3.22 3.92 -0.71 -1.39 0.743 -0.149 ns ns ns 
XI * X2 0.095 -0174 0.077 1.22 -1.04 0.483 ns ns ns 
Constant 29.2 47.1 43.67 5.36 1.37 
72.29 




















XI Budgetary Participation 0.179 0.71 0.01 0.415 1.31 0.01 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Emphasis -2.36 9.3 1.26 -0.797 1.86 0.18 ns 0.069 ns 
XI * X2 0.046 -0.11 0.11 0.437 -0.855 0.492 ns ns ns 
Constant 58.8 17.24 40.7 5.26 0.948 1.41 0 0.34 0.168 
Table A-D-7 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 












n- 62 n-45 
Arab 
n-32 
X1 Budgetary Participation -1.08 2.07 .0 485 -1.89 1.66 -0.732 0.063 ns ns 
X2 Budget Emphasis -6.65 17.18 -5.6 -1.64 1.95 -0.578 ns 0.057 ns 
XI * X2 0.269 v zw , 4 -0.47 0.25 1.88 -1.57 0.841 
T 
0.064 ns ns t 
Constant 8 6 -6.4 84.1 5.78 -0.176 2.42 0 0.86 0.022 
Table A-D-8 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 
Y- Budget Motivation 
I British Saudi 
n=62 n-44 
Arab British Saudi 
n-32 
-n-44 Arab British Saudi 
n- 32 n- 62 44 
Arab 
n- 32 
XI Budgetary Participation 1.04 -1.31 
1.07 -2.18 X2 Consideration 
0.628 1.52 -082 
0.408 1.37 -1.21 
0.368 ns ns ns 
0.198 ns ns ns 
XI 0 X2 -0.039 0.055 -0.012 -1.6 0.99 -ý. 2021 ns ns ns 
Constant 32.23 0.012 0.465 1.49 2.38 0.788, 
FO. 
139 0.022 0.437 
Table A-D-9 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 











British i Saudi 
n-62 n- 44 
Arab 
n- 32 
XI Budgetary Participation 0.859 -2.04 -0.677 1.21 -0.86 -0.383 ns ns ns 
X2 Initiation Structure 0.834 -2.96 -0.487 1 0.99 -1.26 -0.248 ns ris ns 
XI *X2 -0.032 0.074 1 0.028 -1.25 0.97 1 0.485 ns ns ns 




0)9 1.29 0.103 0.042 0.207 
TableA-D-10 
Variables IBt statistics Significance 












n- 62 n-45 
Arab 
n-32 
XI Budgetary Participation -0.255 -0.769 1.96 -0.305 -0.613 2.101 ns ns 0.045 
X2 Information Asymm. -0.164 -1.29 2.18 -0.208 -0.785 1.94 ns ns 0.062 
X1 *X2 0.008 0.039 -0.06 0.32 0.81 . 1.91 ns ns 0.065 




Variables Bt statistics Significance 










n- 62 n- 47 
Arab 
n-35- 
XI Budgetary Participation -1-005 -0.891 -0.226 -2.27 -1.37 -0.618 0.027 ns ns 
X2 Information Asymm. -0.668 . 1.31 0.024 -1.69 -1.56 0.061 0.097 ns ns 
XI * X2 0.029 0.04 0.002 2.21 1.67 0.171 0.031 ns ns 




Variables Bt statistics 
- 
Significance 















XI Budget 0.408 . 1.18 -0.012 0.664 -0.601 -0.011 ns ns ns 
X2 Information Asymm. 0.791 -2.21 -1.98 0.718 -0.628 -0.986 ns ns ns 
XI *X2 -0.025 0.052 0.053 -0.705 0.5 0.91 ns ns ns 
Constant 49.49 118.06 72.02 2.51 1.74 1.99 0.128 0.1 0.105 
Table A-D-13 
Variables Bt statistics 
Y- Budget Motivation 
British Saudi Arab British Saudi Arab 
n= 54 n=23 n=21 n-5 n- 23 n- 21 
Significance 
British Saudi Arab 
n- 54 n- 23 n- 21 
XI Budgetary Participation -0.527 1 -2.54 
_T 












XI * X2 
T0.016-1 0.08 -0.12 0.417 0.713 . 1.62 
t 
ns ns ns 
Constant 58.89 108.65 -0.843 0.155 0.342 0.411 -74.4 1.44 1 0.975 
Table A-D-14 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 















X1 Budgetary Participation 5.9 1.23 -0.36 1 0.73 0.93 -0.92 ns ns ns 
X2 Information Asymm. 8.01 3 -0.01 0.947 1.33 -0.013 ns ns ns 
XI * X2 -0.31 . 0.09 0.013 -0.821 -1.44 0.562 ns ns ns 
Constant . 124.9 -16.78 28.03 -0.722 -0.363 1.99 0.602 0.722 0.102 
Table A-D-15 
Variables t statistics B Significance 
Y= Budgetary Slack 
British 
n-5 
Saudi Arab 1 British 





British I Saudi 
n-55 n- 24 
Arab 
n-24 
XI Budgetary Participation -1.3 0.257 -2.23 0.627 0.305 0.03 ns ns 
X2 Information Asymm. -0.839 0.683 0.494 -1.56 0.557 0.559 ns ns ns 




Constant 53.22 1 . 8.18 
1 0.006 1 0.821 10-26 2.88 -0.229 0.359 




Variables Bt statistics Significance 













n- 63 n- 43 
Arab 
n-31 
XI Budgetary Participation -0.499 2.74 0.875 -0.492 1.59 0.754 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Difficulty 0.012 4.56 1.48 -0.007 1.59 0.539 ns ns ns 
XI *X2 0.023 -0.142 1 -0.04 
0.396 
1 . 
1.46 -0.552 ns ns ns 
Constant 63.26 . 19.91 
1 37.89 1.98 1 -0.39 0.94 0.052 0.699 0.355 
Table A-D-17 
Variables B t statistics Significance 















XI Budgetary Participation 0.135 -0.238 -0.435 0.302 -0.297 -1.03 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Difficulty -0.412 -0.447 -0.604 -0.503 -0.328 -0.591 ns ns ns 
XI OX2 -0.006 1 0.023 0.019 -0.26 0.523 
ý. 
633 ns ns ns 
Constant 31.12 25.38 36.76 2.205 1.009 2.57 0.031 0.319 0.015 
Table A-13-18 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 





Arab ;I British 









XI Budgetary Participation 





0.864 1.68 1 -0.288 







X1 * X2 -0.011 0.023 -0.028 -0.524 0.41 -0.435 ns ns ns 
Constant 30.3 52.47 i 11.8 'A 77 196 0.318 0 0.056 0.753 
Table A-D-19 













n-61 I n-43 
Arab 
n-31 
XI Budgetary Participation 0.194 -0.648 -0-77 0.419 -0.952 -0.489 
_ 4 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Clarity 0.438 -0.58 -1.38 0.378 -0.406 -0.438 ns ns ns 
XI * X2 -0.001 0.048 0.078 -0.036 1 1.03 0.8 2 ns ns ns 
Constant 48.58 62.8 65.3 3.47 2.76 1.23 0.001 0.009 0.229 
Table A-D-20 
Variables BIt statistics Significance 





Arab I British 






n- 62 n-48 
Arab 
n-35 
XI Budgetary Participation 1.6 1.62 -0.346 2.6 1.69, -0.454 0.011 0.096 ns 
X2 Internal Control 1.27 1.37 -0.108 2.14 1.71 -0.177 0.037 0.092 ns 
XI *X2 8 0.003 -2.7 1.55 0.213 0.009 ns ns 




Variables Bt statistics Significance 












n- 34 n- 62 n-46 
Arab 
n-34 
XI Budgetary Participation -1.26 1 0.331 -0.641 -2.75 1 
1.01 -1.55 0.008 ns ns 
X2 External Control -1.34 
! 
0.637 -0.624 -2.08 1.35 -1.01 0.042 ns ns 
XI *X2 1 O. 
WtO. 
008 0.022 2.71 -0.588 1.33 0.009 ns ns 
Constant 57.6 3.5 41.41 3.63 0.327 1 2.7 1 0.001 0.26- 0.188 
Table A-D-22 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 












n- 61 n-47 
Arab 
n-34 
XI Budgetary Participation 1.98 0.482 0.65 2.88 0.516 0.908 0.005 ns ns 
X2 Locus of Control 1 




. 25.14 17.7 
0.262 2.23 1 -0.03 
-4 
-0.01 -2.95 -0.343 
7.6 -1.11 0.582 
081 0.029 ns I ns 
- 
. 1.09 0.005 ns ns 
0-564--T 0.321 0.269 0.75 
Table A-D-23 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 
dr-itis- WIFT- Saudi Arab British Saudi Arab British Saudi j kab Y- Budgetary Slack 
n- 59 n-48 n- 34 n=59 n-48 n-34 n-59 n-48 I n-34 
XI Budgetary Participation 0.339 -0.411 0.38 0.792 -0.606 0.73 ns ns ns 
X2 Ability to Dtect Sic. 0.738 -1.001 1.12 0.866 -0.729 1.01 ns ns ns 
XI *X2 -0.029 0.035 -0.037 -1.01 0.844 -1.12 ns ns ns 
Constant 15.47 33.7 12.01 1.21 1.5 0.712 0.229 0.138 0.482 
Table A-D-24 
Variables Bt statistics Significance 
British Saudi Arab British Saudi Arab British Saudi Arab Y= Performance 11 
-46 n-58 n-46 n-32 n-18 ý_n-46 
_n-32 
1 n-58- n-----, 
-n-32 XI Budgetary Participation 0.544 -0.251 0.422 1.54 
1 
-0.325 0.738 ns ns 
- 
ns 
X2 Job Difficulty 0.467 -0.613 -0.265 0.522 -0.324 -0.175 ns ns ns 
XI *X2 -0.015 0.03 -0.012 -0.532 0.521 -0.266 ns ns 
T 
ns 
Constant 29.92 51.53 1 47.03 2.62 2.02 1 2.29 0.011 0.05 
1 0.029 
Table A-D-25 
Variables Bt statistics Significan e 
Y= Global Performance 
British Saudi 
n-55 n-44 
Arab British i Saudi Saudi 
n- 44 
! 
n-33 , n-55 
i 
n-44 
I Arab ab 
n-33 n 33 




I n-33 I 
XI Budgetary Participation -0.056 0.023 -0.04 -0.98 05 0.254 -0 -0.63 
1 
ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Emphasis (RAPM) -0.353 -0.003 -0.251 -1.6 0 -0.024 -0 -0.85 ns ns ns 
X1 *X2 0.012 -0.0014 0.009 1.7 -0.121 1.08 0.088 ns ns S 
Constant 6.88 
1 5.55 1 7.17 4.11 1 1.88 1 3.04 0 0.067 0.005 )J 05 
A-D-7 
Appendix D 
11 Table A-D-26 
11 
















XI Budgetary Participation -0.167 0.062 0.136 -0.295 1 0.092 -0.133 ns ns ns 
X2 Budget Emphasis (RAPM) -2.18 1.43 -0.558 -1.03 0.513 -0.155 ns ns ns 






0.958 0.186 0.742 ns ns ns 




1.84 1.57 0 0.072 0.127 
A -D- 8 
Appendix E 
04ppeadix e. 
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A-E-1 
Appendix E 
Table Number Hypothesis Number Explanation 
A-E-I H-1.5 The intervening role of initiation structure between BP and motivation 
A-E-2 H-1.5 The intervening Tole of consideration between BP and motivation 
A-E-3 H4.7a The intervening role of budget emphasis between BP and performance 
A-E-4 H4.7b The intervening role of budget emphasis between BP and satisfaction 
A-E-5 H4.8 The intervening role of budget emphasis between BP and motivation 
A-E-6 H4.9a The intervening role of information asymmetry between BP and motivation 
A-E-7 H-1.9b The intervening role of information asymmetry between BP and slack 
A-E-8 H-I. II The intervening role ofjob difficulty between BP and performance 
A-E-9 H-R. 3a The intervening role of budget difficulty between BP and motivation 
A-E-10 H-U. 3b The intervening role of budget difficulty between BP and slack 
A-E- II H41.4a The intervening role of budget clarity between BP and performance 
A-E-12 H-11.4b The intervening role of budget clarity between BP and satisfaction 
A-E-13 H-II. 5 The intervening role of locus of control between BP and slack 
A-E-14 H-U. 7 The intervening role of motivation between BP and performance 
A-E-15 H-Il. 8 The intervening role of motivation between BP and satisfaction 
A-E-16 H-11.10 The intervening role of ability to detect slack between BP and slack 
A-E-17 H-11. II The intervening role of slack between BP and performance 
A-E- 18 H-11.12 The intervening role of slack between BP and satisfaction 
A-E-2 
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